Approximation algorithms for distributed and selfish agents by Mirrokni, Vahab S
Approximation Algorithms for Distributed and
Selfish Agents
by
Vahab S. Mirrokni
B.S., Sharif University of Technology, 2001
Submitted to the Department of Mathematics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLO
Tlinp 90nn.
© Vahab S. Mirrokni, 2005. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and
distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document
in whole or in part.
OK) /A 1
Author ................................... .... .
Department of Mathematics
d3 April 25, 2005
C ertified by ................................
_.7--
Michel X. Goemans
Professor of Applied Mathematics
"2 . ...............Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by ..................A ccep ted by ..................... ....................................
Rodolfo Ruben Rosales
Chairman, Applied Mathematics C,ommittee
Accepted by............ ........... .........
Pavel I. Etingof
Chairman, Department Committee on Graduate Students
ARCHIVES

-,XJl Sh .5.1 5U 4
4 u sAW#:
3
4
Approximation Algorithms for Distributed and Selfish
Agents
by
Vahab S. Mirrokni
Submitted to the Department of Mathematics
on April 25, 2005, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Abstract
Many real-world systems involve distributed and selfish agents who optimize their own
objective function. In these systems, we need to design efficient mechanisms so that
system-wide objective is optimized despite agents acting in their own self interest. In
this thesis, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for
various combinatorial optimization problems in such systems.
First, we investigate the distributed caching and a general set of assignment prob-
lems. We develop an almost tight LP-based 1- - -approximation algorithm and
a local search - -approximation algorithm for these problems. We also design effi-
cient decentralized mechanisms for these problems and study the convergence of the
corresponding games.
In the following chapters, we study the speed of convergence to high quality solu-
tions on (random) best-response paths of players. First, we study the average social
value on best response paths in basic-utility, market sharing, and cut games. Then,
we introduce the sink equilibrium as a new equilibrium concept. We argue that, un-
like Nash equilibria, the selfish behavior of players converges to sink equilibria and
all strategic games have a sink equilibrium. To illustrate the use of this new concept,
we study the social value of sink equilibria in weighted selfish routing (or weighted
congestion) games and valid-utility (or submodular-utility) games. In these games,
we bound the average social value on random best-response paths for sink equilibria..
Finally, we study cross-monotonic cost sharings and group-strategyproof mech-
anisms. We study the limitations imposed by the cross-monotonicity property on
cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial optimization games including set cover
and metric facility location. We develop a novel technique based on the probabilistic
method for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic
cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight bounds for these games. At the
end, we extend some of these results to group-strategyproof mechanisms.
Thesis Supervisor: Michel X. Goemans
Title: Professor of Applied Mathematics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past fifty years, computer scientists have been trying to overcome different
computational constraints in developing efficient algorithms. The main features tra-
ditionally characterizing efficient algorithms are their running time and space com-
plexity. 'However, real-world systems require other important features such as the
ability to run as a mechanism in the presence of selfish agents and the ability to run
as a decentralized algbrithm in a distributed setting. Complexity theory has taught
us that designing efficient algorithms'with these features is hard. Thus, it sometimes
becomes necessary to settle for approximate solutions. In this thesis, we focus on de-
veloping approximation algorithms for various combinatorial optimization problems
with these features.
With the Internet developing as the single most important arena for resource shar-
ing among parties with diverse and selfish interests, traditional algorithmic and dis-
tributed systems approaches are insufficient. The Internet embodies a new paradigm
in which distributed computation is performed by self-interested agents. Unable to
control the algorithms and strategies employed by distributed users, we must instead
design incentives to promote effective system-wide coordination. The goal of mecha-
nism design is to implement some rules so that a system-wide objective is optimized
despite agents acting in their own self interest. In this thesis, we consider various
distributed settings in the Internet and wireless networks and design efficient ap-
proximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms with a provable performance
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guarantee in terms of a desired objective function. In this chapter, we first give an
overview of the results throughout the thesis. Then, we define some preliminaries that
we need throughout the thesis. We suggest unfamiliar readers to first read Section 1.2
to learn the definitions.
1.1 Results and the Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organized in six chapters. In this part of the introduction, we survey the
main results of the other chapters (sometimes with informal definitions). Some formal
preliminaries are also given at the end of the introduction in Section 1.2. Each chapter
also contains an introduction and a set of preliminaries with formal definitions. We
emphasize that in order to understand the details of the results of each chapter, the
reader may need to read the formal definitions in the corresponding chapter.
In Chapter 2, we address the content distribution in service provider networks
and design approximation algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for a distributed
caching problem and a general set of assignment problems called the separable assign-
ment problems (SAP). Here, we give an informal definition of the distributed caching
problem1 . A service provider has a limited set of file caches. Each cache location
has a storage capacity and a bandwidth limit. There are a set of requests, each of a
particular file type, and a particular bandwidth. Given a set of requests for file types,
where each file type has a size, the job of the service provider is to decide 1) which file
types to store at each cache location, subject to storage capacity; and 2) which subset
of requests to answer, subject to file selection at the cache, and available bandwidth.
While the storage space for a particular type in a cache location is independent of
the number of requests for that type, the bandwidth required to serve requests of the
same type is the sum of bandwidth requirements for the individual requests. For each
potential assignment of cache to request, there is an associated profit: the profit of
assigning a request to a cache depends on the connection cost for the request to the
cache. The goal is to maximize the profit of providing requests. DCP is a special case
1 For formal definition, see Chapter 2.
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of a general class of assignment problems called the separable assignment problems.
In a separable assignment problem, we are given a set of n bins and a set of m items,
and a value fij for assigning item j to bin i. We are also given a separate packing
constraint for each bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal family Zi of feasible subsets of items for bin
i. The goal in the SAP is to find an assignment of items to bins with the maximum
aggregate value. We call this separate packing constraint for each bin, the single-bin
subproblem.
In an instance of the single-bin subproblem, we are given a bin i, a set of items with
value vj for each item j, and a packing constraint for bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal family i
of feasible subsets of items that can be packed in bin i. A -approximation algorithm
for 3 < 1 for the single-bin subproblem is an algorithm that outputs a feasible subset
of items whose value is at least p times the value of the feasible packing of items in
bin i with the maximum value.
Separable assignment problems include the distributed caching problems and the
well-known maximum generalized assignment problem (GAP): Given a set of bins and
a set of items that'have a different size and value for each bin, pack a maximum-valued
subset of items into the bins.
Given a -approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem, we design a
polynomial-time LP-based ((1- 1)/) - 6-approximation algorithm and a local search
combinatorial /i -5-approximation algorithm for SAP, for any > 0. This givesp+1
a (- - c)-approximation algorithm and a local search - c-approximation algo-
rithm for GAP and DCP, for any > 0, as the single-bin subproblem for GAP and
DCP admit a PTAS. This result is an improvement over the best previously known
approximation algorithm for GAP (an LP-based -approximation) by Shmoys and
Tardos [82] and Chekuri and Khanna [10]. Our algorithm is based on rounding a new
linear programming relaxation, with a provably better integrality gap.
At the end of Chapter 2, we also design decentralized mechanisms for the DCP
(that can be generalized for problems in SAP). In this part, we assume that caches are
selfish entities that want to maximize their own reward. This setting is particularly
justified in the context of 3G cellular networks. We define the following rewarding
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mechanism for the distributed caching problem: Let cache locations decide on the set
of file types and files that they can provide based on their constraints. We assume that
the profit of each file request goes to the cache location that has the least connection
cost to this file request and can provide it and prove that the price of anarchy of a
(mixed) Nash equilibrium of the corresponding games is at most 2. We also study the
convergence in the general DCP games and the complexity of finding Nash equilibria
in these games. We show that pure Nash equilibria may not exist in this game.
We prove existence of exponentially long best-response walks to equilibria using a
reduction from a PLS-complete problem.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we study convergence in competitive games. We study the
speed of convergence to approximate solutions in general classes of games including
the cut games, basic-utility games, market sharing games, selfish routing games, and
a general set of submodular-utility games (called the valid-utility games). We in-
vestigate the social value of states after a nunmber of,best responses of players as a
measure of the cost of the lack of coordination in such games. ThIis work deviates
from other attempts to study the outcome of the selfish behavior of players in non-
cooperative games in that we dispense with the insistence upon only evaluating Nash
equilibria. Our basic model uses the underlying best-response graph induced by the
selfish behavior of the players. In this model, we study the expected social value after
a random sequence of best responses or the value of the social function after multiple
rounds of best response behavior.
In Chapter 3, we study the speed of convergence in several subclasses of the
potential games, i.e., games in which selfish behavior of players converge to a pure
Nash equilibrium 2. First, we study the convergence in the cut game. We prove fast
convergence to constant-factor approximate solutions on random best-response walks
in these games. Then we exhibit exponentially long fair best-response walks with
poor social value in this game. In addition, we suggest a way to modify the game to
enforce fast convergence to constant-factor solutions after one round of best responses
of players in any order. In basic-utility games, we prove fast convergence to - -
2 For the formal definitions, see Section 1.2.
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approximate solutions after a polynomial-size random best-response walk. Finally, we
prove that in market sharing games, after just one round of iterative selfish behavior,
the social value is within (o) of the optimal social value.
In Chapter 4, we study convergence in games with cycles of best responses. In
these games, a sequence of best responses may converge to a sink equilibrium. A
sink equilibrium is a set of strategy profiles or a set of states that is closed under
the best responses of players. We introduce this new equilibrium concept and define
it formally and study the social value of sink equilibria in comparison to the opt-
mail social value. In particular, we measure the social value of states after a random
sequence of best responses of players and bound the expected social value of states in
sink equilibria 3. We study a weighted unsplittable selfish routing game and bound the
expected social value of states in any sink equilibrium of this game. An implication
of our result is that in weighted selfish routing games, if the delay functions of edges
of the network are bounded-degree polynomial functions and we let players play their
best responses in a;random order, after a polynomial number of best-response moves,
the total delay of players is a constant-factor approximation of the total delay of the
optimal routing. This is in contrast to the negative result of Fabrikant et al. [15]
that shows the existence of exponential best-response walks to Nash equilibria. Thus,
even though the convergence to pure Nash equilibria might be poor, the convergence
to approximately good solutions is fast. Finally, in Chapter 4, we show that even
though the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria in valid-utility games is , players
may converge to a set of states with social value of that of the optimum. This
shows that even in games with small price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria,
selfish behavior of players may converge to a set of states with poor social value. In
addition, using a reduction from a PLS-complete problem, we show existence of states
that are exponentially far from any sink equilibrium in valid-utility games.
In Chapter 5, we study cross-monotone cost sharings and group-strategyproof
mechanisms4 . A cost sharing scheme is a set of rules defining how to share the
3 For the formal definitions, see Chapter 4.
4 For the formal definitions of these concepts, see Chapter 5.
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cost of a service (often computed by solving a combinatorial optimization problem)
amongst serviced customers. A cost sharing scheme is cross-monotonic if it satisfies
the property that everyone is better off when the set of people who receive the service
expands. A main application of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes is in the design
group-strategyproof mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms that are truthful for any coalition
of players. An example of the use of cost sharings in mechanism design is in sharing
the cost of multicast transmissions [44, 21]. We study the limitations imposed by the
cross-monotonicity property on cost-sharing schemes for several combinatorial opti-
mization games including edge cover, vertex cover, set cover, metric facility location,
maximum flow, arborescence packing, and maximum matching. We develop a novel
technique based on the probabilistic method for proving upper bounds on the budget-
balance factor of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, deriving tight or nearly-tight
bounds for each game that we study.
For the set cover garre, that generalizes many of the above games, we show that
no cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme can recover more than an O( fraction of
the total cost, and thus we can not hope to use a set-cover cost sharing scheme as
a black box for the cost sharing schemes of covering games. For the vertex cover
game, we show no cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme can recover more than a
O(n-1/3), demonstrating that cross-monotonicity is strictly harder to achieve than
the core property (vertex cover games have a solution in the core that is 1/2-budget
balanced). For the facility location game, we show that there is no cross-monotonic
cost sharing scheme that recovers more than a third of the total cost. This result
together with a recent 1/3-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme of
Pal and Tardos [69] closes the gap for the facility location game.
1.2 Preliminaries
An a-approximation algorithm A for a maximization (minimization) problem is a
polynomial-time algorithm that for every instance of the problem computes a solution
whose cost is at least (at most) times the cost of the optimal solution on that
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instance. We say that is the approximation factor or the approximation ratio
of algorithm A. In particular, a > 1 for minimization problems and a < 1 for
maximization problems.
Now, we define game theoretic notations that we need in this thesis. For a more
complete description of these concepts, we refer to the text books [68] and [25].
Strategic Game. A strategic game is defined as a tuple (U, {Fili U},
{ai()li C U}) where (i) U is the set of n players or agents, (ii) Fi is a family of
feasible (pure) strategies or actions for player i and (iii) ai : IEUFi - R+ U {O} is the
(private) payoff or utility function for agent i, given the set of strategies of all players.
P'layer i's strategy is denoted by si Fi. A strategy profile or a (strategy) state,
denoted by S = (Si, 2.. ., s), is a vector of strategies of players. i corresponds to
a null or empty strategy for player i. Also let S s := (l,..., si_-1, si+1, k),
i.e., the strategy profile obtained from S if agent i changes its strategy from si to
s/. The vector of strategies of players except player i is denoted by by S-i
(s1,... ,si_1, ,si+1,... ,Sn). Also let F := liYvUFi be the set of all possible strat-
egy profiles.
Non-cooperative Game. In a non-cooperative game, it is assumed that each agent
wishes to maximize its own payoff. In other words, agents are selfish and given the
strategy profile for other players, they play a strategy that maximizes their own utility
function. For a strategy profile S = (sl, 2,..., sn), an improvement move of player i
is a strategy si such that ai(SEs'i) > Ci(S). For a strategy profile S = (si, 2,. .,s),
a strict improvement move of player i is a strategy s such that ai(S ® s) > cai(S).
Also, for a strategy profile S = (sl, s2,...,sn) a best response of player i in S is a
strategy s Fi such that for any strategy si C Fi, ai(S ® s) > i(S ® si). Note
that a best response is an improvement move.
(Pure) Nash equilibria. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) of a strategic
game is a strategy profile in which each player plays his best response. More formally,
S = (, 2,. . , s,) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if for all i U and
for any strategy sC e Fi, ai(S) > ai(S e s).
M/ixed Nash equilibria. A mixed (randomized) strategy for player i is a probability
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distribution ri : Fi - IWR+ U {0} over pure strategies where ESFi lri(Si) = 1. A mixed
strategy profile, denoted by P = (7r, 7r 2 ,... , rn), is a vector of mixed strategies of all
players. For a mixed strategy profile P the probability of realizing a pure strategy pro-
file S = (sl,..., s,) is pP(sl,.. ., s?) := IiEuTri(si). The expected payoff of player i in
the mixed strategy profile P is i (P) := Es1cF 1 ,...,snGFn pP(Sl,..., Sn)ai(s1, 2,... Sn).
Similar to the above definition of pure Nash equilibrium, we can define a mixed Nash
equilibrium. A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile in which
each player does not have an incentive to play a different mixed strategy and improve
her expected payoff. Nash [64] proved that any non-cooperative strategic game pos-
sesses a mixed Nash equilibrium. We denote Nash equilibrium by NE and the pure
strategy Nash equilibrium by PSNE.
State Graph. In order to model the selfish behavior of players, we use the underlying
state graph. Each vertex in the state graph represents a strategy profile or a state
S = (s1, 2 ... s n). The, arcs in the state graph correspond to best-response moves
by the players. Formally, the state graph, ) = (, E), of a strategic game g, is an
arc-labeled directed graph, where the vertex set F. correspondis to the set of strategy
profiles or states in 9, and there is an arc from state S to state S' with label i if the
only difference between S and S' is in the strategy of player i; and player i plays his
best response or one of his best responses in strategy profile S 5 .
Best-Response Walk. Observe that the state graph will contain loops. A best-
response walk is a directed walk in the state graph. We say that a player i plays in
the best-response walk 7', if at least one of the edges of P is labeled i.
Social Value. The social (utility) function or social value, denoted by : EuFi 
R, is defined for all strategy profiles in a strategic game. The optimal strategy profile
is the strategy profile that optimizes the social value. The optimal strategy profile is
called the optimal solution. Also, the social value of the optimal solution, denoted by
OPT, is the optimum. Also let y,(S) := y(S d s') - -'(S), i.e., the increase in the
5In the definition of the best-response moves and the state graph, we only consider the myopic
best responses. Other models can be considering nonmyopic players who can predict the responses
of other players and play a strategy that gives more payoff in the long-term and not only at the
current strategy profile.
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social value if player i plays s. The expected social value of a mixed Nash equilibrium
= (iT.. .( ,rn.) iS y(P) ,):= SF...slF P (S1,.. Sn)Y(Sl,. ,S).
Price of Anarchy. The major tool for analyzing the lack of coordination for some
games is the notion of the price of anarchy in a game [53, 70]. Given a strategic game,
g(U, {Fili e U}, {c()i E U}), and a maximization social function y: iuFi -- I,
the price of anarchy, denoted by poa(g, y), is the worst ratio between the optimum
and the social value of a pure Nash equilibrium [70]6. Formally, if gf is the set of
all pure Nash equilibria, then poa(g,,y) := PT Similarly, if P is the set of
all mixed Nash equilibria, the price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria is equal to
OmiPT() Also, the price of anarchy for a minimization social function y is defined
rninpe-P Y( P) '
as maxpep Y(P)
OPT
Submodular Set Functions. A function f of the form 2 -, I + U {0} is called a
set function on the ground set V. A set function f : 2V - R+ U {0} is submodular if
for any two sets A, B C V, f(A) -f(B) > f(A n B) + f(A U B). A set function f,
is non-decreasing if f(X) < f(Y) for any X C Y C V.
Valid-Utility Game. One class of games that we consider in different chapters of
this thesis is the class of valid-utility games introduced by Vetta [87]. We will use
the definition of these games in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Here, we describe an abstract
definition of these games and refer the reader to the paper by Vetta [87] and Goemans
et al. [29] for several examples of these games. In these games, for each player i, there
exists a ground set V1. Note that Vi's may intersect. We denote by V the union of
ground sets of all players, i.e., V = UiuvVi7. The feasible strategy set Fi of player i is
a subset of the power set of V1, 2i that contains the empty set 0 which corresponds
to having no action. Thus, the strategy si of player i is a subset of Vi (si C Vi). In
order to define these games, we need the following definitions.
Given a vector S = (s ,..., sn), where si is a subset of the ground set V (si C Vi), the
set 'Hs = {(i, j) : i U, j si} is called the pair set for vector S. Note that S may or
6In this thesis, we use the term, price of anarchy, for pure Nash equilibria. For mixed Nash
equilibria, we use the term, price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria. In some other places, the
price of anarchy is defined for mixed Nash equilibria.
7 We can define the valid-utility games by setting all ground sets Vi = V. But for later convenience,
we let the ground set of player i be V/.
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may not be a feasible strategy profile. Given a function f : · iEvu2v - R + U {O}, the
corresponding set function fS of f is a set function of the form 2 - R + U {O} where
-I = {(i,j) : i E U,j V} and f(7s) = f(S). In other words, for a set A C R,
fS(A) = f((al, a2 ,..., a)) if ai = {j (i,j) E A} Here, we assume that the social
function y is of the form ieU2v -- R+ U {O} instead of the form IIiuF -- R+ U {O}.
Let (U, {Fili c U}, {ai()li U}) be a non-cooperative strategic game where
Fi C 2¼v is a family of feasible strategies for player i. Let V = UiGuVi and let the
social function be y : Hiu 2 v R+ U {O}. is a valid-utility game if it satisfies the
following properties:
1) Submodular and Non-decreasing Social Function: -y, the corresponding set
function of y over the set N = {(i,j) : i E U,j E V}, is submodular and non-
decreasing.
2) Vickrey Condition: The payoff of a player is at least the difference in the social
function when the player participates versus when :it does not participate, i.e.,
ai(S) > '(S ® 0i). In basic-utility games, this is an equality, i.e., Ci(S)
,s (S D i).
3) Cake Condition: For any strategy profile, the sum of the payoffs of players
should be less than or equal to the social function for that strategy profile,
i.e., for any strategy profile S, Eiu cai(S) < (S).
This framework encompasses a wide range of games including the facility location
games, the traffic routing games, auctions [87], market sharing games (described in
Chapter 2), and distributed caching games (described in Chapter 2). Vetta [87]
proved that the price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria in valid-utility games is
at most 2. While proving theorems about valid-utility and basic-utility games, we
use the following notation: for two vectors S = (s ,..., s ) and S' = (si,.. ., s), we
define S U S' := (sl U s1,..., sn U s). Also we define S U s := (s, s2,.., si-1, Si U
Sir Si+1, · · · Sn).
Potential Game. Potential games are games in which any sequence of strict im-
provement moves by players converges to a pure Nash equilibrium. Equivalently, in
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potential games, there is no cycle of strict improvement moves of players. This is
equivalent to the existence of a potential function pot : liUVFi - R+ U {0 with
an upper bound that is strictly increasing after any strict improvement move. Exact
potential games are a subclass of potential games for which there exists a potential
function such that in any strict improvement move, the increase in the payoff of a
player is equal to the increase in the potential function.
Congestion Game. Consider a set U of n players and a set V of elements; these
elements are called factors in the original work of Rosenthal [76]. Let Fi C 2V be
a family of subsets of elements. For each element f V, let cf N -- R+ U {0}
be a congestion function. A strategic game g(U, {Fili U}, {ci()li C U}) is called
a congestion game if F C 2V, and for a strategy profile, S = (sl,..., sr), ai(S) =
LEfsi Cf (nf (S)) where nf (S) is the number of players that contains f in their strategy.
Rosenthal [76] proved that congestion games are exact potential games. For the sake
of completeness, we show the potential function for this game. The potential function
is pot(S) = f EfI(S ) cf(t). Let i be a player who changes his strategy from si
in S to s and increases his payoff. The change in the potential function is equal to
pot(SDs'i)-pot(S) = EZfsi cf(Ssi)-Efesis, i cf(S) -- Li(Ssi)-a i(S). Thus,
if player i increases his payoff by changing his strategy, the potential function also
increases by the same value. This shows that congestion games are exact potential
games. Monderer and Shapley [60] proved that congestion games are equivalent to
the class of exact potential games.
In the formulation of congestion games, instead of a congestion function, we may
consider a delay function, If : N -- R + U {0} for each element. In this case, given a
strategy S = (sI,.. ., s) of players, the delay of player i is li(S) = Efs,, If(nf(S))
where nf(S) is the number of players who has f in their strategy. The goal of
each player is to minimize his delay (instead of maximizing his payoff). By setting
cf(x) = -If(x) and ai(S) = -li(S), we can show that these two formulations of
congestion games are equivalent in that we can find a one-to-one correspondence O
between the vertices of the state graphs of these two games such that if there exists
an edge from S to S' with label i in the state graph of the first game, then there exists
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an edge between vertices V(u) and ~b(v) with the same label i. One of the well-known
congestion games is the selfish routing game [78]. In this game8 , the elements of the
game are edges of a directed network. Each player i wants to route a unit amount of
flow from a source si to a destination, ti. The set of feasible strategies of a player is
the set of directed paths from si to ti. The delay of an edge is a function of the total
number of players that use this edge in their path. The delay of a player is the sum
of the delay of the edges on its path.
Local Search Problems and the Class PLS. The class of Polynomial Local Search
problems (PLS) is introduced by Johnson, Papadimitriou, and Yannakakis [47]. A
local search problem is denoted by L and is given by a set of instances I(L). Each
instance I E I(L) is given by a tuple I = (i,y: i - R+ U {O},N : FI - 2' I )
where (i) FI is the set of feasible solutions to instance I, (ii) (F) is the value of
solution F E I, and (iii) N- Fi - 2 is a neighborhood function, that is, for
any feasible solution F FI, it gives a set of feasible solutions that are in the
neighborhood of F (in other words, this set of feasible solutions can be reached
from F only by one local operation). The local search problem is to find a local
optimal solution for any given instance of L, that is, given an instance I GE (L),
a feasible solution F CE F such that no feasible solution in the neighborhood of F
has value more than y(F). The global optimization problem is to find a feasible
solution F G Fi with the maximum value y(F) for any given instance I of L. A
local search problem L is in class PLS if for any instance I E I(L), (i) a feasible
solution in FI is polynomially computable, (ii) for any solution F GE F, y(F) can
be computed in polynomial time, and (iii) a polynomial function is given that for
any solution F CE F either determines that F is a local optimal solution, or returns
F' E NI(F) with y(F') > y(F). Therefore, for any local search problem in PLS, given
any instance I and any feasible solution F E F1 , it can be checked in polynomial
time if F is a local optimal solution or not, and if it is not, a solution F' in the
neighborhood of F (F' N(F)) can be found such that y(F') > 7y(F). Many well-
sIn fact, we describe the atomic version of the selfish routing game in which there are finite
number of players. The other variant of the selfish routing game is the nonatomic variant in which
there exist infinite number of infinitesimal players each with a small load.
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known local search problems are in PLS; For example, the Max-SAT problem with
the flip neighborhood, and the Max-Cut problem with the swapping neighborhood.
The Max-Cut local search problem with swapping neighborhood is as follows: Given
an edge-weighted graph G and a cut, the local operations are to switch one node from
one side of the cut to the other side. The class PLS has its own type of reduction
and its own complete problems. Formally, a local search problem L in PLS is PLS-
complete, if using a polynomial-time algorithm to find a local optimal solution of any
instance of L, we can design a polynomial-time algorithm to find the local optimal of
any problem in PLS. Johnson, Papadimitriou, and Yannakakis [47] introduced this
class of problems and proved that the Max-SAT problem with flip neighborhood is
PLS-complete. They also introduced the concept of the PLS reduction by which one
can prove that a local search problem L' is PLS-complete by reducing a PLS-complete
problem to L'. It is not known if PLS-complete problems are hard to solve or not.
In fact, Johnson et al. [47] proved that if a problem in PLS is NP-Hard, then NP=
co-NP. As a result, it seems unlikely that these problems are NP-Hard, even though
no polynomial-time algorithm is known for them. A problem A is PLS-hard if when
we can solve A in polynomial time, then we can solve any instance of a PLS-complete
problem in polynomial time. In other words, if we can solve a PLS-hard problem in
polynomial time then we can solve any PLS problem in polynomial time.
Given any instance of a local search problem, the neighborhood search algorithm
to find the local optimal solution is the algorithm that starts from a given solution of
this instance, and does the following until it finds a local optimal solution: at each
step, it finds a feasible solution in the neighborhood of the current solution with a
better value, and moves to this solution. Papadimitriou et al. [71] and Schaffer and
Yannakakis [79] have shown that for several PLS-complete problems, the neighbor-
hood search algorithm takes exponential time. In fact, they proved that for some
PLS-complete local search problems such as the Max-2SAT with flip neighborhood,
and the Max-Cut problem with swap neighborhood, there are solutions that are ex-
ponentially far from any local optimal solution, i.e., it takes exponential number of
local improvements to get to a local optimal solution.
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Here, we formally define the PLS reduction. A PLS reduction from L to L' is
given by a pair (, M) where (i) R : (L) - I(L') is a polynomial-time computable
function that maps any instance of L to an instance of L', and (ii) M is a polynomial-
time computable function that maps any pair (F', I), where I is an instance of L
and F' E YF(I) is a solution of T(I), to a feasible solution F of I, and (iii) for any
instance I of L and for any local optimal solution F' E F(,) of R(I), M(F', I) is a
local optimal of the instance I of L.
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Chapter 2
General Assignment and the
Distributed Caching Problems
2.1 Introduction
'The growth of the Internet, the World Wide Web and wide-area wireless networks
allow increasing number of users to access vast amount of information in different
geographic areas. Content delivery is one of the most important tasks of a service
provider in these systems. It is well known that content delivery can be done by
caching popular items in cache locations close to the users. In this chapter, we
address this issue by formalizing different variants of distributed caching problems as a
set of assignment problems and develop approximation algorithms and decentralized
mechanisms for these problems. The general distributed caching problem that we
formalize here is denoted by CaplBDC:
CaplBDC: Let U be a set of n cache locations with given available capacities Ai
and given available bandwidths Bi for each cache location i. There are k request
types; 1 each request type t has a size at (1 < t < k). Let H be a set of m requests
with a reward Rj, a required bandwidth bj, a request type tj for each request j, and a
connection cost cij for each cache location i to each request j. The profit of providing
request j by cache location i is fij = Rj -cij. A cache location i can service a set of
'Request type can be thought as different files that should be delivered to clients.
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requests Si, if it satisfies the bandwidth constraint: Zjes bj < Bi, and the capacity
constraint: Et{tjljES) at < Ai (this means that the sum of the sizes of the request
types of the requests in cache location i should be less than or equal to the available
capacity of cache location i). We say that a set Si of requests is feasible for cache
location i if it satisfies both bandwidth and capacity constraints for bin i. The goal
of the CapIBDC problem is to find a feasible assignment of requests to cache locations
to maximize the total profit; i.e., the total reward of requests that are provided minus
the connection costs of these requests.
We also consider the following special cases of the CaplBDC problem:
CapDC: The CapDC problem is a special case of CaplBDC problem without band-
width constraint. In other words, in the CapDC problem we assume that for each
cache location i, Bi is sufficiently large.
IBDC: The IBDC problem is a special case of CaplBDC problem without capacity.
constraint. In other words, in the IBDC problemn ;we assuine that for e.h cache
location i, Ai is sufficiently arge. From this definition, one can see that IBDC is a
special case of CapDC where there exists exactiy one request of each request type, the
available capacity of cache locations in CapDC is equal to the available bandwidth of
cache locations in IBDC, and the size of request types in CapDC corresponds to the
bandwidth requirement of requests in IBDC.
uniform CapDC: The uniform CapDC problem is a special case of the CapDC
problem where the size of all request types is the same, i.e., at = a for all 1 < t < k.
uniform IBDC: The uniform IBDC problem is a special case of the IBDC problem
where the bandwidth requirement of all requests is the same, i.e., bj = b for all j H.
We refer to all variants of the distributed caching problems as DCP.
In this chapter, we develop approximation algorithms and decentralized mech-
anisms for DCP, and a general class of assignment problems, called the separable
assignment problems (SAP):
SAP: In a separable assignment problem, we are given a set U of n bins and a
set H of m items, and a value fij for assigning item j to bin i. We are also given
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a, separate packing constraint for each bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal' family it of feasible
subsets of items for bin i. We call this separate packing constraint for each bin, the
single-bin subproblem. The goal is to find an assignment of items to bins with the
maximum aggregate value.
Separable assignment problems include all variants of the distributed caching prob-
lems described above. To see this we note that the family of feasible subsets of requests
for a cache location i in the CaplBDC problem is all subsets of requests that satisfy two
packing constraints: the capacity constraint and the bandwidth constraint. Thus, it
is clear that the family of feasible subsets for a cache location is lower-ideal. Moreover,
the profit of each request j to each cache location i is fij = Rj - cij and corresponds
to the value of item j to bin i in SAP. It follows that CaplBDC, and thus all vari-
ants of DCP are special cases of SAP. SAP also includes the well-known maximum
generalized assignment problem (GAP):
GAP: Given a set of bins and a set of items that have a (possibly) different size
and value for each bin, pack a maximum-valued subset of items into the bins.
Picture 2-1 depicts the problems that we consider and their relation to each other.
Figure 2-1: Assignment Problems. There is an arrow from problem A to problem B,
if A is a special case of B.
We design LP-based and local search approximation algorithms for SAP. Our
results depend on an algorithm to solve the single-bin subproblem in SAP. In an
instance of the single-bin subproblem, we are given a bin i, a set of items with value
2 A family I C 2 H of subsets of a set H is lower-ideal, if 0 C H, and for each two subsets S and
R such that R C S, if S E I then R E I.
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vj for each item j, and a packing constraint for bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal family i of
feasible subsets of items that can be packed in bin i. A /3-approximation algorithm
for/3 < 1 for the single-bin subproblem is an algorithm that outputs a subset of items
S CE 2i such that for any other subset S' C 2i of items, jEs v _ > P Ej es' vj.
In Section 2.2, given a -approximation algorithm for the single-bin subprob-
lem, we design a polynomial-time LP-rounding based ((1 - )/3 - 6)-approximation
algorithm 3. In Section 2.3, given a /3-approximation algorithm for the single-bin sub-
problem, we design a simple, polynomial-time local search (- )-approximation
algorithm 4. For GAP and all variants of DCP, there exists an approximation scheme
for the single-bin subproblem, thus we obtain an LP-based algorithm with (1 - -)
approximation and a local search algorithm with - approximation guarantee. To
complement these results, in Section 2.5, we show that SAP and DCP cannot be ap-
proximated within a factor better than 1 - I unless NPC DTIME(n°(l°gl°gn)), even
if there exists a polynomial-time exact algorithm for the single-bir subproblem.
We generalize the local search algorithm to yield an approximation algorithm for
the maximization version of the k-median problem with hard capacity constraints
(KMed):
KMed: Given a set U of n bins, a set H of m items with a value fij for each item
j and each bin i, and also a single-bin subproblem for each bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal
family i of subsets for bin i, choose at most K bins and pack a set of items in each
selected bin to maximize the total value packed.
In Section 2.4, for any > 0, given a -approximation algorithm for the single-
bin subproblem, we design an ( - - )-approximation algorithm for KMed. If the
single-bin subproblem is a knapsack problem, this yields a ( - c)-approximation
algorithm.
We discuss decentralized mechanisms for all variants of the distributed caching
problem in Section 2.6. For the decentralized mechanisms, we may assume that
3 We can set to be exponentially small, i.e., 6 = 1 for any constant c > 0. Throughout the
chapter, we say "for any 6 > 0" to illustrate this.
4 For the local search algorithm, we can set to be exponentially small, i.e., e = for any
constant c > 0.
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caches are selfish entities that want to maximize their own reward. This setting is
particularly justified in the context of 3G cellular networks [29] and this is formalized
in Goemans, Li, Mirrokni, and Thottan [29]. In this setting, resident subscribers are
cache locations that can provide content to clients. Clients ask for different requests
and the service provider wants to cache these requests at resident subscribers to pro-
vide them in a distributed manner. This helps the service provider to use the capacity
of the wireless network instead of relying solely on its own bandwidth. Goemans et
al. [29] formalize the protocol and the system architecture of such mechanisms. In
Section 2.6, we suggest a mechanism to induce selfish cache locations to serve the
set of requests with a good performance guarantee. All mechanisms extend to all
separable assignment problems, but we state the results for the distributed caching
problems since the main motivation of this setting comes from this problem.
Previous Work. For the special case of GAP, Shmoys and Tardos [82] present
an LP-rounding -approximation algorithm for the minimization problem. Chekuri
and Khanna [10] observed that a L-approximation for GAP is implicit in the paper
by Shmoys and Tardos [82]. Their method is based on an LP formulation with an
integrality gap of at least 2. Thus the LP we introduce here is provably stronger.
Chekuri and Khanna [10] develop PTAS's for a special case of this problem called
the multiple knapsack problem. In this problem, each item has the same size and the
same profit for all cache locations. They also classify the APX-hard special cases of
GAP.
Nemhauser, Fisher, and Wolsey, previously look at maximizing submodular func-
tions with and without cardinality constraints [65, 66]. They give a greedy algorithm
with approximation guarantee of 1- 1 for maximizing submodular functions, and
I-approximate local search algorithm for maximizing submodular functions with car-
dinality constraint. The latter paper actually looks more generally at restrictions to
matroids. These results do not extend to handle knapsack constraints, since feasible
sets for knapsack do not form a matroid. Sviridenko shows that the greedy algorithm
gives a 1 - -approximation for maximizing a submodular function subject to one
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knapsack constraint [85], but does not consider assignment type problems with sets
of packing constraints. Indeed the simple greedy algorithm does worse than 1 -
e
even for the multiple knapsack problem. Using LP techniques [1, 83], approxima-
tion algorithms with the guarantee of 1 - for some maximum coverage problems
e
are known. These techniques are different from ours and cannot handle SAP as the
packing constraints in SAP are more general.
Gomes, Regis, and Shmoys [33] use a exponential-size LP and a rounding scheme
similar to the one we use here but to obtain a 1 - -approximation algorithm to solve
the partial Latin square extension problem. In particular, their LP does not capture
knapsack packing constraints.
Baeve and Rajaraman [3] study a problem of data placement in networks. They
formalize a minimization version of our problem in which they need to place ob-
jects in caches to minimize the total connection costs. They give a constant-factor
approximation for this problem, which is iproied to fac'or 1.0 by Swainy [86]. ia
the conclusion of [3], they suggest considering the problem with bandwidth as an
important extension.
2.2 LP-Based Approximation Algorithms
In this section, for any > 0, we give a ((1 - ) - )-approximation for SAP
and its variants where 3 is the approximation factor of the algorithm for the single-
bin subproblem. The general approach is to formulate an (exponential-size) integer
program, solve the linear program relaxation approximately, round the solution to
the linear program, and prove that the rounded solution has this guarantee. There
are two main issues here: proving the quality of the rounded solution, and obtaining
a good solution to the large linear program in polynomial time. We first discuss the
approach in the context of SAP and then discuss some extensions.
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2.2.1 Separable Assignment Problems
Formulation. We give an exponential-size integer programming formulation for
SAP. Let i, for i U be the set of all feasible assignments of items to bin i; these
are the feasible solutions to the single-bin subproblem for bin i. For a set S i,
let Xs be the indicator variable that indicates if we choose S as the subset of items
for bin i. The first constraint is that we cannot assign more than one set to a bin
i, thus for all i U, sezl Xs = 1. Moreover, we cannot assign each item to more
than one bin: Ei,sezi:jcs Xs < 1. Our objective is to find an assignment of items
to bins to maximize the sum of profits, i.e., i, fXi where f s = j fij. By
relaxing the 0-1 variables to nonnegative real variables, we obtain the following linear
programming relaxation:
max EiEusel fXi (2.1)
s.t. iG,sEzi:js XI < 1 Vj C H
Zssz~ Xs = 1 Vi U
Xis > 0 i c U,S G Si
Let LP(SAP) denote the objective function value of this LP.
Rounding the Fractional Solution. Given a solution to the linear program (2.1),
independently for each bin i, assign set S to i with probability Xs. In the resulting
solution, some item j may be contained in the sets assigned to more than one bin. In
this case, item j is assigned to the bin among these bins with the maximum fij-value.
Note that the resulting assignment after this step is feasible, since the family i for
each bin i is lower-ideal.
Theorem 2.2.1 The expected value of the rounded solution is at least least (1 -
l)LP(SAP).
Proof. For item j, sort the bins i for which Yi = ESZI:jES Xi s is nonzero in the
non-increasing order of fij. Without loss of generality assume that these bins are
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1,2,...,1 and fl > f2j... > fj > O. With probability Y the set that is assigned
to bin 1 contains j, thus item j is assigned to bin 1. In this case, the value of item
j is flj. With probability (1 - Y1)Y2, bin 1 does not have item j in its subset and
bin 2 has item j in its set. In this case, the value of item j is f2j. Proceeding
similarly, we obtain that the expected value for request j in the rounded solution is
fljY + f2j(1 - Y1)Y2 + ... + fij(Hil(l - Yi))Y1. The contribution of item j in the
value of the fractional solution is l<i<l fijYi. This in conjunction with Lemma 2.2.2
below yields the result. E]
Lemma 2.2.2 fjY 1 + f2j ( -Y)Y 2+... + ftj(fl ( - Y))Y1 > ( - ) l<i<l fj
whenever Yi > O for all i and Ei Yi < 1 and fij > f2j > ... > fj > O
Proof. From the arithmetic/geometric mean inequality, one can derive (see Lemma
3.1 in [31]):
k k-1 k
1-( (1- Yi)) = Y + (1 - Y)Y2 + + (H(1 Yi))Yk > (1-) Yi,
i=l i=l i=l
for any k. Multiplying this inequality by fkj
summing over k, we derive the lemma.
- fk+l,j > 0 where f+l,j = 0 and
D
Solving the LP. The number of variables in the linear program (2.1) is exponential.
To solve this LP, we first solve its dual (2.2) given below.
min Eieu i + EjEH )
s.t. + EiGs A > fs
Aj > 0
(2.2)
Vi G U, VS cG i
Vj G H.
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The dual linear program (2.2) has a polynomial number of variables, but exponentially
many constraints. We rewrite it as a fractional covering problem as follows:
min ieu qi + EjEH AJ (2.3)
s.t. (qi, AX) Pi ¥i U S i
A _ O Vj H.
Here, Pi is the polytope defined by constraints of the form qi > jEs(fij - Aj)
for all S E i. To solve the LP, we will need a separation algorithm for Pi. We
define an -approximate separation algorithm for polytope Pi to be an algorithm
that given a point (qi, Alj E H) returns either a violated constraint, or guarantees
that (,A Ijl E H) is feasible for Pi. We let LP(Dual SAP) denote the objective
fimction value of the linear program (2.2).
Lemma 2.2.3 For-any 6 > 0, given a polynomial-time /3-approximate separation
algorithm for Pi, we can design a polynomial-time( - 6)'-approximation algorithm
to solve the linear program (2.2) and hence. the linear program (2. 1).
Proof. We run the ellipsoid algorithm on the linear program (2.2) using a -
approximate separation algorithm. More precisely, we move the objective into the
set of constraints by adding the constraint EiuE qi + LjEH Aj -< V* to the current
linear program. For a given v*, we use the ellipsoid algorithm to determine if this
LP is feasible; and use binary search to find the smallest feasible value v*. Using
the ellipsoid algorithm in this binary search framework with a -approximate separa-
tion algorithm, suppose that the process of the algorithm terminates with a solution
(q*, A* j H) such that v* = EiEu qi + EjEH A* Thus, we know that the linear
program (2.2) with the new constraint is infeasible for v* - 6' where 6' depends on the
precision of the binary search5. Thus, the optimal solution to the LP (2.2) is at least
v* - '. Since we use a -approximate separation algorithm, we are not guaranteed
that this solution is feasible. However, we know that (, A*j E H) is feasible. Thus,
5 We can set d' to be 12Z for any constant c > 0.
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the optimal solution to the LP (2.2) is at most . Thus the optimal solution to (2.2)
is between v* - ' and -
In the execution of the ellipsoid algorithm for v* - Y, we check a polynomial
number of constraints. This set of constraints is enough to show that the value of the
dual is greater than v* - 6'. The dual of this restricted LP is equivalent to the linear
program (2.1) restricted to the variables corresponding to this set of constraints (by
setting all other variables to zero). By LP-duality, the cost of the solution to this
program is at least v* - 6'. Thus, the solution to this polynomial-sized LP has value
at least v* - 6'. By setting 6' sufficiently small, this is an (/ - 6)-approximation
algorithm for the primal linear program, since LP(SAP) < LP(Dual SAP) < . l
The fact that, for a class of packing-covering linear programs, an approximate
separation oracle for the dual implies an approximate solution for the primal is also
observed by Carr and Vempala [9] and by Jain, Mahdi;an and Salavatipour [431. An
approximate solution to the linear programs (2.1) and (2.2) can also be obtained via
Lagrangian LP algorithms [73, 88, 27, 89].
We can use a /3-approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem for bin i to
design a 3-approximate separation algorithm for Pi. The /3-approximate separation
algorithm for Pi asks, given (qj, Aj Ij C H), find a set S GE i such that qi < jes(fii -
Aj). It is of course sufficient to find the set S CG i that maximizes 'jes(fij - Aj).
Since 2i is lower-ideal, we know that if qi < 0 then the set S = 0 violates the above
inequality. Moreover, we can consider only items j for which fij - Aj is positive. In
fact, we can set max(O, fij - j) as the value of item j in the single-bin subproblem and
use a /3-approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem, to find a subset S* C
i with value q* such that for any set S' E Zi, q* = jes (fij - Aj) > / js,(fi -
Aj). We know that either qi* > qi in which case we find a violated constraint, or qi* < qi.
In the later case, we know that for any subset S' C Zi, j s,(fij - Aj) < -<
Therefore, in this case (., Aj j C U) is feasible for 7Pi. Hence, a /3-approximation
algorithm for the single-bin subproblem is a /3-approximate separation algorithm for
Pi. The above and previous discussion yield the following general result.
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Theorem 2.2.4 For any constant c > 0, and - = 2, given a polynomial-time 3-
approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem, there exists a polynomial-time
((1 - 1)p - )-approximation algorithm for SAP.
2.2.2 Approximation Algorithms for DCP and GAP
In this section, we show that the single-bin subproblem for each problem class in SAP
discussed in the introduction has an approximation scheme. Thus, for all problem
classes, this yields polynomial-time 1 - - c-approximation algorithms.
GAP: The single-bin subproblem for GAP is a knapsack problem, for which an
efficient FPTAS is well-known.
CapDC: The items in the single-bin subproblem for CapDC correspond to request
types and the value of item t is equal to the sum of the profit of requests of request
type t in the. CapDC instance. The size of item t in the subproblem is the size of
request type t in the CapDC instance. The size of bin i is the available capacity of
cache location i. Therefore, the single-bin subproblem in CapDC is to pack request
types into bin i'(respecting the bin capacity) to maximize the value of the items that
can be assigned to the bin. Thus, the single-bin subproblem is a knapsack problem,
and has an FPTAS.
CaplBDC: The single-bin subproblem for CaplBDC is the following general 2-
dimensional knapsack problem: Bin i has Ai available space and Bi available band-
width. Item j S has value vj, type tj, and bandwidth consumption bj. Each type t
has size at. A feasible packing of items into bin i, satisfies the bandwidth constraint,
i.e., total bandwidth of items in bin i is at most Bi, and the capacity constraint, i.e.,
the total size of types of these items is at most Ai. The goal is to maximize the total
value of items packed in this bin. Shachnai and Tamir [81] formalize this general
2-dimensional knapsack problem and describe a PTAS for it.
As a result of the above discussion, we have:
Theorem 2.2.5 For any > 0, there exists a polynomial-time (1-e-e)-approximation
algorithm for GAP, CapDC, and CaplBDC.
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2.3 Local Search Algorithms
In this section, for any > 0, we give a simple local search (- - e)-approximation
algorithm for separable assignment problems given an -approximation algorithm
for the single-bin subproblem. This, in turn, gives the first combinatorial ( -)-
approximation algorithms for GAP and all variants of DCP. We then show how to
extend this algorithm to give a (1- )-approximation algorithm for the k-median
problem with hard capacities and packing constraints.
We first give a naive local search -approximation algorithm whose running time
might be exponential. Then, we refine the algorithm and change it to a polynomial-
time algorithm. Let S = (S 1,..., S,) be an assignment of items to bins, where Si is
the set of items in bin i. For an assignment S = (S1,..., Sn) of items to bins, we
denote the value of this assignment by v(S). Also, let ai(S) be the total value of
items satisfied by bin i in S. For an item j, let vj(S) the value of item j in S.
The naive algorithm repeatedly iterates over the bins. For bin i, it ;:uns procedure
Local(i). Local(i), given current solution S, finds a repacking S,' of bin i. 11 replacing
Si with S improves the solution then this replacement is made. When no further
improvements can be made on any bin, the algorithm halts. We call the result an
/3-approximate local optimal solution.
Specifically, Local(i) does the following:
1. For each item j, let valuej(S) be equal to fij if j is assigned to a bin i' -# i in
S, and be equal to zero if j is unassigned or is assigned to bin i in S.
2. For each item j, let the marginal value of j be wj = fij - valuej(S).
3. Use the -approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem for bin i to
pack a subset of items in bin i with the maximum marginal value.
Lemma 2.3.1 Let S = (S1,.. ., S) be a /3-approximate local optimal solution and
fQ = (w 1,.. ) be the optimal assignment. Then v(S) > v(a).
Proof. Let R be the set of items that are better served in the optimal solution than
in S and L be the rest of the items. Let Ri be the set of items in R served by bin
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i in the optimum Q. For any set T of items, let o(T) be the value of the items in T
in Q and 1(T) be the value of items of T in S. For all items j Ri, the marginal
value for bin i is positive (wj > 0), since the value of j for bin i is greater than the
current value of j in S. For each item j R, the marginal value of j for solution S
is fij - valuej(S) > fij - vj(S). Thus, the total marginal value of items in set R4 for
bin i is at least jER (fij- vj(S)) = o(R) - I(Ri). Since S is a P-approximate local
solution, the operation Local(i) cannot find a solution with marginal value greater
than oai(S), otherwise this operation could increase the total value. Since we use a
/-approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem and there exists a solution
with marginal value o(Ri)-I(Ri), it follows that oii(S) > P3(o(Ri)-l(Ri)). Therefore,
o(Ri) < I(R) + lai(S). Furthermore, for items in set L, o(L) < (L) < v(S) by
definition. Therefore,
OPT = v(l)
= o(L) + o(R)
= o(L) + o(Ri)
iEu
< (L) + ( (Ri) + i (S))
iEU
< (I + )v(S).
Thus, v(S) > 1 v(Q). E1
Lemma 2.3.1 shows that if we can find an 3-approximate local solution then we
have a -13-approximation algorithm. We prove it is PLS-hard to find a local solution.
The proof of this fact is very similar to the proof of Theorem 2.6.6. An implication
of the PLS-hardness of this problem is that there exists a set of instances for which
the above local search algorithm may take exponential time to converge to a local
optimal solution.
Below, we modify the naive algorithm to get a polynomial-time (-- -e)-approximation
algorithm. The analysis of this algorithm uses the following fact (which we prove in
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the proof of Theorem 2.3.3). Using this fact, we show that after a polynomial number
of local improvements the value of the solution is a good approximate solution.
Fact 2.3.2 If v(S) < -3 OPT then there is a bin i for which Local(i) finds a packing
with marginal value at least -OPT - +v(S).
Local Search Algorithm.
1. Start with the empty solution, i.e., S = (Si,..., Sn) and Si = 0 for all i G U.
2. For an appropriate ' > 0, run the following loop for 1n ln( ) times:
(a) Let the current assignment be S = (S1,, . , S).
(h) For each bin i, run Local(i). Let the marginal value of this solution for bin
i be W147 and et S b the set of items with marginal val ue 
(c) For each bin i, let Ai -- a,-(S).
(d) Let bin i* be the bin with the maximum Ai, i.e.: Ai > Ai for any bin i.
(e) If Ai* > 0, change the set Si of items for bin i to Si.
Theorem 2.3.3 For any > 0, the above local search algorithm is a polynomial-time
(3 - c)-approximation algorithm for SAP.
Proof. Let Q be an optimal assignment, and let S be an intermediate assignment
obtained in the local search algorithm. Let R be the set of items that are better
served in Q than in S and L be the rest of the items. Let Ri be the set of items in R
satisfied by bin i in Q. For any set T of items, let o(T) be the value of the items in T
in assignment Q and (T) be the value of items of T in assignment S. Thus, we have
OPT = o(R) +o(L) and v(S) = l(R)+l(L). For each item j Ri, the marginal value
of j is fij - valuej(S) > fij - vj(S). Thus, the total marginal value of items in set Ri
for bin i is at least EjGRi(fij - v(S)) = o(Ri) - 1(Ri) and Ri is a feasible solution for
bin i. Since we use a /3-approximation algorithm to find Wi, Wi > P(o(Ri)- (Ri)).
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Therefore, Eiu Wi > Eieu (o(Ri) - I(Ri)) = P1(o(R) - 1(R)). Since o(L) < (L),
Eicu Wi > (o(R) - (R) + o(L) - I(L)) = P(OPT - v(S)). Thus,
iEU
= Zwi - Ei(S)
iEU iEU
> (OPT - v(S)) - v(S)
= OPT- (1 + )v(S).
In particular, Ai, > OPT - 1+fv(S). Let S' be the assignment after changing the
set of items of i* to Si'*, i.e., S' = (S1,S2, ., S*, si+ , . . ., Sn). As a result,
v(S') = v(S) +Ai*
> v(S) + -OPT- v(S)
= v(S)(1- 1+ )+ OPT.n nof Step 2. 
Let be the total value of the assignment after the kth execution of Step 2. Froir
the above discussion, yk > (1 - i)Yyk-_1 + OPT and y = .
get that for any 1 < i < k:
Using induction, we
Yk > (1 - )iYk-i
= (1 - )iYk-i
n
= (1 - )iyk-i
+ nOPT(-(1-  ))
+ 13OPT(-(I _ )i)
+ OPT(1-(1-3+1 1 P)i)n
> 0+ -(1-( + ) k) O PT
13 n
Therefore, by solving this recurrence relation, we get Yk (1 - (1 - )k)OPT
k = , we get Yk > (1- --- )OPT = 1(1 - ')OPT. Therefore,
for c' = ±eL, the value of the output of the above algorithm is at least ( - )OPT
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By setting
as desired. E]
2.4 k-median with hard capacities
We can extend the local search algorithm for SAP to the k-median problem with hard
capacities and packing constraints(KMed). Recall that KMed is as follows: Given a
set U of n bins, a set H of m items with a value fij for each item j and each bin
i, and also a single-bin subproblem for each bin i, i.e., a lower-ideal family Zi of
subsets for bin i, choose at most K bins and pack a set of items in each selected
bin to maximize the total value packed. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first constant-factor approximation algorithm for the the k-median problem with hard
capacity constraints.
The local search algorithm for the KMed problem is very similar to the local search
algorithm for SAP. At each step of the algorithm, we try to unpack a used bin, and
pack a (possibly different) bin to increase the total value. The formal description of
the algorithm is as follows:
Local Search Algorithm for KMed.
1. Start with the empty solution, i.e., S = (S 1,..., Sn) and S, --= 0 for all i ( U.
2. Let P= {1,2,...,K}.
3. For an appropriate ', run the following loop for 1K ln( ) times:
(a) Let the current assignment be S = (S 1,..., Sn) where Si = 0 for i , P.
(b) For each bin i P and bin i 2 G (U - P) U {il} do
i. For each item j, let valuej(S) be fij if j is assigned to a bin i' ii in
S, and be equal to zero if j is unassigned or is assigned to bin i in S.
ii. For each item j, let the marginal value of j (with respect to bins il
and i2) be wj = fi2j- valuej(S).
iii. Use the P-approximation algorithm for the single-bin subproblem for
bin i2 to pack a subset of items in bin i2 with the maximum marginal
value. Let the marginal value of this solution for bin i2 be Wili2 and
let S 2 be the set of items with marginal value Wili 2.Sili2
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(c) For every two bins il E P and i2 c (U-P)U{il , let Aili2 = Wili2-ail (S).
(d) Let bins i and i be the bins with the maximum Ali 2, i.e., Ajiq > Aili 2
for any bin il and i2.
(e) If Aii > 0, unpack bin i and pack the set SiT of items in bin i (i.e.,
set P = P - {i} U {i~} and set Si = 0 and Si = Si*i*) .
Theorem 2.4.1 For any c > 0, the above local search algorithm for KMed is a
polynomial-time (' - c) -approximation algorithm for SAP.
Proof. The output of the local search algorithm is a feasible solution of the KMed
problem, since the number of nonempty bins in the output is at most K. Let Q2
be an optimal assignment. Consider the current assignment S in the process of the
algorithm. Let Ps, and Ps be the set of used bins in Q and S respectively. The set of
used bins in Q2 and S are not necessarily the same. Let 7r: U -- U be a permutation
finction such that if i C U is used in both Q and S, then 7r(i) = i and if i is used in Q,
but not in S then r(i) = i' where i' is used in S, but not in Q. As the number of used
bins in Q is K, such a permutation exists. Let R be the set of items that are better
served in Q than in S and L be the rest of the items. Let Ri be the set of items in R
satisfied by bin i in Q. For any set T of items, let o(T) be the value of the items in T
in Q and (T) be the value of items of T in S. Thus, we have OPT = o(R) + o(L) and
v (S) = I(R)+l(L). For an item j, let vj (S) the value of item j in S. Consider two bins
wr(i) and i P. For each item j G Ri, the marginal value of j with respect to bins 7r(i)
and i is fij - valuej(S) > fij - vj (S). Thus, the marginal value of set R with respect
to bins r(i) and i is at least iEGR (fij - vj(S)) = o(Ri) - (Ri) and Ri is a feasible
solution for bin i. Since we use a /3-approximation algorithm to find W=(i)i, W,7 (i)i >
f3(o(R)-I (Ri)). Therefore, EiP, W(i)i > 13 Eicp, (o(Ri)- (Ri)) = (o(R)-I (R)).
Since o(L) < (L), JEiPp Wr(i)i > 3(o(R) - I(R) + o(L) - (L)) = O/(OPT - v(S)).
Thus, (i)i = E W()-EiEPs ai(S) > P(OPT-v(S))-v(S) = /30PT-
(1 + )v(S). In particular, Aii > OPT- 1+K-v(S). Let S' be the assignment after
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setting Si. to 0 and changing the set of items of i to Si-. As a result,
v(S') = v(S) + Aii
v(S) + OPT- v(S)
v(S)(1 - )+ ± OPT.K K
Now, let Yk be the total value of the assignment after the k'th execution of Loop 3b.
From above discussion, yk > (1- 1I)yk-l + OPT and yo = 0. Similar to the
proof of Theorem 2.3.3 and solving this recurrence relation, we get k > +(1 -
(1- +)k)OPT. By setting k = L1' ,we get Yk > 1 (- )OPT = l(1 -
e')OPT. Therefore, the value of the output of the above algorithm is at least ( --
e)OPT as desired. E
2.5 A Hardness Result
In this section, we show a hardness result for the CapDC problem and special cases
of SAP. We prove that the CapDC problem is not approximable better than a factor
of 1 - unless NP C DTIME(n0(l°gl°gn)) showing that the 1 - - -approximation
e e
algorithm for CapDC is almost tight. This hardness result uses a hardness result by
Feige, Halldorson, Kortsarz, and Srinivasan [18] for the domatic number of graphs.
The domatic number of a graph is the maximum number of disjoint dominating sets
in the graph. A subset S of vertices of a graph G(V, E) is a dominating set if for any
vertex v , S, there exists a vertex u G S which is connected to v, i.e., (u, v) C E(G).
We first define a set of problems that are used in the reduction and restate the result
of Feige et al. [18].
The Max 3-colorability problem is as follows: Given a graph G(V, E) color the
vertices of C with 3 colors to maximize the number of legally colored edges (edges
whose endpoints are colored differently). The Max 3-colorability-5 problem is the
Max 3-colorability problem for 5-regular6 graphs. Petrank [72] proved that the Max
6A graph is 5-regular if the degree of each vertex is five.
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3-colorability problem is APX-hard. Using this proof, Feige et al. [18] proved that
the Max 3-colorability-5 problem is APX-hard. Formally, they showed that for some
number < 1, it is NP-hard to distinguish between 5-regular graphs that have a
legal 3-coloring, and 5-regular graphs in which every 3-coloring legally colors at most
6 fraction of the edges. The following claim is implicit in the hardness result of Feige
et al. [18]: Given an instance G(V, E) of the Max 3-colorability-5 problem, we can
construct an instance of a set cover problem with
m =O(IV(G) J(logloglV(°)I)E(G) (logloglV(G)I))
elements and
n = O(IV(G) 1(l°gl°g V(G)) IE(G)I °( loglog IV( ) ) )
sets of size whereP
_ O(IV(G) 1 log log IV(G)I) IE(() 10(logiogV I(G)I))p
such that:
* If the vertices of graph G are (legally) 3-colorable, then there exist p- disjoint
set covers, each with p sets7 in the set cover instance.
* If any 3-coloring of G has less than 6E(G)l legally colored edges then any
collection of Op sets cover at most (1 - (1 - )' 3P)m elements s .
From an instance of the set cover problem with n sets and m elements, we construct
an instance of CapDC with p- types, m - requests, and n cache locations as follows:p
7See Lemma 17 of [18]. In fact, Feige et al [18] present their result in terms of the dominating
set and the dornatic number problem. We restate their result for the set cover problem.
8 The proof of this claim comes from the proof of Lemma 18 of [18]. For the proof of Lemma
18 of [18], the authors refer to the hardness result for the set cover problem by Feige [17] (e.g.
see Proposition 4.3 of [17]). Essentially, the proof of our claim comes from the fact that in the
construction of Feige [17], in this case, any collection of ,3p sets cover at most (1 - (1 - )P)m
elements [16]. The reason is that the number of elements that p sets cover is less than the expected
number of elements that /3p random sets of size p cover where a random set is a set in which each
element is picked uniformly at random and independent of other elements. We also note that p is
not a constant. In particular, as V(G)j tends to o, p also tends to oo.
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For each element j in the ground set of the set cover, we put 7 requests jl, j 2, ... jnp p
of different types in the CapDC instance. For each set i in the set cover instance, we
put a cache location i in the CapDC instance. The capacity Ai for cache location i
is Ai = 1 and the size of each request type is equal to 1. Thus, we can locate at
most one type in each cache location. The profit of assigning request je to cache
location i is 1 if the corresponding element j is in the corresponding set in the set
cover instance. If the set cover instance has disjoint set covers then in the instancep
of the CapDC problem, we can satisfy all requests of a particular type using one
set cover and thus, we can find a solution to the instance of the CapDC problem
with a total profit of m . Moreover, we claim that if any collection of p sets in
the set cover problem, cover at most (1 - (1 - 1)P)m of elements then the profitp
of any assignment to the CapDC problem is at most (1 - (1 - )P)m. Assume thatP p
in the set cover instance, any collection of Up sets cover at most ( - (1 - )P)m
of the elements. Consider a solution S with the maximllu profit for the CapDC
probiem. For I < t ' -, let atp be the number of cache locations that keep the
n
request type t in solution S. We know that P=l c = n Also from the inequality
(1 - p(1- Pp)+ -(1 1)tp) < (1 - (1 - )YP) (1 - (1 - ZP) where x < y < z < t
and x + t = y + z, it follows that the profit of S maximizes when all at for 1 < t < -
are the same, i.e., at = 1. By setting at = 1, we have that the profit of S is at most
n n
t_=1 -(l- (1- ) atP, 1 <- (1 (1 (1 p P .
Therefore, if we apply the Feige et al. reduction from Max 3-colorobality-5 to the
set cover and the above reduction from the set cover to the CapDC problem, we have
the following: Given an instance of Max 3-colorability-5 problem, we can construct
an instance of the CapDC problem with - types, m - requests, and n cache locations
such that:
* If vertices of graph G are (legally) 3-colorable, then there exists a solution with
profit m' for the CapDC instance.
* If any 3-coloring of G has less than 6 E(G)I legally colored edges, the maximum
possible profit of the CapDC instance is at most 1 - (1 - )P of the number of
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requests, i.e., (1- (1 - 1)P)m.
Note that (1-(1 - )P) tends to I - as p tends to oc. Therefore, for any c > 0,
there exists a sufficiently large p such that (1 - (1 - )P) < (1- ) + . Hence, for
any > 0, for any sufficiently large instance of Max 3-colorability-5 problem, we can
construct an instance of the CapDC problem with types, m. - requests, and n cache
locations such that:
* If vertices of graph G are (legally) 3-colorable, then there exists a solution with
profit mn for the CapDC instance.
* If any 3-coloring of G has less than 6E(G) I legally colored edges, the maximum
possible profit of the CapDC instance is at most 1 - + e of the number of
requests, i.e., (1 - + c)p.
This shows that for any > 0, if we can approximate the CapDC problem within
a factor better than 1 - +t e then we can distinguish between the aforementioned
cases of the sufficiently large instances of the Max 3-colorability-5 problem in time
O(V(G)(lglOgV(G))E(G)O(loglogV(G))) Since distinguishing between these two cases
of the Max 3-colorability-5 problem is NP-hard, if we can approximate the CapDC
problem in polynomial time within a factor of 1- ! + c' for c' < , then NPC
DTIME(n°(l°glo°gn)). Note that in the above reduction, we only used instances of
the CapDC problem with uniform sizes and uniform capacities, this shows that even
the uniform CapDC problem is not approximable within a factor better than 1 -
unless NP C DTIME(n(loglo°gn)). In particular, it means that there are instances
of SAP in which the single-bin subproblem is solvable in polynomial time, but the
multiple-bin SAP problem is not approximable within a factor better than 1- e unless
e
NP C DTIME(n(l°gl°gn)). Therefore, we get the following theorem:
Theorem 2.5.1 There are instances of the SAP problem in which the subproblem is
polynomially solvable that are not approximable better than a factor 1 - I unless NP C
DTIME(n(l°gl°gn)). In particular, the uniform CapDC problem is not approximable
better than a factor 1 - ! unless NP C DTIME(no(lo°glogn)).
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2.6 Decentralized Mechanisms
In this section, we explore methods to obtain decentralized algorithms for all variants
of the DCP problem with a good performance. Before stating the formal definitions
and results, we give an introduction on the applicability of the decentralized mecha-
nisms in distributed caching in cellular networks.
The 3G subscriber market can be categorized into groups with shared interest in
location-based services, e.g., the preview of movies in a theater or the scene of the
beach nearby. Since the 3G radio resources are limited, it is expensive to repeatedly
transmit large quantities of data over the air interface from the base station (BS). It
is more economical for the service provider to offload such repeated requests on to the
ad-hoc network comprised of its subscribers where some of them recently acquired a
copy of the data. In this scenario the goal for the service provider is to give incentives
for peer subscribers in the system to cache and forward the data t the requesting
subscribers. Since each data item is large in size and transit subscribers are mobile,
we assume that, the data, transfer occurs in a close range of a few hops.
In this system, we envision a system consisting of two groups of subscribers:
resident and transit subscribers. Resident subscribers are less mobile and mostly
confined to a certain geographical area. Resident subscribers have incentives to cache
data items that are specific to this geographical region since the service provider gives
monetary rewards for satisfying the queries of transit subscribers. Transit subscribers
request their favorite data items when they visit a particular region. Since the service
provider does not have knowledge of the spatial and temporal distribution of requests,
it is difficult if not impossible for the provider to stipulate which subscriber should
cache which set of data items. Therefore, the decision of what to cache is left to each
individual subscriber. The realization of this content distribution system depends on
two main issues. First, since subscribers are selfish agents, they may act to increase
their individual payoff and decrease the performance of the system. Here, we provide a
framework for which we can prove that in an equilibrium situation of this framework,
we use the performance of the system efficiently (below, we will describe the efficiency
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formally in terms of the price of anarchy of a game). The second issue is that the
payoff of each request for each agent must be a function the set of agents that have
this request in their strategy, since these agents compete on this request and the
profit of this request should be divided among these agents in an appropriate way.
Therefore, each selfish agent may change the set of items it cached in response to the
set of items cached by others. This leads to a non-cooperative caching scenario which
we model as the distributed caching game. Motivated from service provider cellular
networks, we assume that cache locations are selfish agents (resident subscribers) who
want to maximize their own profit.
Consider a distributed caching setting in which selfish cache locations decide which
types and which requests to provide, based on their limited space and bandwidth.
The service provider let cache locations decide on the set of requests they want to
satisfy, and run the following rewarding scheme: the profit of each request will go to
the cache location that provides this request with the maximum profit. The payoff
of a cache location is the total profit of the requests that are assigned to this cache
location. Cache locations compete with each other on getting more profit from sat-
isfying these requests. This defines a game - the CaplBDC game which is formally
defined below. The service provider is interested in maximizing the total profit, i.e.,
the social function is the total profit of the cache locations.
We define the distributed caching game in the setting of CaplBDC - with both
capacity and bandwidth constraints. Given an instance of the CaplBDC problem, we
define a strategic game 9(U, {Fii E U}, {aiIi C U}) as follows. The set of players U
is the set of cache locations. The family of feasible strategies Fi of a cache location i
is the family of subsets si of requests such that EjEs b < Bi and EtjljEsi} at < Ai.
Given a vector S = (slI , 2. . , sn) of strategies of cache locations, the favorite cache
locations for request j, denoted by FAV(j), is the set of cache locations i such that
.j E si and fij has the maximum profit among the cache locations that have request
j in their strategy set, i.e., fij > fi'j for any i' such that j si,. For a strategy
profile S = (SI,... ,) ai(S) = Ej:isEFAV(j) FAVj)j. Intuitively, the above definition
implies that the profit of each request goes to the cache locations with the minimum
53
connection cost (or equivalently with the maximum profit) among the set of cache
locations that provide this request. If more than one cache location have the maximum
profit (or minimum connection cost) for a request j, the profit of this request is divided
equally between these cache locations. The payoff of a cache location is the sum of
profits from the requests it actually serves. We say that a player i serves a request j
if i FAV(j). The social value of strategy profile S, denoted by y(S), is the sum of
profits of all players. This value y(S) is a measure of the efficiency of the assignment
of requests and request types to cache locations.
We similarly define games for the other versions of the distributed caching prob-
lem. For problems, such as CapDC and uniform CapDC, that just have capacity
constraints, the strategy of player i is simply a subset of requests si and a strategy
si is a feasible strategy for player i if tE{(t3jIsji at < Ai. For IBDC, the strategy of
player i is a subset of requests si and the set si is a feasible strategy for player i if
EiE~b U, - Bi
In this section, we bound the price of anarchy for these games (Section 2.6.1),
study the existence of pure equilibria (Section 2.6.2) and demonstrate convergence
results for the more general versions of the game (Section 2.6.3). Picture 2-2 depicts
the games that we consider in this chapter and their relation to each other. Some of
these games are defined later in the chapter.
2.6.1 CapIBDC Game: Price of Anarchy
Since the CaplBDC game is a strategic game, it has mixed Nash equilibria [64]. We
prove that in a mixed Nash equilibrium of this game, the expected social value is at
least of the optimal social value. We can prove this by showing that the CaplBDC
game is a valid-utility game. First, we give a direct proof of this fact.
Theorem 2.6.1 The price of anarchy of the CaplBDC game for a mixed Nash equi-
librium is at most 2.
Proof. In a mixed Nash equilibrium, each player chooses a probability distribution
over its feasible pure strategies. We prove that the expected social value of this
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Finding PSNE is PLS-hard
Finding PSNE is in P
Figure 2-2: Different classes of Games. There is an arrow from game A to game B, if
A is a special case of B.
equilibrium is at least of the optimum solution. Consider the optimum solution
Q (al,... ,an). Let the profit of request j in Q be pj. Consider a mixed Nash
equilibrium P. Let the expected payoff of player i in P be aci(P). For any request
j, let pj be the probability that j's profit in P is at least pj. It is easy to see that
E[-y(P)] > EjeH PPj, since with probability pj the profit of j is at least pj. We know
that the expected social value of P is equal to E[y(P)] = EijU oai(P). Let player i
change his strategy in P to the pure strategy ai. Consider a request j cE . With
probability 1 - pj the profit of request j is less than pj. When player i provides this
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request, the profit is pj. Thus, if player i changes his strategy to ai, his expected
payoff is at least jE,,(l - pj)pj. is a mixed Nash equilibrium, thus player i's
expected payoff in X is at least his expected payoff when he plays ai in . Therefore,
ai(P) > ZEji(l -pj)pj. Therefore,
OPT = y(Q)
= Pi
jEH
= ppj±+(1-pj)pj
jEH jGH
< E[y(P)] + E (1 -pj)pj
iEU jEai
< E[(P)] + Zi(P)
2E[d(P)]
as desired. i
In the following, we show that the CaplBDC gamne is a valid-utility game. By a result
of Vetta [87], this gives an alternative proof for the price of anarchy for mixed Nash
equilibria in CaplBDC game.
Theorem 2.6.2 The CaplBDC game is a valid-utility game.
Proof. We need to show the following three properties:
1) Nondecreasing and Submodular Social Function: First, it is clear that ?yS
is non-decreasing. To show its submodularity, we use an equivalent definition
of submodular functions: A set function f is submodular if for any two subsets
A and B such that A C B and for any element i B, f(A U {i}) - f(A) >
f(BU{i})-f (B) [26]. Thus, in order to prove that - s is submodular, it is enough
to prove that for two (possibly infeasible) strategy profiles S = (si,. .. , s) and
S' = (s:,... ,s ) such that si C s for all i E U, by adding a new request j
to the strategy set of any player i the increase in y8 for S is not less than the
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increase for S'. Let vj and vj be the profit of request j in S and S', respectively
(vj = 0 if j ' UiEusi and vj' = 0 if j UiEusi). As a result,
Vj. - max fiji:jEsif
> max fij
i:jEsi
= Vj.
Adding j to a strategy Sh and sh increases 7y for S and S' by max(0, fhj -vj) and
max(O, fhj - vj), respectively. From v > vj, it follows that max(0, fhj - vj) >
max(O, fhj - v). Hence, the increase in yS for S is greater than or equal to the
increase for S'. Thus in any case, the increase for S is not less than the increase
for S'.
2) Vickrey Condition: The difference in the social function when i plays si or
empty (does not play at all) is equal to Ej:iEFAV(j),IFAV(j)I=1 fij and this is indeed
less than or equal to ai(S) = Ej:iEFAV(j) IFAV()'
3) Cake Condition: By the definition of the social function, we have iu ai (S) =
y(S) and therefore the third property is satisfied as well.
The above theorems extend to the general setting for all separable assignment
problems. We can define the SAP game similar to the CaplBDC game: bins are selfish
agents and their strategy is to keep a feasible subset of items according to the lower-
ideal Zi. The profit of an item j goes to a player i that have this item in his strategy
and has the maximum profit for item j among all bins that have this item in their
strategy. The above proofs show that the SAP game is a valid-utility game and thus,
the price of anarchy for a mixed NE for this game is at most 2.
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2.6.2 DCP Games: Pure Nash Equilibria
In this section, we address various problems related to pure strategies in the DCP
games. We show that on the one hand, there are instances of CapDC and IBDC that
have no pure Nash equilibria; while the uniform IBDC games in which there are no
ties among the profit of the requests to cache locations have pure Nash equilibria. For
the uniform CapDC game, we demonstrate a cycle of strict best responses. A strict
best-response move for a player i is a best-response move in which player i strictly
increases his payoff.
Theorem 2.6.3 There are instances of the IBDC game that have no pure Nash equi-
librium.
Proof. Consider the following instance with 2 players and 4 requests. The bandwidth
consumption of requests are 8, 3, 5 and 6 respectively. The profit of requests to player
1 are 10, 2, 5.5 and 5.5 respectively. The profit of requests to player 2 ae 2, 3, 3 and
5.6 respectively. The available bandwidth of player 1 and 2 are 11 and 8 respectively.
The example is depicted in Table 2.1. The only possible best responses of player 1 to
any strategy of player 2 are sets {1,2} and {3, 4}. The only possible best responses
of player 2 are subsets 4} and {2, 3}. None of the 4 pairs of best responses is a pure
Nash equilibrium, thus this game does not have a pure Nash equilibrium.
The Profit of the Requests
1 2 3 4 Available Bandwidth
Cache Loc. 1 10 2 5.5 5.5 11
Cache Loc. 2 2 3 3 5.6 8
Table 2.1: The profit of request and available bandwidth for cache locations in the
IBDC game without pure Nash equilibria.
D
Since, IBDC is a special case of CapDC, the above theorem implies that there are
instances of the CapDC game that have no pure Nash equilibrium. In the above ex-
ample the bandwidth consumption of requests are not uniform, and this was essential
58
in finding the example. In the following, we study the uniform variant of these games.
Note that we can easily change the above example to an example of the IBDC game
without tie among the profit of the requests and with no PSNE. In the following,
we prove that the uniform IBDC game in which there are no ties among the profit of
requests does not contain any cycle of strict best-response moves. As a result, the
subgraph of the state graph with strict best-response moves as arcs does not contain
any cycle. Therefore, this graph has a vertex without any outgoing arcs, and this
vertex is a PSNE.
Theorem 2.6.4 Any instance of the uniform IBDC game in which there are no ties
among the profit of the requests does not have any cycle of strict best-response moves
and thus, has a PSNE.
Proof. Given a strategy profile S = (sl,... ,s), and the resulting assignment of
requests to cache locations, order the set of all pairs (i;j)' of (cache i, request j) such
that cache i serves a request j'in non-increasing order of their profits. Consider the
vector p(S) of the profit of these pairs in the above order. We claim that this vector
is lexicographically increasing as players play a strict best-response move.
To see this, consider a player i that plays a strict best-response move from si to
si. Consider the first pair (i*,j*) of cache i* and request j* that disappears from
the vector of profits (i.e., fi*j* appears in vector p(S) and not in vector p(S ® s) ) .
Thus, the profit of all pairs in p(S) with a profit larger than fi*j* appear in the vector
p(S E si). Since request j* is not served by i* in S d si, either j* is served by player
i in S ® s, or i* = i and j is not in si.
In the first case, player i serves request j* instead of player i* and thus the profit
of i for j* should be more than fi*j*. Therefore, there exists the number fij* which
is strictly greater than fi*j* in vector p(S E s) instead of fi*j*; thus the vector is
lexicographically increasing. In the latter case, since (i,j*) = (i*,j*) is the pair with
the largest profit whose profit disappears from the vector p(S) and player i increased
his payoff playing his best response from si to s and the bandwidth requirement of
all requests are the same, there exists another request j' E s with profit fij, such that
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fij, is greater than fij*; and fijl appears in vector p(Ss') instead of fi*j*. Therefore,
in the latter case the vector is lexicographically increasing as well. [
We note that the existence of pure Nash equilibria for the uniform IBDC game
when there are no ties among profits can be derived from the existence of stable
matchings in a general setting with social choice functions with substitutability prop-
erty [22]. However, cycles of strict best-response moves are known even for stable
matching games [77] 9. Our proof for this variant of the uniform IBDC indicates that
not only PSNE exists, but also any sequence of strict best-response moves of players
converges to a PSNE.
For the uniform CapDC game, in the example below, we demonstrate a cycle
of strict best-response moves. We do not know if the uniform CapDC game or the
uniform IBDC game always have a PSNE or not.
Theorem 2.6.5 There exist cycles of trict best-response monves in the uniforrr CapDC
game.
Proof. Consider an instance of the distributed caching game with three players
Profit of the Requests to Players
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3
Al 2 0 1
A 2 3 0 4
B 1 0 6 5
B2 0 2 1
C1 1 7 0
C2 3 2 0
Table 2.2: The profit of the requests for the example of the CapDC game with a cycle
of strict best responses.
and three request types, two requests from each type. The available capacity of each
9In stable matching games, each player has an arbitrary preference list for each request, and each
request has an arbitrary preference list for the players. Players offer to a request in their preference
list, and each request j goes to a player with the highest priority among the players that offer to
j. Each player likes to get a request with a higher priority in his preference list. A cycle of strict
best-response moves is known for this game [77]. The IBDC game in which each cache location can
cache only one request can be formalized as a special case of the stable matching game.
60
player is one and the size of each request type is one. Let players be 1, 2, and 3. Let
request types be A, B, and C. There are two requests of type A, i.e, Al and A 2, two
requests of type B, i.e., B1 and B 2, and two requests of type C, i.e., C1 and C2. In
each strategy profile, each player can choose both requests of only one request type.
The profit of all requests are depicted in Table 2.2. Since, each player can cache both
requests of only one type, we can refer to the strategy of a player as one type. In the
following, by a type as the strategy of a player, we mean the set of both requests of
that type.
In this instance, starting from the strategy profile (C, C, B) for players, if we let
players 2, 1, 3, 2, 1, and 3 play their best responses in this order, players will end up
with the same configuration (C, C, B). The complete cycle is depicted in Table 2.3.
In this table, we refer to the strategy of a player as a type and by that we mean both
requests of that type.
Players [1 Player's Type (Player's Payoff) 
1 C(3) C(4) - A(5) A(2) A(2) C(3)
2 31 C(7) -B B(8) (8) B(8')-- C(9) C(7)
3 B(6) B(O) B(O) - A(4) A(4) A(5)
Table 2.3: A cycle of size 6 of best-responses in the uniform CapDC game. Each
column represents the vector of request types that the players provide. The numbers
in parenthesis in each column are the payoffs of players. The arrow (-+) indicates
that a player plays his best response and changes his strategy to the request type in
the next column.
D
2.6.3 CapDC Game: Poor Convergence to Equilibria
In this section, we prove that there are instances of the uniform CapDC game in
which finding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard [47] (See the definition of PLS-
hard problems in Section 1.2).
We give a reduction from the Max-Cut local search problem with swapping neigh-
borhood to the problem of finding a PSNE in some instances of the uniform CapDC
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game. In turn, this implies that there are states of this game from which any path of
best response moves to the equilibrium has exponential length.
Recall that the Max-Cut local search problem with swapping neighborhood is as
follows: Given an edge-weighted graph G and a cut, the local operations are to switch
one node from one side of the cut to the other side if it can increase the value of the
cut. In this section, WLOG we assume that the graph G is connected.
Theorem 2.6.6 There are instances of the uniform CapDC game with pure Nash
equilibrial° for which finding a pure Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard.
Proof. We give a reduction from the local search Max-Cut problem with swapping
neighborhood to the uniform CapDC game.
Consider an instance G(V, E) of the Max-Cut problem with weights w E(G) -4
N on edges. We construct an instance R(G) of the CapDC game as follows: Each
player corresponds to a vertex of graph C(. There are two types of requests. The size
of each request type is equal to one and the capacity of eaclI cache location is, one.
For each edge, we define two requests. Edge uv has a request P,, of type one and
a request quv of type two. We assume that the connection costs of both requests on
edge uv to either u or v is zero. The connection costs of these two requests to any
other vertex is greater than w(uv). The reward of each of these two requests is w (uv).
Each player caches either requests of type one or requests of type two. If both u
and v cache requests of the same type then they each get profit (uv) from the requests
from edge (u, v). If they cache different types then they each get profit w(uv) for this
edge. Thus, given a strategy profile, the total profit obtained is exactly w(E) + w(C)
where C is the set of edges with one player caching type 1 and the other caching type
2. In other words, C is the cut set defined by the cut where all vertices that cache
type 1 are on one side and all vertices that cache type 2 are on the other.
From the definition of the game Z(G), if s is a best-response move of player i
in strategy profile S, we claim that either s' contains all requests of type 1 on edges
1
°We can also say that finding a sink equilibrium is PLS-hard. A sink equilibrium is a set of
strategy profiles that is closed under best-response moves. A pure equilibrium is a sink equilibrium
with exactly one profile. This equilibrium concept is formally defined in Chapter 4.
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adjacent to i, or s contains all requests of type 2 on edges adjacent to i. The reason
is that if s' does not contain all requests of one type on edges adjacent to i then player
i can strictly increase his payoff by including the rest of requests of the same type
on edges adjacent to him in his strategy (here, we use the fact that G is connected.).
We let be the set of strategy profiles S of the instance R(G) in which each player
i plays a set si such that s either contains all requests of type one on edges adjacent
to player i, or si contains all requests of type two on edges adjacent to player i. From
the above discussion, it follows that any PSNE of game J(G) is in L2.
From a feasible strategy profile S C L of R(G), we construct a cut M(S, G) in
the Max-Cut local search problem on G. For a player u in the game 7Z(G) if u caches
requests of type one, then we put u in side one of the cut M (S, G), and if u caches
requests of type two, then we put u in side two of M(S, G).
In a strategy profile S c of game 1(G), player u can strictly improve his payoff
by playing switching from requests of type 1 to requests of type 2 (or vice-versa) if
and only if the value of the cut et M(S, G) strictly improves by moving u to the
other side of the cut. Thus, if a strategy profile S CG is a pure Nash equilibrium
in game 7Z(G), then M(S, G) is a local optimal solution of the Max-Cut local search
problem for graph G.
Thus, if we have a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a pure Nash equilibrium
S (or a sink equilibrium) in any instance of the uniform CapDC game, since this
pure Nash equilibrium is in L, this implies a polynomial-time algorithm for finding
a local optimum M (S, G) of any instance of the Max-Cut local search problem with
swapping neighborhood. The PLS-hardness follows from a PLS-completeness result
of Schaffer and Yannakakis [79]. []
Using the above proof and a result of Schaffer and Yannakakis [71, 79], we can show
that in some instances of the uniform CapDC game there are states from which all
paths of best; responses have exponential length.
Corollary 2.6.7 There are instances of the uniform CapDC game that have pure
Nash equilibria with states from which any sequence of best-response moves to any
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pure Nash equilibrium (or sink equilibrium) has an exponential length.
Proof. In [79], it is shown that there exists a weighted graph GC, and an initial cut C,
such that the length of any sequence of local operations for the Max-Cut local search
problem from C to any local optimal solution is exponential. Consider the CapDC
game R(G) defined in the previous proof and the set L of strategy profiles. From the
cut C of G, we can easily construct a strategy profile S cE L such that M (S, G) = C
by letting player u play all requests of type 1 or 2 in S, if vertex u is in the side 1 or
2 of the cut C, respectively. We claim that any sequence of best responses from S to
any PSNE in R(G) has exponential length.
Assume for contradiction that there is a sequence of strategy profiles So = S,
S1, ... , St where t < poly(n) and player ui plays his best-response move from Si
to S,+1 and St is a PSNE. Since So = S E L and ui plays his best-response move
from S, to S+ by induction it follows that Sic L for all < i < t. It is easy to
see that C A (, (CT) T M(S:, G), 2 -= .A (S2 ), (S'), 2 (is a.
sequence of cuts such that cut Ci+l results from the cut C, by the local operation
of vertex ui and Ct is a local optimal solution. Therefore, t < poly(n) implies that
there exists a sequence of local operations of polynomial length from cut C to a
local optimal solution. This contradicts the assumption that no such sequence of
polynomial length from cut C exists. D]
2.6.4 Market Sharing Game: Price of Anarchy
In this section, we formalize a special case of non-cooperative content distribution in
wireless networks as a market sharing game introduced in [29] and study these games.
This class of games is a subclass of both congestion games and valid-utility games.
Here, we define this set of games.
Market Sharing Game. Consider a set U of n agents and a set V of m markets.
For each agent i, we are given a limited budget Bi and a subset V of markets that
are of player i's interest (we write i is interested in market j, if j GE V). For each
market j C V, we are given a cost Cj and a value vj; this value depends on the
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rate at which market i is requested per unit time. The strategy set, Fi C 2 of
player i is a family of subsets of V such that the sum of the cost of markets is less
than the budget of player i, i.e., si Fi if jsi,, Cj < Bi. The strategic game
G(U, {Fili c U}, {ai()li G U}) is called a market sharing game if for a strategy profile
S = (s1, . ., sn) i(S) = ji T(S where nj (S) is the number of agents that serve
market j in S. We also consider the social utility function y(S) = jU aj(S) for
this game. By definition, the market sharing game is a congestion game with the
congestion function cj(x) = L and thus, it is an exact potential game.X
Consider an instance g' of the IBDC game. Assume that the connection cost of
each request j follows the following pattern: the connection cost of j to a subset of
cache locations, denoted by Tj, is zero and the connection cost to the rest of cache
locations is a large number. Thus, the profit of request j for any cache location in Tj
is fij = Rj and the profit of j for other cache locations is fij = 0. Therefore, given the
strategy of players the profit of a request j is divided equally among the set of cache
locations in Tj that serve this request. We demonstrate a correspondence between
the game g' and a market sharing game g'(U, {Fi]ji U}, {(aii E U}), where Fi is a
family of subsets of markets in V, i.e., Fi C 2. The set of players U corresponds
to the set of cache locations. The set of requests in IBDC corresponds to the set of
markets, V = UiGuV in the market sharing game. We let V1 = {jli Tj}. The
available bandwidth Bi of cache location i in IBDC, corresponds to the budget Bi of
agent i in the market sharing game. The reward Rj and bandwidth bj of request j
correspond to the value vj and cost Cj of market j, respectively. If si is a strategy of
cache location i in g', it is implied Zj,,, bj < Bi. Equivalently, if agent i's strategy
is si in the market sharing game, 'j,,i Cj < Bi. This correspondence shows that the
market sharing game is a special case of the IBDC game, and thus, it is a valid-utility
game, and the price of anarchy for mixed Nash equilibria of any special case of this
game is at most 2. In this section, we study the market sharing game and prove
tighter results on the price of anarchy for PSNE in some special cases of this game.
In Section 2.6.5, we study the problem of finding a pure Nash equilibrium in these
games.
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As mentioned above, in the market sharing game, the value of market j corre-
sponds to the reward Rj of request j. In the distributed caching setting, the reward
of a request j depends on the rate at which clients ask for this request. Thus, vj
directly depends on the demand rate of clients for market j. It has been observed
that in many practical situations, demand curves follow the power law (Zipf) distri-
butions [8], namely vj = for a parameter 0 < 3 < 1. This motivates us to study
the special case of the market sharing game in which the value of markets follows
power law distributions. We prove that in a uniform market sharing game where the
cost of all markets is the same, i.e., Cj = C for all j, if all players are interested in all
markets, the price of anarchy (for PSNE) is less than 1.45 + o(1) in the worst case,
where o(1) depends on n, i.e. o(1) tends to 0 as n - o. Furthermore, for cases in
which V = V for each player i or markets have different costs, we prove that the
factor 2 for the price of anarchy is tight.
Theorem 2.6.8 Ir the uni'form7 market sharing game, if Vi -- J or each player i
and values are from a Zipf distribution with parameter /3, zt is implied that
• The price of anarchy (for PSNE) is less than or equal to o(1) for any
/ < 1. In particular, it is less than e + o(1) < 1.45 + o(1) for any P < 1 and
it tends to 1 + o(1) when/3 -* 1.
* For /3 = 1, the price of anarchy (for PSNE) is (1 + ln) (1 + (1))).
Proof. Consider a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and let p be the least index such
that the players do not select p but select all markets 1 to p- 1. No market beyond p
can be selected by any player, since otherwise such a player would have an incentive
to switch to market p, thus l > p or > for1 < j p - 1. Summing over all
markets 1 < j p- 1, we get Ej- > (j=l nj)p. Letting V(k) -= k1 a, we
get pV(p - 1) > n. As OPT can at best serve all markets, we have that the price
of anarchy is at most v,(n)VWe consider the wo cases = 1 and < 1 separately. We start with = 1.
We consider the two cases p = 1 and p < 1 separately. We start with/3 = 1.
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We need to compute V(p-1) From ln(n) < VI(n) < ln(n) + 1, it is not hard to
see that p > n, for sufficiently large n. Therefore,
V1 (n) ln(n) + 1 ln(n) + In In(n) In ln(n)
V1(p -1) -ln((ln(n) - ln(n - n(n)) - lnln(n) ln(n) ln(n)
where the last step can be proved using L'Hopital's rule when n --+ o.
We now consider the case /3 < 1. Let L,(k) = -(k - 1), then it is easy to see
LO(k) < V3(k) < LO(k) + 1. Using this fact, we can bound the ratio limn , V(n)'
Observing the facts that p o and L (p- 1) -, oo and P is a positive constant less
than 1, we can compute the bound as follows:
lim V (n)
n-o V(p- 1) lim L1 (n) + 1
= lirnoo L(p - 1)(l- -1im< lir (p VL(p -1))1- -
lim (L (p-1) + 1)1
p+ (]9- 1 ) l- 1
p-(1f 1 (p- f()1--1 S(1- Ili 1
lim
p--4 oo (p- 1) - -1
(1 _ )1-i3
Now, one can observe that this bound is less than e for any /3 < 1 and tends to 1 as
d tends to 1. E
Theorem 2.6.9 There are instances of the uniform market sharing games for power
law (Zipf) distribution in which the price of anarchy for PSNE is arbitrarily close
to 2. Moreover, the price of anarchy of some instances of the nonuniform market
sharing game where Vi = V for each player i is arbitrarily close to 2.
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Proof. We give an example with vj = . There are n2 + n markets and n2 players.
Players are partitioned in n groups of size n. Players in group k are interested in
markets k, kn + 1, kn + 2,..., kn + n. All budgets and costs are equal, i.e., for all
1 < j < n2 + n and 1 < << n2 , Bi = Cj = c. The strategy profile in which all
players of group k provide market k is a a Nash equilibrium and the social value of
this Nash equilibrium is Hn = 1 + .. + 1. However if we assign a new market to
each player, all markets are provided except n of them. The value of this assignment
is Hn2+n _- jn +n = Hn2+n - Hn Thus the ratio is /n2n I-1 which is equal1jn+n n+1' Hn n+l
to In(n2+n) = 2 as n - oo.
The proof that this bound is tight for general market sharing games where 14 = V
for all i E U is based on an example similar to the above one. Let Vi = V for
each player i. The budgets of players in group k are n - k. The cost of markets
k, kn + 1,kn + 2,... kn n - 1 is also n - k for 1 < k < n. The cost of the market
kn +n is large. 'The value of: market j is vj = 4. Similar te the previous eample if
all players of group k provide market k, no player has incentive to change his strategy.
It follows that the price of anarchy for this PSNE is arbitrarily close to 2. 1,
2.6.5 Market Sharing Game: Finding a Nash Equilibrium
By definition, the market sharing game is a congestion game and thus, a potential
game; and any sequence of strict improvement moves of players converges to a pure
Nash equilibrium (See Section 1.2 for definitions).
In a market sharing game with one player, finding a pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium corresponds to solving optimally a knapsack problem. Thus, the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium in the market sharing game is NP-hard. However, a Nash
equilibrium always exists. In this section, we give a polynomial-time algorithm to
find a pure Nash equilibrium in a uniform market sharing game.
Recall that in the uniform market sharing game, we assume that Cj = C for
all markets j E V. One main feature of the uniform variant is that it is easy for
player i to determine its best response, given the set of strategies for other players.
Indeed, player i only needs to solve an easy maximization problem corresponding
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to selecting the ki most rewarding markets, where ki = ]. We could therefore let
players repeatedly and optimally improve their strategy, but the main issue is to show
that such a process converges to a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time. In fact, we
will not analyze this algorithm. Instead we analyze an iterative algorithm in which
each agent is restricted to a set of changes at each step. This proves that if players
change according to these restrictions, they will converge to a Nash equilibrium in
polynomially many steps. This implies that a Nash equilibrium can be found in
polynomial time. An iterative algorithm to find a Nash equilibrium seeks a sequence
of improvement movesll starting from an empty strategy profile.
Theorem 2.6.10 For the uniform market sharing game, a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium always exists and can be found in polynomial time. Furthermore, it can be
obtained by a sequence of length m 2n of improvement moves of players.
Proof.. Our algorithm for finding he sequence of improvement moves and finding
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium proceeds in rounds. The first round starts at the
strategy profile (01,. .. , 0) corresponding to the set of empty strategies. In each
round, the first improvement move corresponds to a player, say i, switching from si
to si (with the maximum increase) where si = si U {j}. In other words, player i
only adds precisely one market which gives the maximum increase in the payoff to its
strategy. We refer to this first improvement move as an add improvement move. After
this first improvement move, subsequent improvement moves in a round are change
improvement moves. These correspond to a player, say i, replacing si by si U {j} \ {k),
where j si and k C si; player i exchanges market k for market j. Furthermore, given
i and k, j is selected among all possible markets i of interest to i and not currently
in si in order to maximize i's payoff. A round finishes when there are no change
improvement moves from the current strategy profile. Subsequent rounds start at the
strategy profile where the previous round finishes, unless this strategy profile has no
add improvement move from it in which case this is the last round.
First, observe that when the last round finishes, the current strategy profile has
"See the definition of an improvement move in Section 1.2
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no add or change improvement moves and therefore must be a pure Nash equilibrium.
This implicitly uses the fact that we are dealing with a uniform market sharing game
and therefore any maximal strategy for player i can be obtained from any other
maximal strategy by exchanging in and out two markets at a time. Furthermore, at
the end of each round, the current state has no change improvement moves outgoing
from it, which implies that it corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium if we suitably
modify the budgets of each player (so that they cannot add markets).
As one player adds a market at the beginning of each round, the number of rounds
cannot be greater than mn. We now show that each round ends after traversing at
most m - 1 change improvement moves (and one add improvement move).
Let us focus on one round and let nj be the number of players servicing market
j at the beginning of a round. For simplicity, we assume that the markets are sorted
in such a way that " > 2L >. > l . Consider any strategy profile in the
round after the first add improvement move. Let si be the markets currently served
by i and let Ti be the markets of interest to i not in si. For player i, let m(i) denote
min{j Ti}. We show by induction that the following properties hold throughout
the round:
1. For any player i, m(i) does not decrease during the round.
2. Every market j is covered by nj players, except one, denoted by p which is
covered by np + 1.
3. For any player i, any market j si and any market k T we have > .n - nk+l
Properties 1 and 2 are obviously true after the first add improvement move corre-
sponding to player, say 1, adding market p. Property 3 is also true after the first
add improvement move. Indeed, the condition reduces to the fact that the last round
ended in a pure Nash equilibrium except for the case where i = and j = p where it
follows from the choice of p: p > vP >  k
np np+l - nk+1
We see now what happens when we traverse a change improvement move corre-
sponding to player 1 exchanging two markets. Condition 3 implies that 1 leaves market
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p since all other markets do not increase 's payoff. Thus property 2 is maintained
after the change (with a different value for p). Secondly, 1 will now serve market m(l)
by definition of m(l). This implies that T < vm() i.e. m(l) < p. This means
np+l nm(1)I
that property 1 is also maintained. To verify that Property 3 is still maintained, we
only need to consider the cases in which i = 1 and either k = p or j = m(l). If
y = m(l), property 3 follows from the definition of m(l): m(l) > vm() > vk Ifim(l) nm(l)+l - nk+l'
k = p, it follows from > m(l) > p
nj - nm()+lI np+l'
All three properties are maintained during the round. Furthermore, since player
1 replaces market p by market m(l) and m(l) < p, we have that p decreases as we
traverse change improvement moves. This implies that we have at most m- 1 change
improvement moves in a round. This proves our bound of nm 2 on the length of the
number of improvement moves that we need to reach a pure Nash equilibrium.
In order to run the algorithm, we actually do not need to construct the entire state
graph. We only need to be able to find the next improvement move to traverse, and
this can be done in O(m+n) time, resulting in a total running time of O((m+n)m 2 n).
2.7 Conclusions and Open Problems
In this chapter, we developed centralized 1 - - -approximation algorithms, -
approximate decentralized mechanisms, and local search - -approximation algo-
rithms for a broad class of maximizing assignment problems. As our main motivation,
we focused on variants of a distributed caching problem, but all algorithms in this
chapter work for separable assignment problems. We complement this result by prov-
ing that the uniform CapDC problem is not approximable better than a factor of
1 - d, unless NPC DTIME(no(O°gl°gn)). The most natural question is to improve the
approximation factor for GAP.
In the decentralized mechanism, we show a good price of anarchy for mixed Nash
equilibria, but we also show several negative results for the convergence of these
games. One interesting open question is to prove fast convergence to constant-factor
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solutions in the CaplBDC game 12 . Another interesting open question is to see if the
uniform CapDC game or the uniform IBDC game have a pure Nash equilibrium. In
this chapter, we showed that a special case of IBDC game has a PSNE and the CapDC
game contains a cycle of strict best-response moves.
12In Chapters 3 and 4, we see some examples of games for which we can prove fast convergence
to constant-factor solutions.
72
Chapter 3
Convergence in Potential Games
Traditionally, research in operations research has focused upon finding a global op-
timum. Computer scientists have also long studied the effects of lack of different
resources, mainly the lack of computational resources, in optimization. Recently, the
lack of coordination inherent in many problems has become an important. issue in
computer science. A natural response to this has been to analyze Nash equilibria, in
these games. Of particular interest:is the price of anarchy 1 in a game [70]. Clearly,
a low price of anarchy may indicate that a system has no need for a single regulatory
authority. Conversely, a high price of anarchy is indicative of a poorly functioning
system in need of some regulation.
In this chapter, we move away from only measuring the social value of Nash equi-
libria to evaluate the performance of a game. There are several reasons for this. The
first reason is that we are not guaranteed that the selfish behavior of players con-
verges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, if a sequence of selfish behavior of players
converges to a Nash equilibrium, the time it takes for this convergence even may be
extremely long. So, from a practical viewpoint, in order to analyze the decentral-
ized mechanism, it is important to evaluate the speed or rate of convergence of the
corresponding game.
As is clear, these issues are particularly important in games in which the use of
pure strategies and repeated moves are the norm, for example, auctions. For these
'Some of the definitions and notations that are used in this chapter can be found in Section 1.2.
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games, then, it is not sufficient to just study the value of the social function at
Nash equilibria. Instead, we must also investigate the speed of convergence (or non-
convergence) to an equilibrium. Towards this goal, we will not restrict our attention
to Nash equilibria but rather prove that after some number of improvements or best
responses the value of the social function is within a factor of the optimal social
value. We tackle this by modeling the behavior of players using the underlying state
graph on the set of strategy states. We consider best-response walks in this graph
and evaluate the social function at states along these walks. The rate of convergence
to high quality solutions (or Nash equilibria) can then be measured by the length of
the walk. We address these issues in two chapters of this thesis. In this chapter, we
study potential games in which any sequence of strict improvement moves of players
converges to a PSNE. In these games, we study the rate of convergence to approximate
solutions. In Chapter 4, we examine games in which selfish behavior of players does
; not necessarily converge to a PSNE. In fact, these games may not possess any pure
Nash equilibrium. We will define a new equilibrium concept for those games and
measure the social value of this new equilibrium concept (See Chapter 4).
In this chapter, we study convergence for three classes of potential games: Cut
games (See Section 3.2 for definitions and results), basic-utility games (Section 3.3)
and market sharing games (Section 3.4).
3.1 Preliminaries
In this chapter, we use the definitions and notations from Section 1.2. Given a
best-response walk starting from an arbitrary state in the state graph, we are most
interested in the social value of the last state on the walk. Notice that if we do not
allow every player to make a best response on a walk 1P, then we may not be able to
bound the social value of a state with respect to the optimal solution. This follows
from the fact that the strategy of a single player may be very important for producing
solutions of high social value. Hence, we consider the following models:
One-round walk: Consider an arbitrary ordering of all players il. . . , i. A walk P
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of length n in the state graph is a one-round walk if for each j E {1,2,..., n},
the jth edge of P has label ij.
Covering walk: A walk P in the state graph is a covering walk if for each player i,
there exists an edge of P with label i.
k-Covering walk: A walk P in the state graph is a k-covering walk if there are k
covering walks Pi,P 2,... ,Pk such that P = (Pl,P 2,... ,Pk).
Random walk: A walk P in the state graph is a random walk, if at each step the
next player is chosen uniformly at random and independently of the previous
players.
Random one-round walk: Let or be a ordering of players picked uniformly at ran-
dom from the set of all possible orderings. Then, the one-round walk P corre-
sponding to the ordering a, is a random one-round walk.
Note that a one-round walk is a covering walk. Also in the one-round walk we
let each player play his best response exactly one time, but in a covering walk we
let each player play at least one time. For a non-cooperative game g with a social
fiunction y, we are interested in the social value of states (especially the final state)
along one-round, covering, k-covering, and random walks.
Related Work. Here, we give a brief overview of related work in this area. The
consequences of the selfish behavior and the question of efficient computation of Nash
equilibria have recently drawn much attention in computer science [70, 67]. Moreover,
the use of the price of anarchy [70] as a measure of the cost of the lack of coordination
in a game is now widespread, with a notable success in this realm being the selfish
routing game [78]. A basic result of Rosenthal [76] defines congestion games for which
pure strategy Nash equilibria exist. Monderer and Shapley [60] proved that congestion
games are equivalent to the class of exact potential games2 . Milchtaich [55] studied
player-specific congestion games and the length of best-response walks in this set of
2See Section 1.2 for the definition.
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games. Even-Dar et al. [14] considered the convergence time to Nash equilibria in
variants of a load balancing game. They bound the number of required steps to reach a
pure Nash equilibrium in these games. They consider a central policy that let agents
move in a certain order, and analyze different policies to choose such an ordering.
In contrast to this work, their interest is in the convergence time to a pure Nash
equilibrium and not to good approximate solutions. Fabrikant et al. [15] studied the
complexity of finding a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in general congestion games.
Their PLS-completeness results show that in some congestion games (including selfish
routing games), the length of a best-response walk in the state graph to a pure Nash
equilibrium might be exponential.
A Simple Example. Here, we illustrate the use of the above definitions by studying
covering walks in a simple load balancing game; The speed of convergence to Nash
equilibria in this games has been considered :by Even-Dar et al. [141. Coilsider n
jobs that can be scheduled on m machines. Assume that it takes pi units of time
for job i to run on any of he machines. Formally, :we define the strategic game
g(U, {Fi ic U}, {cili c U}) as follows: The set of players U is the set of jobs, and
the strategy set Fi of a player i is the set of all machines Fi = {j II < j < m}. Given
the strategy profile S = (Sl,..., sn), let Ij(S) be the total processing time or the load
of machine j. The payoff of player i is ai(S) = li(s) Thus, each job wants to be
scheduled on a machine with the minimum load. The social function is the maximum
load over all machines, i.e., y(S) = maxI<jml, j (S)
This game is a potential game. The potential function is as follows: Given a
strategy profile S, we sort the numbers lj(S) for all machines in a decreasing order.
Consider the resulting vector. We claim that this vector is a potential function for
this game. To see this, we can show that if a job moves from a machine to another
machine and decreases its payoff, this potential function decreases lexicographically.
Therefore, any sequence of strict improvement moves of players converges to a PSNE.
First, we show that the price of anarchy for PSNE in this game is at most 2. Let
OPT be the value of the optimal schedule. Consider a PSNE S of this game. As no
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job i has incentive to change machine and decreases the load of the machine that it
is scheduled on, we have: for any job i and any machine j, 1, (S) < Ij (S) +pi. Thus,
for any machine j and any job i such that si = j, all machines are busy at all times
before lj(S)-pi, thus, OPT > lj(S)-pi. Consider the machine j* with the maximum
load in S and a job i that is scheduled on j*. Hence, OPT Ij* (S) -p = y(S) -pi.
Clearly, OPT > Pi. Thus, (S) < 20PT as desired.
In addition, from any state there is a walk of length at most n to some pure
Nash equilibrium [80]. On an arbitrary best-response walk, it may, however, take
more than n steps to converge to a pure Nash equilibrium. Our goal is to show
that the social value of any state at the end of a covering walk is within a factor
2 of optimal. Consider a covering walk P = (S1, S2 ,... ,Sk). Let j* be the ma-
chine with the largest load at state Sk. Consider the last job i* that was sched-
uled on machine j*, and let the strategy profile after scheduling i* be St. Ig-
noring job i*, at time t the load of all the machines is at least 1* (Sk) - pi*. If
not, job i* would not have been scheduled on machine j*. Consequently, we have
El<i<npi > m(lj*(Sk) - pi*). Thus, OPT > El <i<npi/m > ij*(Sk) - Pi*. Clearly,
OPT > pi*. Thus, y(Sk) = l* (Sk) = lj*(Sk) - Pi* + Pi* < 20PT as desired.
3.2 The Max-Cut Game: Convergence
In this section, we study an illustrative potential game, called the cut game or the
Max-Cut game. First, we define this game formally. We are given an undirected
graph G(V, E), with n vertices and edge weights w : E(G) Q+. In this section, we
assume that G is connected, simple, and does not contain loops. For each v G V(G),
let deg(v) be the degree of v, and let Adj(v) be the set of neighbors of v. Let also w, =
EuEAdj(v) Wu,. A cut in C is a partition of V(G) into two sets T and T = V(G) - T,
and is denoted by (T, T). The value of a cut is the sum of edges between the two sets
T and T, i.e., EeT,uET WUV.
The Max-Cut game or the cut game on a graph G(V, E) is defined as follows:
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each vertex v G V(G) is a player, and the strategy of v is to choose one side of the
cut, i.e., v can choose s =-1 or s = 1. A strategy profile S = (sl,s 2,...,Sn),
corresponds to a cut (T,T) where T = {i s = 1}. The payoff of player v in a
strategy profile S, denoted by a,(S), is equal to the contribution of v in the cut, i.e.,
a(S) = -i:iS#v Wiq. It follows that the cut value is equal to ZEvv av(S). If S
is clear from the context, we use av instead of av(S) to denote the payoff of v. We
denote the maximum value of a cut in G, by c(G). We consider the cut value as the
social function.
The Max-Cut problem is a well-studied problem [30]. Simple greedy approxima-
tion algorithms are known for this problem with the performance guarantee of 2. A
greedy algorithm is as follows: start from an empty cut, add vertices of the graph one
by one, and add each vertex to the side that maximizes the contribution of vertex v in
the cut. The total weight of edges in the resulting cut is at least of the the total weight
of edges, thus, it is a, l-approxiimation algorithm. Goemans and Williamson [30] gave
a 0).87.8-approximation algorithm for the.Max-Cut problem which is the best known
approximation algorithm for this problem. Local search algorithms have been con-
sidered for this problem. At, each step of the local search algorithm for the Max-Cut
problem, we find a vertex such that if we move this vertex to the other side of the
cut, the value of the cut increases. It is known that the cut value of a local optimal
solution or equivalently the PSNE of the cut game of the cut game is at least of the
optimal solution. The reason is that in a PSNE, the payoff of each vertex is at least
2 of the total weight of the edges that are adjacent to this vertex. It follows that the
sum of the payoffs of players in a PSNE of this game is at least the total weight of
edges of the graph. Therefore, the cut value in a PSNE is at least of the maximum
cut.
The cut game is a potential game. The potential function for this game is the value
of the cut. As a result, selfish behavior of vertices will converge to a PSNE. But, it is
well known that finding a local optimal solution of the Max-Cut local search problem
or a PSNE of the cut game is PLS-complete [47, 79] and there are some configurations
that are exponentially far from any local optimal solution. In other words, there are
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strategy profiles in the cut game in which the shortest best-response walks to any
PSNE is exponentially long. On the positive side, Poljak [74] proved that for cubic
graphs the convergence time is at most 0(n2 ) steps.
3.2.1 Fast Convergence on Random Walks
First we prove positive results for the convergence to constant-factor approximate
solutions with random walks. We show that the expected value of the cut after a
random one-round walk is within a constant factor of the maximum cut.
Theorem 3.2.1 In weighted graphs, the expected value of the cut at the end of a
random one-round walk in the cut game is at least of the maximum cut.
Proof. It suffices to show that after a random one-round walk, for every v G V(G),
E[av] '8 §Wv,.
Consider a vertex v. The probability that v occurs after exactly k of its neighbors,.
is deg(v)+l for k = 0, 1, .. , deg(v). After v moves, the contribution of v in the cut is
at least -. Conditioning on the fact that v occurs after exactly k neighbors, for each
vertex u in the neighborhood of v, the probability that it occurs after v is deg(v) k
and only in this case u can decrease the contribution of v in the cut by at most wv.
Thus the expected contribution of v in the cut is at least max(, w( 2- dv) ))
Summing over all values of k, we obtain
dg 1 1 _ deg(v)- 
E[o] > E max deg() ))
k=Oadeg(v)± 1 2 deg(v)
deg(v) 2k - deg(v)
- deg(v) + 1 liv 2deg(v)
k=de2J+l
W> 
- 8
'The result follows by linearity of expectation. OE
The next theorem studies a random walk of best responses that is not necessarily
a one-round walk.
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Theorem 3.2.2 The expected value of the cut at the end of a random walk of length
3nlog n is at least a constant-factor of the maximum cut.
Proof. Let G(V, E) be a weighted graph, and let X = l, x2 ,. . . ,xk be a sequence,
where each xi is chosen uniformly at random from V(G). If k = 3nlogn, then
X contains each element of V(G) with probability 1 - 1. By the union bound, all
vertices occur in X with probability 1 - 1. Thus, it is sufficient to prove the assertion
conditioning on the fact that all vertices occur in X.
Assume now that X contains all the elements of V(G), and for each v G V(G) let
t(v) be the largest i, with 1 < i < k, such that xi = v. Consider now the subsequence
X' of X, such that X' contains only those elements xi, such that i = t(v), for some
v V(G). It is easy to see that X' induces a random one-round walk. Observe
that for xt(u), t(v) E X', with t(u) < t(v), we know that after vertex v plays, the
contribution of v in the cut that is due to the edge {u, v} cannot change. Therefore,
by applying the same argument as in the proof of Theoremr 3.2.1, the assertion fllows.
3.2.2 Poor Deterministic Convergence
We now give lower bounds for the convergence to approximate solutions for the cut
social function. First, we give a simple example for which we need at least Q(n) rounds
of best responses to converge to a constant-factor cut. The construction resembles a
result of Poljak [74].
Theorem 3.2.3 There exists a weighted graph G(V, E), with V(G)I = n, and an
ordering of vertices such that for any k > 0, the value of the cut after k rounds of
letting players play in this ordering is at most O(k/n) of the maximum cut.
Proof. Consider a graph G(V,E), with V(G) = {1,2,...,n}, and E(G) = {{i,i +
1}1 < i < n - 1}. For any i, with 1 < i < n, the weight of the edge {i,i + 1}, is
1 + (i - 1)/n2 . Since G is bipartite, the value of the maximum cut of G is c(G) =
Ei=1(1 + (i- 1)/n2 ) = Q(n). The graph G is depicted in Figure 3-1.
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Let a be an ordering of the vertices of G, with v(i) = i. Consider the execution
of the one-round walk for the ordering a. At the beginning,, we have T = V(G). It
is easy to see that in any round i > 1, when vertex j plays, if j < n - i, j moves to
the other part of the cut. Otherwise, if j > n - i, j remains in the same part of the
cut. Thus, after round i, we have
T {rn,n - 2,n - 4,..., n - i + 1} if i is odd
T {1,2,...,n-i-1} U {n,n-2,n-4,...,n-i} ifiiseven
It easily follows that the size of the cut after k rounds according to the ordering a, is
Zi=n-k 1 + (i- 1)/n2 0 O(k).
1 1+1/nA2 1+(n-l)/nA2
2 3 n-
Figure 3-l: A path of length n on which k rounds of best responses of vertices result
in a cut of value Q(k) of the maximum cut. The numbers on edges are the weight of
the edges.
We next combine a modified version of the above construction with a result of
Schaffer and Yannakakis for the Max-Cut local search problem [79] to obtain an
exponentially-long walk with poor cut value.
Theorem 3.2.4 There exists a weighted graph G(V, E), with V(G)I = (n), and a
k-covering walk P in the state graph, for some k exponentially large in n, such that
the value of the cut at the end of P, is at most 0(1/n) of the optimum cut.
Proof. In [79], it is shown that there exists a weighted graph Go(V, E), and an initial
cut (To, To), such that the length of any walk in the state graph, from (To0,To) to
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, is exponentially long. Consider such a graph of
size (n), with V(Go) = {vo, v1,. .. ,VN}. Let Po be an exponentially long walk from
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(To, To) to a Nash equilibrium in which we let vertices v0, Vl,. , VN play in this order
for an exponential number of rounds. Let So, SI,..., SIpol be the sequence of states
visited by Po and let yi be the vertex that plays his best response from state Si to
state Si+l. The result of [79] guarantees that there exists a vertex, say vo that wants
to change side (i.e., strategy) an exponential number of times along the walk o (since
otherwise we can find a small walk to a pure Nash equilibrium). Let to = 0, and for
i > 1, let ti be the time in which vo changes side for the i-th time along the walk Po.
For i > 1, let Qi be the sequence of vertices Yti 1+l, . . , yti. Observe that each Qi
contains all of the vertices in Go.
Consider now a graph G, which consists of a path L = x1, 2 , . . ,X, and a copy
of Go. For each i c {1,..., n-1}, the weight of the edge {xi, xi+} is 1. We scale the
weights of Go, such that the total weight of the edges of Go is less than 1. Finally, for
each i E {1,... , n}, we add the edge {xi, vo0}, of weight , for some sufficiently small
e. Intuitively, we can pick the value of c, such that the moves made by the vertices in
Go; are independent of the positions of the vertices of the path L in the current cut.
For each i > 1, we consider an ordering 7Ri of the vertices of L, as follows: If i is
odd, then R7i = x,x 2,. .. ,xn, and if iis even, then Ri = x,,x ,_l,... l.
We are now ready to describe the exponentially long path in the state graph.
Assume w.l.o.g., that in the initial cut for Go, we have vo C To. The initial cut for G
is (T, T), with T= {x} U To, and T = {x 2,.. ., I U To. It is now straightforward to
verify that there exists an exponentially large k, such that for any i, with 1 < i < k,
if we let the vertices of G play according to the sequence Q1, R 1, Q2, R 2 ,..., Qi, Ri,
then we have (see Figure 3-2):
* If i is even, then {vo0,x1 } c T, and {x2,..., x} T.
* If i is odd, then {xl,... ,x_-} c T, and {vo,xn} c T.
It follows that for each i, with 1 < i < k, the size of the cut is at most O(1/n) times
the value of the optimal cut. The result follows since each walk in the state graph
induced by the sequence Qi and Ri is a covering walk. ]
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(a) i is even. (b) i is odd.
Figure 3-2: The cut (Ti, T) along the walk of the proof of Theorem 3.2.4 after playing
Qi and Zi.
3.2.3 Mildly Greedy Players
By Theorem 3.2.1, it follows that for any graph, and starting from an arbitrary cut,
there exists a walk of length at most n to an Q(1)-approximate cut. On the other
hand, Theorems 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, show that there are cases where a deterministic
ordering of players may result to very long walks that do not reach an approximately
good cut.
We observe that if we change the game by assuming that a vertex changes side in
the cut if his payoff is multiplied by at least a factor 1 + e, for a constant > 0, then
the convergence is faster. We call such vertices (1 + e)-greedy. In the following, we
prove that if all vertices are (1 + e)-greedy for a constant > 0, then the value of the
cut after any one-round walk is within a constant factor of the optimum.
Theorem 3.2.5 If all vertices are (1 + c)-greedy the cut value at the end of any
one-round walk is within a min{ +2, 42 factor of the optimal cut.
Proof. Consider a one-round walk P. For each vertex v, let ' be the payoff of v
right after its occurrence in P, and let Cav be the payoff of v at the end of P. Let
V be the set of vertices that did not change their side in the one-round walk and
V2 = V(G) \ V. For a vertex v G V2, let r be the total weight of the edges that are
removed from the cut at the time that v moves to the other side. Since vertices are
1 -+ c-greedy, w'-r' > 1 + e otherwise v would not change side. Thus, r, < 1 w. We
rv -2+c V
claim that the difference between EvEV(G) a' and EVc(G) Acv is at most ZvEv2 rv.
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To see this, we observe that when a vertex v G V2 changes side, it can decrease the
summation ZvV(G) Cav by at most rv. Moreover, if v V then a'(v) > 2+wv,
and if v E V2 then a'(v) > +wv. In the following, for a set T C V(G), we let
W(T) = ZvET wV. Thus,
E ° > -E rV
VEV(G) vGV(G) VEV2
=E + Z -
vEV1 vEV2 vE V1 1VEV2 V1V2
> 2 W(V + + W(V 2) W(V2)
-+ 2 + 2 +7
1 e
> min{2 + ' 2 + }W (V (G ) )'
Thus, the value of the cut after this one-round walk is at least a min(4+;, 42)-
approximation. The best bound is obtained when = 1, for which we obtain a
·- approxiInate cut after one round. ; L
3.2.4 Unweighted Graphs
In unweighted simple graphs, it is straight-forward to verify that the value of the cut
at the end of an n2 -covering walk is at least 1 of the optimum. The following theorem
shows that in unweighted graphs, the value of the cut after any Q(n)-covering walk
is a constant-factor approximation.
Theorem 3.2.6 For unweighted graphs, the value of the cut after an Q(n)-covering
walk is within a constant-factor of the maximum cut.
Proof. Consider a k-covering walk P = ( 1,..., Pk), where each Pi is a covering
walk. Let M0 = 0, and for any i > 1, let Mi be the size of the cut at the end of Pi.
Note that if Mi- Mi-1 > I(), for all i with 1 < i < k, then clearly Mk > k E(G)li0n 0n
and since the maximum size of a cut is at most E(G) , the lemma follows.
It remains to consider the case where there exists i with 1 < i < k such that
i - Mi- 1 < E(G) . Let V be the set of vertices that change their side in the cut10n
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on the walk Pi, and V2 = V(G) \ VI. Observe that when a vertex changes its side in
the cut, the size of the cut increases by at least 1. Thus, IV I < E(G), and since theI0n
degree of each vertex is at most n - 1, it follows that the number of edges that are
incident to vertices in VI, is less than IE(G).10
On the other hand, if a vertex of degree d remains in the same part of the cut,
then exactly after it plays, at least d/21 of its adjacent edges are in the cut. Thus,
at least half of the edges that are incident to at least one vertex in V2, were in the
cut, at some point during walk Pi. At most IE(g) of these edges have an end-point
in V, and thus at most that many of these edges may not appear in the cut at the
end of Pi. Thus, the total number of edges that remain in the cut at the end of walk
Pi, is at least I()L-L()/1° - .1( Since the maximum size of a cut is at
most E(G) , we obtain that at the end of Pi, the value of the cut is within a constant
factor of the optimum. O
We complement the upper bound of Theorem 3.2.6, by exhibiting aij. example that
requires Q(v/-) rounds of best responses to converge to a constant-factor cut.
Theorem 3.2.7 There exists an unweighted graph G(V, E) with V(G)I = n and an
ordering of the vertices such that for any k > 0, the value of the cut after k rounds
of letting players play in this ordering is at most O(k/lV) of the maximum cut.
Proof. Let V(G) = {vi,jl < j < i < t} and E(G) = {vijVi+l,l1 < j i <
t- 1,1 < I < i + 1}. Clearly, G is bipartite, and thus the maximum cut value
c(G) = E(G) = Q(t3 ) = Q(n3 /2 ). The graph G is depicted in Figure 3-3. Vertex vij
for any 1 < i,j < n is labeled by (i,j). Let the subset {vijl1 < j < i} of vertices be
the layer i of vertices of this graph.
Consider now the ordering , such that for any i, j with 1 < j < i < t, (i(i-) +
j) = vi j. We start from the empty cut. By an argument similar to the one used
in the proof of Theorem 3.2.3, we obtain that after k rounds of letting players play
according to the ordering a, the size of the cut is at most O(kt2 ) = O(kn). In fact in
the ith round of best responses of players, all vertices in layers 1, 2,.. . , t - i change
side to the other side of the cut.
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Figure 3-3: An unweighted graph G on which k rounds of best responses of vertices
result in a cut of value Q( ) of the maximum cut. The graph consists of t layers;
layer i consist of i vertices, and all vertices of layer i are connected to vertices of layer
i+1.
3.3 Basic-utility Games: Convergence
In this section, we study the social value of random and deterministic best-response
walks for basic-utility games. Recall that basic-utility games are a subclass of valid-
utility games (See Section 1.2 for the definition of valid-utility and basic-utility
games). Basic-utility games include a wide class of facility location games. These
facility location games are introduced by Vetta [87]. Vetta [87] observed that basic-
utility games are potential games. In fact, a potential function is the social utility
function. To see this, consider a strategy profile S = (sl,..., s) where si C Vi and
a player i who changes strategy from si to si and increases her payoff. Therefore,
oi(S ( s) > ai(S). The difference between the social value of S s and S is
y(S ED S') - y(S) = (y(S E Ds) - y(S D 0)) - (y(S) - y(S ¢ 0i))
= i (S ) - ~, (S)
> 0.
Therefore, the social utility function is a potential function for basic-utility games.
This shows that any sequence of strict improvement moves converges to a PSNE.
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Vetta [87] proved that the price of anarchy for (mixed) Nash equilibria for basic-
utility (and valid-utility) games is at most 2. This implies that in basic-utility games,
any sequence of strict improvement moves converges to a state with social value at
least OPT. In the following, we study the rate of convergence to states with high
social value on random walks.
Here, we prove that in basic-utility games, the expected social value of a state
after Q(n) random best responses is at least 2 - of the optimal social value, for any
constant > 0. In Chapter 4, we will show that this fast convergence does not hold
for valid-utility games.
Theorem 3.3.1 In basic-utility games, for any constant e > O, there exists a constant
c such that the expected social value of a state after cn log e random best responses is
at least -e of the optimum. Moreover, for any constant A' > O, there exist constants
e., c' > 0 such that after cn log n log random best responses, the social value is at
least - E of the optimum with high probability.
Proof. Let Q = (l,...,con) denote an optimal state, and T = (tl,t 2 ,...,tn) be
a strategy profile of agents. Let T i be the strategy profile resulting from T after
agent i plays its best response in T and let Qi = ( 1,...,aji, 0 i+1,.. , 0,n). Let Y =
1 Eju y(Ti) be the expected social value of the state after a random agent plays its
best response. Our goal is to lower bound Y.
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To do so, using submodularity, basicness and the cake condition we get:
nY - ny(T) = >((Ti) - (T))
i/U
= (y(T) - y(T · 0)) - y(y(T) - y(T 0i))
iEU iEU
= oi(T) - a(T) [by basicness]
iEU iEU
> aOi(T) - (T) [by cake condition]
iEu
>E ai(Ti D oi) - y(T) [since i plays his best response in Ti]
ieu
- > ', (Te ( ) - y(T) [by basicness]
iEU
> ,(7y(T · (i) - y(T · 0,)) - y(T)
ieU
> (~y(T U Qi) - )y/(T U Qi-L)) - y(T) [by submodularity]
icu
= y(T U Q) --- (T) ...:(T) [since it is a 'teiscopic sunmmation]
> OPT - 2y(T) [since y is non-decreasing].
The above inequalities show that Y > n2y(T) + 1OPT. Let Yo be the actual
social value of the initial state. At each step, a random agent is picked and plays its
best response. Thus, if Y is the social value of the state after step i, then E[YjIYi_l- 
y] > ()y + 1 OPT. Let pyy, be the probability that Yi_1 = y' given that Yi-2 = Y
Thus, E[Yi_1 Y_2 = y] = >Y py, y'. Therefore,
E[lYiY-2-= y] = pyyE[YilYi-2 = y, Yi-1 = y']
Y/
(n- 2, 1
> pyy,(( n )Y'- +OPT)
y'fl-2 1
= ( )E[Y_lYi_2 = y] + -OPT
n-2 ( n-2 OPT) +Ž ( l )Y+ 1OPT)+ OPT
( n-)2y+ OPT(1 + ( ))
n n n
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Thus, E[YilYi- 2 = ] > (n-2) 2 y + 7OPT(1 + (n-2)). Similarly, we can prove that
E[YiYo = yo] > (n-2)iyo + OPT(1 + (n-2) + .. + (_-)-1 ) Since yo > 0, E[Y] >
,OPT( (1- 2)i)
This proves that for a sufficiently large constant c and by setting i = cn log f, the
expected social value after cnlog best responses is at least - of the optimum.
Moreover, since in basic-utility games the social value is non-decreasing as agents play
their best responses, we claim that for a sufficiently large c' = cc" > 0 and a sufficiently
small > 0, after c'nlognlog e random best responses, with high probability the
social value is at least - t' of the optimum. The reason is that we can partition the
best response walk of length cn log n log e into c" log n best-response walks of length
cn log e, and after each of these subwalks, the expected social value is at least - e
of the optimum. Thus, by Markov inequality, with a constant probability after each
of the subwalks of length cn log l, the expected social value is at least ( - c') of the
optimum. Hence, after cn log n log - best responses, the social value is at least -- /
of the optimum with high probability. EJ
3.4 Market Sharing Games: Convergence
In this section we consider the market sharing game. For the formal definition and
an introduction to these games, see Chapter 2. Note that in this game, to find the
best-response strategy, each player should solve a knapsack problem. Therefore, in
order to model computationally constrained agents, we may assume that the agents
apply A-approximation algorithms to determine their best-response strategies. More
precisely, when a player uses a A-approximation algorithm for his best-response move,
he changes his strategy if he does not decrease his payoff and his payoff after this move
is at least A times his payoff after any other move from this state. We then obtain
the following theorems concerning the social value after one round of best responses
moves. In the following we use the Harmonic number H, = 1 + + ... + .
Theorem 3.4.1 In market sharing games, the social value of a state at the end of
a one-round walk is at least 12H+ of the optimal social value (or at least +H+1 if
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the agents use A-approzimation algorithms).
Proof. Let Q = (l,... , a,) denote an optimal state. Here i C V is the set of
markets that player i services in this optimal solution; we may also assume that each
market is provided by at most one player in Q (we will use this fact later in the proof).
Let T = (t,.. , tn) and S = (Si,..., sn) be the initial and final states on the one-
round walk, respectively. We assume that the agents play best-response strategies in
the order 1,2,..., n. So in step r, using a A-approximation algorithm, agent r changes
its strategy from tr to sr; thus T r = (S, ... ., sr, tr+i, . . , tn) is an intermediate state
in the one-round walk P = T = {  ,T1,...,Tn = S}. The social value of state
S = T n is y(S) = ieu ai(S). We need to show that iCu ai(S) > l+ H OPT.
Towards this goal, we first show that -y(S) = EieU ai(Ti) -> Z Lieua ai(Ti).
We know that agent r does not change its strategy from sr after step r. Therefore
a market j has a nonzero contribution in y(S) if and only if market j has a nonzero
contribution in the summation Eieu ai (Ti). For any market j, if j appears in any of
strategies in Tn then the contribution of j to y(S) is qj. C)n the other hand, at most
n players use market j in their strategies. The payoff of the first player who serves
market j is at most qj. The payoff of the second player who served market j is at
most qj, since when he plays, at least one other player serve market j. Similarly, the
payoff of the ith player who serves market j is at most , since when he plays, at
least i - 1 other players serve market j. Consequently, the contribution of market j
in the summation EiEU ai(Ti) is at most
1 1(1 + + +... +-)qj = Hqj.
2 3 n
It follows that aiEu (Tn) > i Eicuai(Ti), as required. We denote by T the
summation EiGU a°i(Ti). Consider the optimal assignment Q, and let i be the set of
markets that are serviced by agent i in ai but that are not serviced by any agent in
S, that is, Yi = ai - UEusr. Now, y(S) is greater than the value of all the markets
in UrGU (ar - Y), since these markets are a subset of markets serviced in S. Hence,
using the notation q(Q) = EjeQ qj to denote the sum of the value of a subset Q of the
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markets, we have ?y(S) > C,,U q(r - Yr); here we use the fact that in the optimum
each market is served by at most one agent.
Next, we will prove that T > A ErEU q(Yr). Let Y' be the markets in Yi that are
not serviced in T i , that is, Y' = Yi - (l U .. U si U ti+l U ... U t). Then Y' is a
feasible strategy for agent i at step i. Thus, we have ai(T i ) > q(Yi'), since player i
uses a A-approximation algorithm. Therefore, T > A ErEU q(Y). Again, we use the
fact that Yi"s are disjoint.
Finally, we claim that T > iev q(Yi") where Yi" = Yi - Yi'. To see this, consider
a market j Yi". Market j is not in the strategy set of any agent in T n, but is in
the strategy set of at least one player in Ti . Therefore, somewhere on the walk P,
after Ti , some player must change its strategy and discontinue servicing market j.
Also note that if j E Yi" then j Yi' for any i' :~ i, since each market is serviced
by at most one player in Q. Let. bj be the time step such that TbJ is the first state
amongst Ti+l,... ,T' that does not service market j. Let M1 - {j Vlbj =. i be
the set of markets for which bj = i. It follows that UEUr/ = UrevMr. Notice that
A/i C ti and no other agents service any market in Mi in T i- l, since after player i
changes his strategy any market in Mi is not serviced in T i. Player i changes his
strategy from ti to si and does not service Mi in T i, thus the payoff of player i in T i
is at least ZjcEM qj (since j is only served by i in Ti-'). As a result, ai(T i ) > q(Mi)
(since player i changes his strategy only if he can increase his payoff). Therefore,
ZiEU q(Yi") = JiEU q(Mi) < EiEU ai(Ti ) = T. Hence we have,
OPT = q(i)
iEU
< E q(oi - Yi )+ q(Yi)
iEU iEU
< a(S)+ Y) + E q(Yi")
iEU iEU
1
< (S)+ T+T
A+I
< (1 + Hn)y(S).
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Theorem 3.4.2 In market sharing games, the social value of a state at the end of a
one-round walk may be as bad as - of the optimal social value.
Proof. Consider the following instance of a market sharing game. There are m = n
markets, and the value of market j is qj = - c for all 1 < j < n where is
sufficiently small. The cost of market j is Cj = 1 + (n - j)e for 2 < j < n and
C1 = 1. There are n players and the budget of player i is equal to 1 + (n - i)e. As
a result, player i can only serve markets 1 and i, i + 1,..., n and we assume that
he is interested is serving all these markets. Consider the ordering 1,2,... , n and
the one-round walk starting from the empty set of strategies and letting each player
play once in this order. The resulting assignment after this one-round walk is that
all players provide market number 1 and the social value of this assignment is n - .
However, in the optimal solution, agent i services market i. This gives an optimal
social value of nHT - n. Thus, the ratio between the optimum and the value of the
resulting assignment is H,, at the end of a one-round walk. D
3.5 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this chapter, we introduced a framework for studying speed of convergence to
approximate solutions in potential games. We believe that in order to capture the
computational issues of the performance of systems under lack of coordination, instead
of just bounding the performance of a Nash equilibrium, it is necessary to bound the
performance of the system along walks induced by a polynomial number of movements
by players. We are especially interested in the performance of the system along fair
walks (e.g., random and covering walks) to equilibria, since we may hope for better
social functions along these walks. This, in turn, has implications in local search
method in optimization. In order to use local search to optimize a function, we do
not need to find the local optimum. We can find short walks to approximate solutions,
e.g., by randomizing over the choice of the next local operation. Similar questions
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can be asked about different classes of games and local optimization problems. In
Chapter 4, we will see another example of games in which the convergence to equilibria
is exponential, but we can show fast convergence to approximate solutions on random
walks.
Market sharing games are not yet well understood. In particular, it is not known
whether exponentially long best-response paths exist. Bounding the social value of a
state at the end of a k-covering path is another open question. In Chapter 2, we gave
a polynomial-time algorithm to find the pure Nash equilibrium in uniform market
sharing games. Finding such an equilibrium is NP-complete for the general case, but
the question of obtaining approximate Nash equilibria is open.
Among the problems for the convergence in cut games, we do not know if the
result of Theorem 3.2.1 for random one-round walks holds with high probability or
not. The complexity of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in the above cut
game is not known to us. Another open problem is bounding the length of walks to
Nash equilibria in cut games in which all players are (1 + >)-greedy.
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Chapter 4
Sink Equilibria and Convergence
A standard approach in analyzing the performance of systems controlled by non-
cooperative agents is by the examination of Nash equilibria. Of particular interest is
the price of anarchy in a game [53]. This gives one measure of the cost to society of the
inherent lack of coordination in a game. As mentioned 'in Chapter 3, there are several
drawbacks in the use of Nash equilibria. For example, one issue relates to use of non-
randomized (pure) and randomized (mixed) strategies. Often pure Nash equilibria
may not exist, yet the use of a randomized (mixed) strategy is unrealistic in many
games. This necessitates the need for an alternative solution concept in evaluating
such games. Another issue arises from the observation that Nash equilibria represent
"stable" points in a system. Therefore (even if pure Nash equilibria exist), they
are a more acceptable solution concept if it is likely that the system does converge
to such stable points. In particular, the use of Nash equilibria seems more valid
in games in which Nash equilibria arise when players iteratively engage in selfish
behavior. However, in many games it is not the case that repeated selfish behavior
always leads to Nash equilibria. In these games it also seems that another measure
of the cost of the lack of coordination would be useful. Observe that these issues
are particularly important in games in which the use of pure strategies and repeated
moves are the norm, for example, auctions. We remark that for most practical games
these properties are the rule rather than the exception and this observation motivates
much of the work in this work. In this chapter, we address this issue by introducing
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a new solution concept in a game, namely sink equilibria and studying the (expected)
social value in these equilibria. We first formally define this equilibrium concept.
4.1 Sink Equilibria
We model the behavior of agents via a state graph. In many games with iterative
moves, the evolution of game-play may then be naturally modeled by a path in the
state graph. Such a path may or may not converge to a PSNE; observe that a
PSNE is a vertex in the state graph for which the best response move of each agent
corresponds to a self-loop. Clearly it may also be the case that there are no PSNE.
We may ask what happens in such games. Specifically, does some concept of stability
or equilibrium exist? The answer is yes, and we now describe such an "equilibrium".
Consider the strongly connected components of the state graph. If we contract the
strongly connected components to: singletons then we otain an acyclic graph. The
sinik nodes in this graph (nodes with out-degree equal to' zero) correspond to strongly
connected components with no out-going; arcs in the state graph. We call such a
strongly connected component a sink equilibrium 1. The reason for this terminology
is clear: if a best-response walk ever reaches a node in a sink equilibrium then it will
never leave that set of nodes. This justifies using the terms sink and equilibrium.
In addition, a long enough random walk in the state graph will converge to a sink
equilibrium with probability arbitrarily close to 1. (This model can be justified in
extensive games with complete information and is used in the economics literature
extensively in the context of studying convergence in these games.)
We denote by Q the set of sink equilibria in a game. We remark that the union
of states in sink equilibria correspond to the set of recurrent states in a Markov
chain that only has non-zero transitional probabilities on arcs in the state graph.
In a random sequence of best responses of agents, we choose an agent uniformly at
random at each step and independent of the previous players and let this agent play
'We can also call this equilibrium the myopic equilibrium, since we only consider myopic best
responses in the state graph
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his best response (if the agent has more than one best-response move, we may assume
that the agent arbitrarily chooses a move from the collection of best-response moves).
When this walk reaches a state in some sink we then have a random walk over the
states in that sink. For a sink Q Q, let rQ : Q E+ U {O} be the steady state
distribution of the random walk over states in Q. Let y(S) measure the social value
of a state S. The (expected) social value of a sink equilibrium Q E Q, denoted by
F(Q), is the expected social value of states given by the steady distribution of the
random walk over the states of Q, i.e., F(Q) = ZsQ 7rQ(S)y(S)2 We then define, the
price of sinking3 for a maximization social function as
Price of Sinking OPT OPT
min (Q) min ZSEQ 7rQ(S)1(S)QEQ QEQ
In other words, the price of sinking is the worst ratio between the expected social
value of a sink equilibrium and the social value of the optimum. Similarly, the price of
max r(Q)
sinking for a minimization problem is QePT -. Given that sink equilibria are stable
solutions in such games, this is a more realistic measure of the cost of the lack of
coordination than the price of anarchy.
We illustrate the use of the price of sinking in Section 4.2 where we present an
n-player valid-utility game that always converges to states with social value a factor n
worse than optimal. Indeed, the price of sinking for this game is n. However the price
of anarchy is almost 1. Thus, the price of anarchy gives us a misleading confidence
in the social quality of an outcome that will result from selfish behavior.
As well as being a more appropriate solution concept than PSNE in many games,
the existence of sink equilibria has several nice implications. Since sink equilibria al-
ways exist, the price of sinking can always be calculated even in games without PSNE.
Unlike PSNE, sink equilibria also possess natural convergence properties. The price
of' sinking also has a close relation to the convergence to approximate solutions (states
2It is possible to define F(Q) = minsQ y(S). In fact, proving positive results with this definition
is harder and stronger. We chose the definition based on the expected social value on the random
walk, since it is closely related to the rate of convergence to approximate solutions on random
best-response walks which is the topic of Chapter 3 of this thesis as well.
3We may call this the price of myopia since we only consider myopic best responses of players.
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whose expected social value is within an approximation factor of optimal) in games.
In particular, our proof techniques to bound the price of sinking also imply bounds
on the speed of convergence to approximate solutions. We study two examples in
Section 4.3:
(1) Unsplittable Selfish Routing (and Weighted Congestion Games). We present in-
stances of the weighted unsplittable flow version of the selfish routing problem that
possess no PSNE (For the formal definition of the unsplittable selfish routing game,
see Section 4.3.1). However, we show that, for bounded-degree polynomial latency
functions of degree at most d, the price of sinking is at most 0(22dd2d+3). In addition,
our proof technique implies fast convergence to high quality solutions. This may be
compared to the negative result by Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar [15] showing
the existence of exponentially long best-response walks to PSNE (in the unweighted
version of this game). For example, consider the case of linear latency functions. Here
it is known that PSNE exist [24]; it may be the case that the number of best-response
moves needed for convergence to a PSNE is exponential. Our results show that after
a polynomial number of random best-response moves, the social value of the flow is
within a constant factor of the optimal solution.
(2) Valid- Utility Games. Our second example concerns the class of valid-utility games;
Here, we show that the price of sinking is at most n + 1; thus the worst case price of
sinking in a valid-utility game is between n and n + 1.
We also present a hardness result concerning sink equilibria. In section 4.4 we
show that in general it is a PLS-hard problem to find a sink equilibrium (or PSNE)
in valid-utility games. This implies the existence of exponentially long best-response
paths to any sink equilibrium in valid-utility games.
We conclude this introduction with a very brief discussion on related work. In or-
der to deal with the stability and convergence problems of Nash equilibria, equilibrium
concepts other than Nash equilibria have been studied in the economics literature.
Among these concepts are stable equilibria [52], stochastic adjustment models [48],
iterative elimination of dominated strategies, the set of undominated strategies etc.
Convergence and strategic stability of equilibria in evolutionary game theory is a also
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central subject of study for many economists. However, in their studies the most
important factor is typically the stability of equilibria, and not measurements of the
social value of equilibria. In Chapter 3, we began our investigation into the impor-
tance of moving away from the use of Nash equilibria as the main solution concept
for measuring performance in a game.
4.2 Price of Sinking vs. Price of Anarchy
In this section, we present an n-agent game in which the price of sinking and the
price of anarchy give very different pictures as to the consequences of non-cooperative
behavior. In particular, the price of anarchy will be close to 1, suggesting that no
form of mechanism design is required to enforce socially good solutions. However,
every possible outcome of the game will result in a solution whose value is a factor n
smaller than that of the optimal social solution.
Here, we present an n-agent valid-utility) game for which the price of sinking is
n+~ but the price of anarchy is just 1 + for an > 0. The ground set V of agent i
n
consists of n + 1 elements = {, x, x. ., x }. For motivation, we can think of
strategy Yi as a socially responsible strategy for agent i. In contrast, all the strategies
{x,x2,.. . ,x} can be viewed as socially irresponsible strategies. Moreover, we will
see that in any situation one of these n irresponsible strategies provides a better
payoff for agent i than acting responsibly. Consequently, there is an incentive for
every agent to act anti-socially with extreme consequences for the social outcome. In
contrast, the price of anarchy is oblivious to this incentive for anti-social behavior.
The reason being that the payoffs to each agent are intrinsically linked to the behavior
of the other agents. Any specific irresponsible strategy may be beneficial in certain
circumstances but typically (given the other agents responses) that specific strategy
has smaller payoff than the responsible strategy. Consequently, unlike randomized
strategies, playing an irresponsible strategy is likely to lead to low private returns.
Thus mixed strategy Nash equilibria will require that most agents behave responsibly,
blissfully ignoring the fact that in every possible situation each agent has an incentive
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to behave irresponsible.
The family of feasible strategies Fi for each agent i is the set of singletons of his
ground set and the empty set, i.e., Fi = {s C : IsJ < 1}. Let Xi = {xlx2, n
and X = UiXi. Let S = (Sl,S 2 ,... ,s) be a vector of subsets si C Vi for all
i = 1,2,..., n. For a vector S = (sl,...,sn), we let S = Uiusi. We construct
a non-decreasing, submodular social utility function y on rIiUvi in the following
manner.
(S) = u\XI if SU n X = 0
I Su\XI + 2 otherwise.
With this social utility function, we construct a valid-utility game. To do this we need
to specify the private utilities of each agent at any state. In order to define the payoff
functions, we define a function i*(S) for each strategy profile S. We set i*(S) = null
for any strategy profile S in which no player plays an irresponsible strategy. If in
a strategy profile S some players play irresponsibly, i*(S) is the index of a plaver
who plays irresponsibly. In addition, i*(S)' satisfies the following property: given
the stategies of the other agents, any agent i can always choose some irresponsible
strategy so that after i's playing i*(S) = i. In the following, we give one example of
a function i* that satisfies these properties.
Let Xij(S) be the indicator variable for the event that agent i plays the irrespon-
sible strategy xi . That is
I if X' G SU
0 ( otherwise.
Next let
null if SU n X = 0 (no one plays irresponsibly)
i*(S) = i if Su Xi 0 for i {il,... .,ik}
and I = [Eiu(E'= I ' Xij(S)) mod k] + 1
Observe that if i*(S) = null then i can play the irresponsible strategy s = {xi} and
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make i*(S E si) = i. Otherwise, there exists a strategy s =- {x} such that if i plays
Si = {x} it makes i*(S s) = i.
We are now ready to give a payoff function cai for each agent i.
ai(S)= 
0 if yi si and i ! i*(S)
1 if yi E si and i i*(S)
2 if yi si and i = i*(S)
3 if yi si and i = i*(S).
So agent i gets utility 1 for playing the responsible strategy and another 2 units of
utility if i = i*(S). We will see in Section 4.3.2 that this is a valid-utility game with
a non-decreasing social utility function. Thus we may apply the following result from
[87].
Theorem 4.2.1 The price of anarchy in a valid-utility game with a non-decreasing
social utility function is at most 2. L-
If fact, it is easy to see that the price of anarchy in this game actually tends to 1 as
the number of agents increases. In particular, it is easy to see that a socially optimal
solution has n - 1 of the agents playing their responsible strategies while exactly
one of the agents plays an irresponsible strategy. Such an outcome has value n + 1.
Moreover, note that by playing responsibly an agent can guarantee that they receive
1 unit of utility. Thus, it must be the case that in a Nash equilibrium4 every agent
has an expected payoff of at least 1. Since y(S) > ZiEU ai(S) for any state S, we
have that the expected social value of a Nash equilibrium is at least n. Thus the price
of anarchy is at most 1 + .
Now we consider the price of sinking in this game. Given any strategy profile S,
the best response of each agent is to play the specific irresponsible strategy that gives
it a payoff of 2. To see this, note that agent i always has a move that sets i*(S') = i.
Thus a responsible strategy i is never a best-response strategy. In fact, the best
4 One Nash equilibrium is the following. Each agent i plays strategy i with probability p and
each bad strategy with probability -P. It is easy to check that letting p = -2 (1 - 1 ) gives a
Nash equilibrium.
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response of each player is to play an irresponsible strategy to get the payoff of 2,
but each player makes the payoff of other players who are playing the irresponsible
strategy 0. It follows that there is a unique sink equilibrium consisting of every
strategy profile in which each agent plays an irresponsible strategy. Thus, every state
in the sink has social value exactly two. Hence the price of sinking is exactly n1
We remark that even if we start at an optimal solution, if each agent makes a single
best-response move in turn then we end up with a solution of value 2! Moreover, we
can then never leave this sink if players play their myopic best responses.
Notice also that we could alter the payoffs in the game slightly so that the payoff
resulting from the first irresponsible move is 1 + 6 rather than 2. Clearly the price of
sinking is then R-~ which tends to n. Thus we have
Lemma 4.2.2 There are valid-utility games, with non-decreasing social utility func-
tions, for which the price of sinking is almost n while the price of anarchy is almost
1, . .
Thus the price of anarchy underestimates the social cost of the lack of coordination
by a factor n. The reason for this is that the good strategy always gives a good return.
Any bad strategy can give a high return but only in a small number of situations, thus
any bad strategy performs badly against randomized strategies and players tend to
play their good strategies in the mixed Nash equilibria. Hence the price of anarchy is
good. This type of issue often arises in games, and explains why the price of anarchy
will often significantly under-estimate the social cost of the lack of coordination in
such games.
Finally, note that this game has no PSNE so focusing here upon sink equilibria is
essential. Surprisingly, Lemma 4.2.2 is also almost tight; we will show in Section 4.3
that the price of sinking in a valid-utility game is at most n + 1.
4.3 Price of Sinking and Convergence
PSNE are special cases of sink equilibria. We have already seen that games in which
agents repeatedly react to the other agent's strategies via the use of pure strategy
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best responses will converge to sink equilibria and not necessarily to PSNE. Moreover,
many classes of games have instances for which no PSNE exists. In these games,
we can still measure the cost to society of the lack of coordination using the price
of sinking. Moreover, in bounding the price of sinking for sink equilibria we may
obtain bounds on the expected social value of states after a random sequence of best
responses.
4.3.1 Unsplittable Selfish Routing and Weighted Congestion
Games
Consider the "unsplittable flow" version of the selfish routing game. We have a
directed network G = (V, E) with a flow dependent latency function , : R IR+U{O}
on each arc e c E. There is a set U of n agents; agent i wishes to route flow at a rate
ri from a source si to a sink ti. Each agent aims to incur as small a latency as possible.
In the unsplittable flow version,, an agent may not split its flow. Hence each agent
picks a unique si - ti path and routes all its flow along the path. The latency of an
agent is equal to its traffic size multiplied by the sum of the latencies of arcs along the
path that it chooses. The latency of an arc e is a non-decreasing and non-negative
function of the total load on arc e. In this chapter, we consider bounded-degree
polynomial latency functions. In particular, for an arc e, we let 4e(x) = o<j<d ae,jxJ
be a non-negative and non-decreasing delay function for arc e. For a strategy profile
P = (PI, P2, .. ., Pn) where Pi is a si - ti path, let the load of arc e be f, = i:eEPi ri.
Then, the latency of agent i is li(f) = ri ZeEPi (fe) and the total latency of flow f
is (f) EiU i(f) = ZeE(G) e(fe)fe.
Before stating our results on weighted unsplittable selfish routing games, we note
that all our results on these games extend to the general class of weighted congestion
ganes. Weighted congestion games are the generalization of weighted unsplittable
selfish routing game in which the family of feasible strategies of players are arbitrary
family of subsets of arcs (and not necessarily paths from a source to a destination).
This definition extends the definition of congestion games defined in Section 1.2. In
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none of the proofs for the price of sinking and convergence, we use the fact that
the feasible strategy is a path. Therefore, all the results hold for general weighted
congestion games.
Recently Awerbuch, Azar, and Epstein [2] proved that the price of anarchy in
such games is exactly 2.618 for linear latency functions and is at most 0(2ddd+l)
for polynomial latency functions of degree at most d. They extended their results
to mixed Nash equilibria, since the existence of pure Nash equilibria for these games
with polynomial latency functions was not known. For linear latency function Fotakis,
Kontogiannis, and Spirakis [24] proved that the game is a potential game. Here, we
exhibit an instance of this game with quadratic latency functions that does not possess
any PSNE. This, in turn, provides additional motivation for analyzing the price of
sinking in these games. Our example is shown in Figure 4-1. It depicts a network with
4 yertices and 6 arcs. Arcs are labeled from 1 to 6. The latency functions of arcs are
el(x) x + 33, 2(x) = 13x, £3() = 3x2, F4 (x) - 6 2 , 4s(x) = x2 +q 44, and. 6(x) --
47x. There are two agents with traffic r -1 and r2 = 2. The source of both agents
is vertex 1 (s1 = s2 = 1) and the destination of both agents is vertex 4 (tl = i2 = 4).
Consider four paths P1 = (6), P2 = (3,5), P3 = (3,4,2), and P4 = (1,2) where the
numbers within the parentheses are the labels of arcs on the path. It is not hard to
check that the only sink equilibrium of the weighted unsplittable selfish routing game
on this network is the set of strategy profiles {(P1, P2), (P3, P2), (P3, P4), (P1, P4)}. To
see this, one can check the following inequalities5:
11(Pl, P2) = 46(r1 ) = 47 >
46 = 3(ri + r 2) + f4 (r1) + f2(r1) = 1l(P3, P2)
12(P3 , P2) = 2(C3(ri + r2) + e5(r2)) = 150 >
148 = 2(l1(r2) + f2(r1 + r2)) = 12(P3 , P4)
/1(P3, P4) = 63(rl) + 4(rl) + 2(rl + r2) = 48 > 47 = 6(rl) = 11(Pl, P4)
12(P1, P4) = 2(f1 (r2)+ 2(r2 )) = 122 > 120 = 2(e3(r2) + 4(r 2)) = 12(P1, P2)
Using the above inequalities, we can show that {(P1 , P2), (P3, P2 ), (P3, P4), (P1 , P4)}
is a sink equilibrium. The only feasible strategies of players are paths P1, P2, P3, P4.
5In fact, we have found this example by solving a program to find a solution that satisfy these
inequalities using CPLEX.
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Figure 4-1: A weighted unsplittable selfish routing game without PSNE Vertices are
labeled from 1 to 4. Arcs are labeled from 1 to 6. Four paths (P1, P2 , P3, P4) are
highlighted from vertex 1 to vertex 4. Two players with traffic loads 1 and 2 send
traffic from vertex 1 to vertex 4.
Moreover, if player 2 plays one of the paths, the best response of player 1 is one of
the paths P and P3. Also, if player 1 plays one of the paths, the best response of
player 2 is one of the paths P2 and P4 .
Table 4.1 depicts the best-response move from any strategy profile in which players
play one of the four paths. This table shows that no PSNE exists in this game and
the only sink equilibrium of this game is {(P1 , P2), (P3, P2 ), (P3 , P4 ), (PI, P4)}.
The key to obtaining bounds on the price of sinking is that any agent making
a best-response move cannot cause too much cumulative harm to the other agents.
Consequently, if an agent can make a move that significantly increases its private
welfare, then the overall social welfare must rise. This will be an important factor in
allowing us to prove that we have a low price of sinking in these routing games.
Theorem 4.3.1 The price of sinking for a weighted unsplittable selfish routing game
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P1 P2 P3 P4
P1 (2, P2) (1, P3 ) (2, P2 ) (2, P2)
P2 (2, P4) (1, P3 ) (2, P4) (1, P1 )
P3 (2, P4) (2, P4) (2, P4) (1, P1)
P4 (2, P4) (1, P3) (1, Pi) (1, P1 )
Table 4.1: The table corresponding to the weighted unsplittable selfish routing game
without PSNE. Rows correspond to the strategy of the first player. Columns cor-
respond to the strategy of the second player. The pair (i, P) in a cell of the table
indicates that player i's best response in this strategy profile is P.
(or a weighted congestion game) is at most 0(22dd2d+3).
Proof. We need the following three lemmas for the proof.
Lemma 4.3.2 Let f be the flow corresponding to the current strategy profile P =
(P 1 ,..., P). Suppose agent i changes its flow path from Pi to P', to give a new flow
f'. Then l(fi') < I(f) + (d + 1)li(fi) - li(f). In particular, if agent i decreases its
latency by changing to Pi', then l(fi) < (f) + dli(f) < (d + 1)1(f).
Proof. The latency incurred by agent i is then
li(fi ) = ri SE ae,j(fi,e)j = ri
eCP' O<j<d
( Pi ae,Ojf +
eEP'fnPj O<j<d
E: E ae,j(fe
eEP'-Pi O<j<d
Note that for e P'- Pi, we have fi,e = fe + ri. Moreover, we know that
I(fi) < I(f) + (i(fi) - li(f)) + (aeje)
eEP'-Pi <_<
the last term corresponding to the increase in latency for agents other than i due
to the rerouting of agent i. We can get an upper bound on the increase in latencies
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(ae,j fe )) (f',e - ri),
+ ri)d.
faced by the other agents by noting that
po(ZdE (aejfi,e) - (ae,,
ee ,'-pi O<j<d
- E E (aej(fie -
eGP -Pi O<j<d
- E (OE aej (fie -
eseP-Pi < j<d
< E ('- ae,jr
eeXP'-Pi O<j<d
Ji feJ)) (f;,e - ri)
f, ) fe)
f ) ( E fie-f -1) f)
(l< (fj + ri) (fe + r))
l<t<j'
< ri E (E jaej(fe +ri)j)
eGP,'-Pi O< j<d
< dl (fi').
Thus, the total latency after agent i changes its strategy is at most l(f)+(d+ 1)li(fi')-
li(f). Since, li(fJ') < li(f), this shows thati l(fJ') - 1l(f) + dli(f) < (d + 1)/(f)
Lemma 4.3.3 Let f be the flow corresponding to the current strategy profile. Con-
sider the following random process: choose an agent i at random and let it play its
best response. If f' is the new flow after this change, then E[l(f')lf] < (1 + d)l(f).
Proof. Let f be the flow after agent i plays its best response to f.
Lemma 4.3.2, we have:
Then, using
E[l(f')lf] = l El(f)
iEU
I1z
n iEu
(1(f) + dli(f))
= -(nl(f) + dl(f))
d
= ( + -)l(f).
n
The third lemma we neis b low. Itsproof is nspired byhe w rk ofAzaet
The third lemma we need is below. Its proof is inspired by the work of Azar et
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al. [2].
Lemma 4.3.4 Let f be the flow corresponding to the current strategy profile. Con-
sider the following random process: choose an agent i at random and let it play its best
response. If f' is the new flow after this change, then either E[l(f')lf] < (1 )l(f),
or l(f) < 0(22d(d + 1)2d+2) OPT.
Proof. Assume that the best
resulting in the flow fi'. Thus,
two cases:
response of agent i is to switch from path Pi to P/'
E[l(f') f] = EiU l (fi). We consider the following
· ..~
Case 1: ZiJ 2(d + 1)li(f') < YiZs li(f). In this case, by Lemma 4.3.2,
E[l(f')lf] = (fi)
< - >3 (I(f) + (d + 1)li(f) - li(f))
iEU
<-( (f)n (±+ li(f) - li(f)
icU iEU iEU
_
= (1- )l(f).2n
Thus, we obtain E[l(f')Ifl < (1 - I)l(f).
Case 2: ieu 2(d + )li(fi) > Eicu li(f). Let P* = (PI*,. . , P*) be the optimal
solution and let f* be the flow corresponding to P*. Set J*(e) = {i: e C Pi*}. Let
fi* be the flow resulting from the switch of agent i from Pi to Pi*. Since Pi' is i's
best response, we have li(f*) > li(fi'). Thus, in this case, ivU 2(d + 1)li(fi*) >
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Eiu li,(f) = (f). Consequently,
I(f) < )E2(d+l)li(fi*)
iEU
< (2d + 2) ri E ee(fe + ri)
iEU eEP*
d
- (2d+2) ri y E ae,j(fe +ri)j
iGU eEP?* j=O
d
= (2d + 2)E E 
e j=O iEJ*(e)
ae,j(fe +ri)jri.
The rest of the proof of this case is based on the proof of Lemmas Al, A2, and A3
in [2]. First, we use the following inequality from
for any c > 1. Thus, we get:
d
1(f) (2d+2)1 5e E a,j(fe+ri)ri
e j=O iJ*(e)
d
< (2d+2)e E ae,j
e j=O
E (cfJri+
ieJ*(e)
d (
e j=O
d
= c(2d + 2) E E
e j=O
d
= c(2d+2)EE =
e j=O
dInc
ae,jfff + (2d + 2)
a,jfe fe* + (2d + 2)
+1) d )
d
ln c
d
ln c
f*j+l1)
d d
+ I ) aeif 1
e j=0
d
E e (fe ) f
where the second inequality comes from the fact that ZiJ*(e)ri d < fe*d and the
function f(x) = ( + 1)x is an increasing function for x > O. Holder's inequality
states:
E abl- <
i
1-a
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In c +) ri)
[2 X + y+yd < C i fd + 1))d
+ I
aj E bj
Applying this, with aj = a,jf j+ l bj = ae,jf'*j +, = J+i yields
d
1(f) < c(2d + 2) E a,jfEjf +
e j=o
d /
< 2c(d+1)E 
j=0 e
+2(d + 1) dlnc
d
< 2c(d + 1) ( e(fe)
j=o e
+2(d + 1) c
d d
- + )E (f ) f7
e
a ,j+i/(j+l)
), j/(j+l) f) 1/(j+l)f *
i) d
+ t,(fe) f
e
1/(d+l)
< 2c(d + 1)5 ( (fe)f) /(fd))
j=0 e eI )( d
-F2(d- c) I -- I1< el V e 'e 
< 2c(d + 1)2 d/(del)E fe (fe ) fe ( e (fe *)
ee
+2(d + 1) Ic
fe*)
d
+ (f*) ff
e
where the fourth inequality is from the inequality xy 1- a > xa'y - a for x > y > 0
and 1 > a > a' > 0 with x = -e 'e(fe)fe and y = Ze e(f:*)f*. By letting
1l(f)d+l
1
OPT d+
we get
xd+1 < 2c(d + 1)2 xd + 2(d + 1) (dln c +l) d
After dividing both sides by xd, we get:
x < 2c(d + 1)2 + 2(d + 1)
d i
d
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(2d + 2) (
d
+ ) e (fe*)fe
e
l/(d+1)
J/(J+l)fj+1a,,j . E
e
We claim that if we set c = 2 - c for = d+l 2 (d+l), then we have x < 4(d + 1)2.
Assume for contradiction that x > 4(d + 1)2. Then,
4(d + 1)2 < x < 4(d + 1)2 -2(d + 1)2 + 2(d + 1)
Thus,
(d 1)d
(d+ 1) < n c
< 2d [since Inc > 0.5]
4(d + 1)2 )
< 2(d + 1)
= (d+t 1).-
which is a contradiction. Therefore, by setting c 2 2- , we get x < 4(d+ 1)2. Hence,
I(f) = xd+lOPT < O(22d(d + 1)2d+2 )OPT. E
From Lemma 4.3.4, we can bound the price of sinking as follows. Consider a
sink Q. Let fo be a flow in Q. Consider a random walk starting from fo in which
we let a random agent play his best response at each step. Let fo, fl, f2,..., fN
be a sequence of observed flows in Q. Recall that the value for sink Q is equal to
F(Q) = CESQ FrQ(S)l(fs) where fs is the flow corresponding to the state S and 7FQ is
the steady distribution for the random walk on Q. Since Q is strongly connected, this
is equal to F(Q) = limN, °<J<N E[l(f)] . In order to upper bound this value, it isN
sufficient to upper bound E[l(fj)] for each 0 < j < N. Lemma 4.3.4 shows that there
exists a state in any sink Q with total latency less than 0(2 2 d(d + 1)2d+2 )OPT. Note
that, as Q is strongly connected the value of the sink is independent of the choice
of fo. Therefore, we can set fo such that l(fo) < c'22d(d + 1)2 d+2OPT. Let ci be
the coin toss of step i in the random walk. More precisely, we want to upper bound
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aj El,C2,.,Cj[I(fj) ]. By Lemma 4.3.4 and Lemma 4.3.3, we have
* Either Ecj+ [l(fj+,l)fj] < (1- )l(fj) or l(fj) < 22d(d + 1)2d+2OPT.
· Ej+[l(fj+l)fj] < (1 + )l(fj)
Let E1 be the event that l(fj) < 22d(d + 1)2d+2 and E2 be the event that l(fj) >
c2 2d(d + 1)2d+2)OPT. Let p be the probability that event E2 happens. Furthermore,
let Y = E[l(fj)lE] < c2 2d(d + 1)2d+2 and X = E[l(fj)lE 2]. Thus, aj = E[l(fj)] =
pX + (1 - p)Y. Now,
aj+l = E[l(fj+l)]
< (l- )X+(i-p) 1+ Y
< 1- 2 )(pX + (- )Y)+ + Y
• ( n)kJ2n ( 2n
a( ) 2d+ 2n}. 2n
•<( -1 a3 2 c122(d± 1)2d+0 prp
Combining the above recurrence relation and ao < (fo) < 2c2 2d(d + 1)2 d+30PT,
we can prove aj+l < 2c122d(d + 1)2 d+3OPT by induction. Thus, E 1,C2,...,Cj[l(fj)] <
0(2 2 d(d + 1)2d+3oPT). Hence, the price of sinking is at most 0(22 d(d + 1)2d+3) by
the linearity of expectation. As (d + 1)2d+3 - O(d2 d+3), we have the desired bound.
We can also use the lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 to bound the
rate of convergence to states with good social value in unsplittable (weighted) selfish
routing games. We can prove that starting from a flow of latency C, after O(n log OPT)
random best responses, the expected social value is less than 70 OPT for linear latency
functions for any c > 0, and is less than 0(22dd2d+3)OPT for polynomial latency
functions of degree at most d. This is in contrast with the negative convergence result
of Fabrikant, Papadimitriou, and Talwar [15], in which they exhibit exponentially long
best-response paths to PSNE (or sink equilibria) in these games. Our bounds show
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that, even though convergence to PSNE (or sink equilibria) may be exponential, a
random sequence of best responses of agents converges to a state with good social
value after polynomial number of best responses. Here, we prove a tighter bound
for convergence in the weighted unsplittable selfish routing game with linear latency
functions. We assume that the latency function of arc e is a linear function. In
particular, we let the latency function for arc e E E(G) be e(x) = aex + be with
ae, be > .
Theorem 4.3.5 In the weighted unsplittable selfish routing game with linear latency
functions, starting from any state with total latency C the expected latency of the flow
after O(nlog T) random best responses is at most 70 OPT for any c > 0.
Proof. Let f be the current flow, and suppose agent i changes its flow path from Pi
to.PiJ, to give a new flow fl. From Lemma 4.3.2, l(,) < I(f) + 2i(f) - li(f). We
will use the following refinement to Lemr-a 4.3.4.
Lemma 4.3.6 Let f be the flow corresponding to the current strategy profile. Con-
sider the following random process: choose an agent i at random and let it play its best
response. If f' is the new flow after this change, then either E[l(f')lf] < (1 - ) I(f),
or l(f) < 23.32 OPT.
Proof. Assume that the best response of agent i is to switch from path P to Pi'
resulting in the flow fi'. Thus, E[l(f')lf] = 1 EiEu l(fi). We consider the following
two cases:
Case 1: Eju 41i(fi) < EiEU li(f). In this case, similar to Case 1 of the proof of
Lemma 4.3.4, it follows that E[l(f')lf] < (1 - )l(f).
Case 2: ZiEu 41i(fi') > iEu li (f)· Let P* = (P*,... , Pn*) be the optimal solution
and let f* be the flow corresponding to P *. Set J*(e) = {i: e G Pi*}. Let fi* be the
flow resulting from the switch of agent i from Pi to Pi*. Since Pi' is i's best response,
we have li(fi*) > li(fi'). In this case, we can apply the method of Azar et al. [2] as
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follows:
(ri (aefe + b))
i eEPi
< E41i(f1 )
iEU
< 41i(fi) [since player i play his best response to f4]
iEU
< 4ri (ae(f + ri) + b)
iEU eEPi*
= 4 E C [(aefe + be)ri + aer2]
iEU ePi*
4 [(afe + b)ri + aeri.
e i:eEPi
It follows that
l(f) < 4 f,*(ef + b) + 4 5 aef 2
e e
= 4 f*afe + 4 (aef + be)f*
e e
= 4 E f*aefe + 4 OPT
e
,f )(vea7f))
e
a f2) (
+ 4 OPT[Cauchy-Schwartz inequality]
ae f*2) +4 OPT
< 4/(ae,
e
fe + be)fe S(aefe* + be)f* + 4 OPT
= 4/(f)PT+ 4 PT.
By setting x = (f)T we have x < 4(Vx+ 1). This gives x < 23.32. Hence, in this
case, (f) < 23.32 OPT. D
Proof of Theorem 4.3.5. Let ao = C be the social value of the initial flow. Assume
that at each step we choose an agent at random and let it play its best response. Let
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1(f)
4
= 4\
(e
e e·)
aj be the expected latency of the flow after j's step. From Lemma 4.3.6, we have
for any j > 0, aj < 23.32 OPT or aj+l < aj(1 - ). Moreover, from Lemma 4.3.3,
aj+l < aj(1 + l) for any j > O. Now, let p be the probability that aj > 23.32 OPT.
Let X be the expected value of aj given that aj > 23.320PT and Y be the expected
value of aj given that aj < 23.320PT. Thus,
aj+l p (1-+ ( -(1 -) + -)Y
_< 1
< ((1-2 (PX+(I-P)Y)+3 Y( 1 69.96
< l-2 ) a + 2 OPT.
It follows that
69.96 OPT(-(1- 2n)
a- 2n9 2n2n
fori < j. Asaresult, aj < ao (1 - n) +69.96 (1- (1- )) OPT < C (1 J -
69.96 OPT. Thus, for j > n log log C, we get a < (69.96 + ) OPT. Therefore,
after O(n log OT) steps the expected value of aj is at most 70 OPT. D
Finally, we note that all our results on the price of sinking and convergence for
weighted unsplittable selfish routing games extend to weighted congestion games,
since we never used the fact that the strategy of players is a path from the source to
the destination, and the feasible strategies could be any subset of arcs of the network.
It follows that these results hold for general weighted congestion games.
4.3.2 Valid-Utility Games
Valid-utility games are formally defined in Section 1.2. This class of games are in-
troduced by Vetta [87] for which he proved that the price of anarchy for mixed Nash
equilibria is at most 2. Here we prove bounds on the worst-case price of sinking in
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valid-utility games. First, we show that our bad example in Section 4.2 is a valid-
utility game. Thus the price of sinking in valid-utility games can be as bad as n.
Then, we will prove that this lower bound for valid-utility games is almost tight. In
particular, we will show that the price of sinking in a valid-utility game is at most
n+ 1.
In order to prove that the bad example in Section 4.2 is a valid-utility game, we
need to verify three conditions:
1) Non-decreasing and Submodular Social Function: First, it is clear that the
corresponding set function of the social function ys is non-decreasing. To show
its submodularity, we use an equivalent definition of submodular functions: A
set function f is submodular if for any two subsets A and B such that A c B
and for any element i ~ B, f(A U {i})-f (A) > f(B U {i)-f (B) [26]. Thus, in
order to prove that yS is submodular, it is enough to prove that for two (possibly
infeasible) strategy profiles S -= (asl S' · ...., ad s) such that
si C s for all i U, by adding a new element j to the strategy of any player i
the increase in -s for S is not less than the increase for S'. First, we consider
the case that j -= x If Su n x = 0 then SU n X = 0, and thus x (S' ® 0) = 2
and y( (S 0i) =2. If SU n x 0 then yx(S' ® Di) =O < 0 (S 0 •i)
Hence if j = xi, the desired condition for submodularity holds. Also, if j = yi
it is implied that 7y,(S' E 0) = 1 if and only if S'U n {y) = 0, otherwise
y (S' ® 0i) = 0. It follows that -,i(S' 0j) < 4, (S i 0). Therefore, -y is
submodular.
2) Vickrey Condition: If player i plays Yi then she gets 1 and the social value
changes by 1. If player i plays an element of Xi and increases the social value
by 2, then she is the only player who plays an irresponsible strategy. Thus,
i = i*(S) and so she receives those two utility units. Otherwise the playing of
an element of Xi has no effect on the social value. Thus, the Vickrey condition
is trivially satisfied.
3) Cake Condition: It is straightforward to check that ¢Eiu ai(S) = y(S) and the
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cake condition holds.
Now, we prove that this bound is almost tight.
Lemma 4.3.7 Given a strategy profile T = (tl,.. . t) in a valid-utility game, let
the best response of agent i be i. Set T i = (tl,...,ti-l,si,ti+l,...,tn). Then
EiEv ai (Ti) > OPT - y(T).
Proof. Let Q = (,,... , ,n) be the optimum state. Let
Qi = ( 1, 2,... , i, i+1,) i+2,... n).
Given that si is a best-response strategy, we have ai(TV) > y,(T 0Gi). Combining
this with the submodularity of ',. we obtain
a (T) > Z (TED i)
icU iEU
= Z(y(T (ai) -- (T d i))
icU
> C(y(T U a) - (T))
iGU
> A(y(T U Qi) - y(T U Qi-1))
isU
= f(T U Q) - y(T).
Since y is non-decreasing, it follows that Eicu ai(Ti) > OPT - y(T). O
Theorem 4.3.8 The price of sinking in a valid-utility game is at most n + 1.
Proof. Consider a sink equilibrium Q. Let T = (t1 ,. .. , tn) be a state in Q. Let the
best response of agent i be si at state T, and set Ti = (tl,..., ti-l, siti+l,... ,tn).
Let Y be the expected social value of the state after a random best-response move
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from T. By the cake property and Lemma 4.3.7, we have
Y =
n iEU
n> -(OPT - 7(T)).
Observe that the price of sinking is equal to the expected social value on a sufficiently
long random walk. Now take a long random walk To, T,..., Tk. Let ei be the expected
value of y(Ti) where the expectation is over the random coin tosses of the random
walk. We know that as i tends to oo, (Q) = ei. We need to prove that e >
i OPT as i tends to o. Let Pi,y be the probability that y(Tj) = y. Thus, ei =
EyPi,uY and ei+l = Eypi,yE[?(Ti+l)7(T) = y]. The above inequality shows that
E[y(T+,) l(Ti) y] > (C)oT -- y). Therefore,
c';i+ > - piy(OPT - y)
Y
-= (OPT- EPi,yY)
y
- -(OPT- ei).
n
Hence, e+l > OPT - . Since as i goes to o, (Q) = e = ei+l, we get r(Q) >
OPT - r(Q). Therefore, F(Q) > OPT as desired. [I
Thus the worst case price of sinking in a valid-utility game is between n and n + 1.
4.4 A Hardness Result
In Section 2.6.3, we showed that finding a PSNE for some instances of the uniform
CapDC game is PLS-hard (Theorem 2.6.6). Moreover, we proved that this result
implies the existence of exponential best-response paths to equilibria in this game
(Corollary 2.6.7). In Chapter 2, we proved that the CaplBDC games (and in particular
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the CapDC games) are special cases of valid-utility games (Theorem 2.6.2). These
results from Chapter 2 imply the following corollary:
Corollary 4.4.1 Finding a sink equilibrium (or a state in a sink equilibrium) is PLS-
hard for some instances of valid-utility games. In addition, in some instances of valid-
utility games, there exist states that are exponentially far from any sink equilibrium
in the state graph. E
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Chapter 5
Cross-Monotonic Cost Sharing
Methods and Group-Strategyproof
Mechanisms
Consider a situation where a group of customers (which we call agents) wish to
buy a service such as connectivity to a network. The total cost of this service is
a function of the group of customers that are serviced: a group of customers in
distant towns might incur a larger cost than a group of customers in the same town.
The service provider must develop a pricing policy, or cost-sharing scheme, that,
given any group of customers, divides the cost of the service amongst them. For
example, one plausible cost-sharing scheme divides the cost of the service evenly
amongst the customers. However, in the case of network connectivity, this scheme
seems to undercharge distant customers with high connection costs and overcharge
other customers. Developing a fair and economically viable cost-sharing scheme is a
central problem in cooperative game theory. One commonly explored condition is that
of cross-monotonicity [62, 63]. Intuitively, cross-monotonicity requires that the price
charged to any individual in a group decreases as the group expands. Thus customers
have an economic incentive to promote the service. In this chapter, we study this type
of cost sharing schemes for different combinatorial optimization problems. Before
stating the known results and the main contribution of this chapter, we state the
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formal definitions that are used in this chapter.
5.1 Preliminaries
Let / denote a set of n users who are interested in a service. The cost of providing
service to a set S C of users is denoted by C(S). A cost allocation for a set S C o
is a function : S i- R+ U {0}, that for each user i C S, specifies the share b(i)
of i of the total cost of servicing S. A cost-sharing scheme is a collection of cost
allocations for every S C Sd. More formally, a cost sharing scheme is a function
: x 2 i- 1R+ U {0}, such that for every S C .~0 and every i ' S, (i, S) = 0.
Intuitively, we think of (i, S) as the share of i of the total cost if S is the set of
agents receiving the service.
Ideally, we want cost sharing schemes (and cost allocations) to be budget-balanced,
i.e., for every S C X, 5',Es (i, S) -= C(S). owever, it is not always possible to
achieve budget balance in combination with other properties, or even if it is possible,
it might be computationally hard to compute the cost shares. Therefore, we relax
this notion to the notion of a-budget balance (for some a < 1), which means that for
every S C ', aC(S) < Ies (i, S) < C(S).
In addition to budget balance, we usually require cost allocation and cost sharing
schemes to satisfy additional properties. One property that is extensively studied in
the cooperative game theory literature is the property of being in the core (see, for
example, Bondareva [7] and Shapley [84]), which intuitively says that no subset of
users should be overcharged for the service.
Definition 5.1.1 A cost allocation b for a set S C ' is in the a-core if and only
if it is a-budget balanced and for every T C S, EiCT(i) < C(T). A cost sharing
scheme J is in the a-core if and only if for every S, (., S) is in the a-core. We refer
to 1-core as core.
Another property, which was studied by Moulin [63] and Moulin and Shenker [62] in
order to design group-strategyproof mechanisms (see the definition below), and has
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recently received considerable attention in the computer science literature (see, for
example, [49, 46, 44, 69]), is cross-monotonicity. This property captures the notion
that users should not be penalized as the serviced set grows. Namely,
Definition 5.1.2 A cost sharing scheme ~ is cross-monotone if for all S, T c o and
i E (i, S) (i, SU T).
It is a simple exercise to show that every a-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost
sharing scheme is in the a-core, but the converse need not hold. Therefore, cross-
monotonicity is a strictly stronger requirement than being in the core.
The main application of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes is in the design of
cost sharing mechanisms, defined in the following setting: Each user i has a willingness
to pay or a true bid bi E IR+ U {O} for the service, i.e., she is willing to pay up to bi
dollars to get the service. We further assume that the happiness of user i is given by
biqi -xi, where q is an indicator variable which indicates whether she has received the
service or not, and xi is the amount she has to pay . A cost sharing mechanism. (also
'known as a social choice function) is an algorithm that elicits a bid bi C R+ U {O} from
each agent, and based on these bids, decides which agents should receive the service
and how much each of them has to pay. More formally, a cost sharing mechanism is
a function that associates to each vector b of non-negative bids a set Q(b) C a of
agents to be serviced, and a vector x(b) E IRn of non-negative payments. When there
is no ambiguity, we write Q and x instead of Q(b) and x(b), respectively. Throughout
this chapter, we assume that a mechanism does not charge an agent who does not
receive the service (i.e., xi = 0 for i ~ Q), does not charge an agent who receives the
service more than her bid (i.e., xi < bi for i E Q), and for each agent i, there is some
bid ooi such that if i bids ooi, she will get the service, no matter what others bid2 .
Furthermore, we would like the mechanisms to be approximately budget balanced.
We call a mechanism a-budget balanced if the total amount the mechanism charges
the agents is between aC(Q) and C(Q) (i.e., aC(Q) < iEQ xi < C(Q)).
1As noted by Moulin and Shenker [62], this assumption is without loss of generality
2 For a discussion about these properties see Moulin [63] and Moulin and Shenker [62].
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The main property that we want a mechanism to satisfy is incentive compatibility.
We want our mechanism to encourage participants to submit their true willingness
to pay as their bid. Agents should not be able to benefit from lying about the
prices they are willing to pay. Ideally, not even a group of users should be able
to benefit by cooperatively lying, thus discouraging complicated bidding strategies.
More precisely, we look for mechanisms, called group-strategyproof mechanisms which
satisfy the following additional property. Let S C v be a coalition of users, and b, b
be two vectors of non-negative bids satisfying bi = bi for every i X S (we think of b
as the true willingness to pay of users, and b as a vector of strategically chosen bids).
Let (Q, x) and (Q', x') denote the outputs of the mechanism when the bids are b and
b, respectively. We say that the mechanism is group strategyproof if for every such
S, b, b, if the inequality biq - x' > biqi - xi holds for all i E S, then it holds with
equality for every i G S.
We call the vector (b,..., bn) of true bids a scenario. A coalition S with bid
vector b of players is a lying coalition for a scenario b if when members of S announce
b instead of b (their true willingness to pay) as their bids, every member of the
coalition S is at least as happy as in the truthful scenario in which S announce their
true bid b, and at least one person is happier. Notice that we do not allow members
of the coalition to sacrifice their own happiness to benefit the group's total happiness.
For a group-strategyproof mechanism, any coalition of players with any bid vector is
not a lying coalition for any scenario.
For the important class of services with submodular cost functions 3, various
cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes were studied by Moulin and Shenker [62] and
further by Jain and Vazirani [46]. For submodular cost functions, there are cross-
monotonic cost-sharing schemes that are budget-balanced. There are many other
interesting classes of cost functions that arise from NP-hard optimization problems.
For example, the cost of providing the service for a set of agents S could be expressed
as the cost of building the cheapest rooted Steiner tree that covers a given root
vertex r and all the elements of S, or the minimum cost of opening facilities and
3In a service with submodular cost function, C(S) is a submodular set function.
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connecting each member of S to an open facility4 . These two games, and many others
of practical importance, are instances of covering problems. For such problems, it is
usually impossible for a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme to be budget-balanced.
Moreover, even if a budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme exists, it
might be hard to compute. Therefore, it is natural to consider cost sharing schemes
that are approximately budget balanced. Such schemes have been studied by Kent
and Skorin-Kapov [49], Feigenbaum et al. [20], Jain and Vazirani [44], and Pal and
Tardos [69].
Among the covering combinatorial optimization problems, a fundamental problem
is the (fractional) set cover problem. Given a family of subsets A C 2V, a family
A C A of subsets is a set cover for a set S, if any element v c S is contained in at
least one set T A (v T). The minimum set cover of a set S is a set cover of S with
minimum number of sets. Given a family of subsets f C 2V, a fractional set cover
for a subset S C V is a collection of fractional numbers aT for each T E YF, such that
(i) 0 < aT < 1, and (ii) for each element v S, ZTG:VET aT > 1. The minimum
fractional set cover for a set S is a fractional set cover in which ZTE. aT is minimized.
We refer to Tc.F aT as the cost of the fractional set cover. The corresponding set
cover and fractional set cover games are defined as follow:
Definition 5.1.3 Let .F C 2V be a collection of subsets of the universe V. The set
of agents in the set cover game defined on F is the set of elements of the universe V.
Given a subset S C V of the agents , the cost of S is the minimum size of a set cover
for S. In the fractional set cover game, the cost of a subset S C V is the cost of the
minimum fractional set cover for S.
It is easy to show that if there is an -budget balanced cross-monotonic cost-
sharing scheme for the fractional set cover game, then for any special case of the set
cover problem of integrality gap at most /i, there is an a-budget balanced cross-
monotonic cost-sharing scheme. For example, if we could get a constant-factor for
fractional set cover game, it would have implied a constant-factor for metric facility
4See the formal definition of the facility location game in Section5.2.3.
125
location and generalized Steiner tree games. Unfortunately, our result shows that no
cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for fractional set cover game with a reasonable
budget-balance factor exists, and thus this approach for designing cross-monotonic
cost-sharing schemes fails to recover much of the cost. This raises the natural question
of whether it is possible to design well budget-balanced schemes for these combina-
torial optimization games.
We can derive simple bounds on the budget-balance factor of combinatorial op-
timization games using the integrality gaps of the "natural" LP-relaxations. The
cross-monotonicity of a cost sharing scheme implies that for every set of agents the
cost shares form an allocation in the core of the game. Therefore, the best budget-
balance factor achievable by a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme cannot be better
than that of a cost sharing in the core. This, together with the folklore theorem
that the best budget-balance factor for a cost sharing in the core of integer covering
games is equal to the integrality gap of the "natural" LP-relaxation of the problem;.
gives us upper )ounds for the best cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme for various
combinatorial optimization problems. For example, this argument implies that cross-
monotonic cost sharing schemes for metric facility location, vertex cover, and set
cover games cannot recover more than a 1,' ' and 1 fraction of the total cost,
respectively. Prior to this work, this was the only method known for upper bounding
the cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes. In this chapter, we show stronger upper
bounds for several combinatorial optimization problems using a novel technique based
on the probabilistic method that will be explained in Section 5.2.1. In particular, we
prove that the best budget-balance factor achievable for the facility location game is
1/3. This matches a lower bound recently given by Pal and Tardos [69]. Also, for
the vertex cover and set cover games, we show that no cross-monotonic cost shar-
ing scheme can recover more than an O(n- 1 /3 ) and 0(l) fraction of the total cost,
respectively. Previously, Devanur et al. [13] give a strategyproof Q(1/ log(n))-budget
balanced cost-sharing mechanism in the core for the set cover game, but their un-
derlying cost-sharing scheme is not cross-monotonic. We also apply this technique
to several other cost or profit sharing problems including edge cover, maximum flow,
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maximum matching, and arborescence packing.
Cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes are mainly used to obtain group-strategyproof
mechanisms using a method developed by Moulin and Shenker [63, 62]. In fact, almost
all known group-strategyproof mechanisms are Moulin-Shenker mechanisms. There-
fore, one might hope that our negative results on cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
might imply similar negative results for group-strategyproof mechanisms. However,
we observe that for almost any problem there are trivial group-strategyproof mech-
anisms that recover all the cost. These mechanisms completely ignore the structure
of the problem and can therefore be unfair and inefficient. This suggests that new
conditions should be added to the definition of group-strategyproofness to exclude
such mechanisms. We study a few such conditions, and prove that with the extra
assumptions of no free riders and upper continuity5 , group-strategyproof mechanisms
give rise to cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes, and hence our upper bounds hold
for group-strategyproof mechanisms with these extra assumptions. We also consider;
subsidy-freeness '[61], which is a stronger fairness condition and prove the equiva-
lence of budget-balanced cross-monotone cost sharing schemes and budget-balanced
group-strategyproof mechanisms with this property.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 contains a description
of our upper bound techniques, our upper bounds for the covering game and the
facility location game, and the statement of some other results that we have been
able to prove using this technique. In Section 5.3 we present several trivial group-
strategyproof mechanisms and study some of the axioms that can be added to the
definition of group-strategyproof mechanisms to eliminate such trivial mechanisms.
5.2 Upper bounds for cross-monotonic cost shar-
ing schemes
In this section we present the main idea behind our upper bound technique and prove
several upper bounds for the games defined based on edge cover, vertex cover, and
5See the definitions in Section 5.3.
127
facility location. In Section 5.2.1 we explain the technique with a simple example of
the edge cover game. Sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 contain the proofs of the upper bounds
for the vertex cover and facility location games. Finally, in Section 5.2.4 we state
(without proof) several other upper bounds that can be proved using our technique.
5.2.1 A simple example: the edge cover game
In this section, we explain our technique using the edge cover game as a guiding
example. The edge cover cost function is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2.1 Let G(V, E) be a graph with no isolated vertices. The set of agents
in the edge cover game on G is the set of vertices of G. Given a subset S of vertices,
the cost of S is the minimum size of a set F C E of edges such that for every v E S,
at least one of the edges incident to v is in F. Such a set F is called an edge cover
for S.
It is easy to see that for every set S, one can obtain .a minimum edge cover of S by
taking a maximum matching on S and adding one.edge for every vertex that is not
covered by the maximum matching (see [12]). Using this fact, we can give a cost-
sharing scheme that is in the 3-core of the game: charge each vertex that is covered
by the maximum matching 1, and other vertices . Let v be the amount that vertex
v is charged. Thus, for any two vertices u and v of G, if av = u = , then there is
no edge between u and v. Consider any subset S of vertices. Consider an optimal
edge cover T C E(G) of S. For any edge {u, v} G T, we know that av + au < 1, since
Av + 2 or a, 2. Therefore, TI > s a,,. Thus, this cost-sharing scheme satisfies
the core property. Furthermore, it is easy to see that the sum of the cost shares
is at least times the edge cover for S. Therefore, there is a cost-sharing scheme
satisfying the core property with a budget-balance factor of 3. In fact, Goemans [28]
showed that for every graph there is a cost sharing scheme in the -core. However,
in the following, we show that no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme can achieve a
budget-balance factor better than '
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Theorem 5.2.1 For every e > O, there is no ( +c)-budget balanced cross-monotonic
cost sharing scheme for the edge cover problem.
Here's the high-level idea of the proof: We assume, for contradiction, that there is a
cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme that always recovers at least a ( + e) fraction
of the total cost. We explicitly construct a graph G (or in general the set of agents
v and the structure based on which the cost function is defined), and look at the
cost-sharing scheme on this graph. For edge cover, this graph is simply a complete
bipartite graph Kn,n, with n large enough. Then, we need to argue that there is a
set S of agents such that the total cost shares of the elements of S is less than + c
times the size of the minimum edge cover for S. This is done using the probabilistic
method: we pick a subset S at random from a certain distribution and show that in
expectation, the ratio of the recovered cost to the cost of S is low. Therefore, there
is a manifestation of S for which this ratio is low. In the edge cover example, we pick
one vertex v of G uniformly at random and let S be the union of v and the set of
vertices adjacent to v. We now need to bound the expected value of the sum of cost
shares of the elements of S. We do this by using cross-monotonicity and bounding
the cost share of each vertex u S by the cost share of u in a substructure T of
S. Bounding the expected cost share of u in T is done by showing that for every
substructure T, every u T has the same probability of occurring in a structure S
in which T = T. This implies that the expected cost share of u in T (where the
expectation is over the choice of S) is at most the cost of T, divided by the number
of agents in T. Summing up these values for all u gives us the desired contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 5.2.1. Assume that there is a ( + c)-budget-balanced cross-
monotonic cost sharing scheme . Let G be the complete bipartite graph K,,n, where
n will be fixed later, and consider on G. For every v V(G), we let S be the union
of v and the set of vertices adjacent to v (i.e., vertices of the other part). We pick a
set S of agents by picking v uniformly at random from V(G) and letting S = S. By
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the definition of the edge cover problem,
C(S) = n for every S. (5.1)
On the other hand,
Es [ (i,S)] = E [(v,Sv) ] + Ev [ E(,Sv)]
iES uGSv\{v}
< 1 + E (Uu, 'v})],
uCSv\{V}
where the last inequality follows from the facts that for every vertex u and every set
S, (u, S) < 1, and that for every v C V(G) and u G Sv \ {v}, (u, Sv) < (u, {u, v}).
Both of these facts are consequences of the cross-monotonicity of . By the definition
of expected values, we have
E [ ' L - u, {uv})]= E,, {(u. vi)] (5.2)
ulSV\{lJ}
where the second expectation is over the choice of v from V(G) and u in S \ {v}.
However, choosing a vertex v and then a neighbor u of v at random is equivalent to
choosing a random edge e in G at random, and letting u be a random endpoint of e
and v be the other one. By the budget-balance condition, the sum of the cost shares
of the endpoints of e is at most one. Therefore, for every e, if u is a random endpoint
of e and v is the other endpoint, E[~(u, u, v})] < . Thus, the right-hand side of
Equation 5.2 is at most . Therefore, by Equations 5.1 and 5.2, we have
El Ees ~ s) < < +
s C(S) - n 2
for n > 1/c. Therefore, there is a set S satisfying iE(S) < + e, which is a
contradiction with the assumption that ~ is ( + c)-budget balanced. ]
It is not difficult to see that for any instance of the edger cover game, the cost-sharing
scheme satisfying (i, S) = for every i S is cross-monotonic and -budgetscheme~~~~~~~ 2 aifig (,S
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balanced. Therefore, the bound given in the above theorem is tight. Also, one can
think of the edge cover problem as a special case of the set cover problem in which the
size of each set is 2. It is not difficult to generalize the above result (using k-partite
k-uniform complete hypergraphs) to the special case of set cover in which the size of
each set is k, and prove that for k constant, no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme
for this problem can recover more than a fraction of the cost. Similar argument
shows that for the general case of the set cover game, no cross-monotonic cost-sharing
scheme can recover more than a 0(1) of the total cost. This result is also tight up
to a constant multiple.
Theorem 5.2.2 There is no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme ~ for the set cover
game such that for every set S C X, d recovers more than a fraction of the cost
of S.
Proof. Assume that there is such a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme ~. Consider
the following instance of the set cover problem. Let .' be a set of n2 agents that
can be partitioned as = Al U A 2 U ... U A,, where Ai's are disjoint sets each of
size n. Define F as the collection of all sets S c v' such that IS n Ail = 1 for every
i = 1,.. ., n. An alternative way to look at this is that ' and F are sets of vertices
and edges of an n-uniform n-partite complete hypergraph.
We pick a random set S of agents in the above instance as follows: Pick a random
i from {1,...,n}, and for every j 4 i, pick an agent aj uniformly at random from
Aj. Let T = {aj : j ~ i} and S = Ai U T. The cost of the optimal set cover solution
on S is always at least n, since no set in F contains two distinct elements of Ai, and
therefore each element of Ai must be covered with a distinct set in F.
We now bound the average recovered cost over the random choice of S.
Es [ (x,S)] = E [I E(x,S)] + E [I 3(a, S)]
xe zxcAi jii
xEAi j)i
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Since all elements of T can be covered by one set, the second term in the above
expression is at most 1. We write the first term as nEs, [(x, {x} U T)] where the
expectation is over the random choice of S and the random choice of x from Ai. As
in the proof of Theorem 5.2.6, the expected value of ((x, {x} U T) in this experiment
is equal to the expected value of Ej.=l (aj, a ,..., an}) in an experiment that
consists of choosing an agent aj from each Aj uniformly at random. By the budget-
balance property, we always have En=l (aj,{a,... ,an}) < C({al,...,an}) = 1.
Therefore, the first term in the right-hand side of the inequality (5.3) is at most one.
This means that the expected total cost share recovered from the set S is at most
two. Therefore, the ratio of recovered cost to total cost of S is at most 2/n < 4/lSl.
5.2.2 The vertex cover game
The vertex cover game is defined on a graph G(V F). The set of agents is the set of
edges of G, and the cost of serving a set S C E is equal to the minimum size of a
set A of vertices such that for each e G S, at least one of the endpoints of e is in A.
Such a set is called a vertex cover for the set S. It is well-known that the integrality
gap of the LP relaxation of vertex cover is 2, and therefore no allocation in the core
can recover more than half the cost of the solution in the worst case. We show in the
following theorem that if we require the cost-sharing scheme to be cross-monotonic
then no constant-factor budget balanced scheme exists.
Theorem 5.2.3 For every > O, there is no cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme
for vertex cover that on every set S of n agents, recovers at least a (2+c)n-1 /3 fraction
of the cost of S.
Proof. Assume, for contradiction, that such a scheme exists. We let G be a
complete graph on m + 2f vertices, where m and e (m < () are numbers that will be
fixed later, and consider the cost-sharing scheme J on G. We show that there is some
set S of edges of G for which recovers at most a IS-1/ 3 fraction of the cost. We
do this by picking S randomly from a distribution described below, and showing that
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Figure 5-1: The structure S in the vertex cover game
the above statement holds in expectation, and therefore there should be a particular
S satisfying the above statement.
Let 7r be a permutation of the m + 2f vertices. Let A be the set of the first m
vertices, B be the set of the next f vertices, and C be the set of the remaining 
vertices. We denote the i'th vertices of B and C (based on the ordering given by 7r)
by bi and ci. Let S, denote the set of all m£ edges between A and B, union the set
of edges bici for i = 1, . . , f. We pick S by picking the permutation 7r uniformly at
random and letting S = S,. See Figure 5--i for an example.
If we denote the set of edges between A and B by T', we have
E [ (e, S) ]< E [ (e, T) < (5.3)
eET eET
where the first inequality follows from the cross-monotonicity of J and the second
inequality is implied by the budget balance assumption and the fact that the cost of
the minimum vertex cover in T is m. We also let T/ be the set of all m + 1 edges in S
that have bi as an endpoint (see Figure 5-1). Equation 5.3 and the cross-monotonicity
of ( imply the following.
Es [ (i, S)]= E [E(eS)1ZE [(bici, S)1
ieS eET i=l
< m + E [(bc,T ] (5.4)
i=l
We now need to analyze the expectation of (bici,Ti) over the random choice of
r. Notice that the only elements of 7r that are important in (bici,Ti) are the first
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m elements and the m + i'th and m + e + i'th elements (bi and ci). Therefore, the
expectation of ~(bici, Ti) over the choice of ir is equal to the expectation of (Vm+2vm+l,
{VlVm+l, V2Vm+1,... , VmVm+l, m+2Vm+1}) over the random choice of an ordered list
vI, V2 ,. .. , Vm+2 of m+ 2 different vertices of G. However, in this experiment it is clear
by symmetry that the expected cost share of vivm+l is the same for i = 1,..., m, m+2,
and therefore by the budget balance condition each of these expected cost shares is
at most 1 This, together with Equation 5.4 imply the following.
Es [,(i,S)] <m+ m+s [ sk ) <m + (5.5)
iES
On the other hand, the size of the minimum vertex cover in S is always . Therefore,
the expected value of the ratio of i s (i, S) to C(S) is at most + 1L Thus,
there is a set S for which this ratio is at most e-+ . Taking m = V, we see that
the allocation on S recovers at most a < (2 4- e)IS/3 fraction of the cost. O
We-can show the following positive result for cross-moonotonic cost sharing schemes
for the vertex cover. We 'do not know the right bound for the budget-balance factor
of the vertex cover game.
Theorem 5.2.4 For the vertex cover game, the cost sharing scheme that charges the
edge uv in the set S an amount equal to min(1/degs(u), 1/degs(v)) is cross-monotonic
and 2-budget balanced.
Proof. It is clear that this scheme is cross-monotone. We only need to verify the
budget-balance factor. Consider a set S of n agents (i.e., edges), and the graph G[S]
induced on this set of edges. First, we show that the total cost share of agents in S
is at most the cost of vertex cover for S. Let T C S be an optimal vertex cover of
G[S]. For an edge {u, v} E E(G[S]), u E T or v E T or both of u and v are in T. Let
/u, be I if u and v are both in T; otherwise let 3,,, be 1 or 1 ifdegS(v)+degS(u) deg (u) degs(v)
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u C T or v c T. Then
1 1E min( I) E OU
{u,v)EE(G[S]) degu(u) deg(v) {EE(G[S])
= ITI.
This shows that the sum of cost shares of edges in G[S] is at most the cost of the
minimum vertex cover of S.
Now, we prove that the total cost share of the agents in S is at least times
the cost of a vertex cover for S. Divide the set of vertices into two subsets L and
H, where L is the set vertices of degree less than +/E in G[S] and H is the rest of
vertices (H = V(G) - L). As a vertex cover solution, select H and both endpoints
of all edges (u, v) such that u, v G L. We show that the cost shares of the edges in S
sum to at least a i- fraction of the cost of this solution. First consider any edge e
between vertices in L. The cost share of e is at least 1, thus its cost share covers the
cost of picking both its endpoints. Now consider the vertices in H. Since the degree
of each vertex v G H is greater than or equal to /n, the sum of the cost shares of
the edges adjacent to v is at least 1 V/ = . Each edge is included in at most two
such summations, and thus the sum of the cost shares of edges adjacent to vertices
in H is at least a fraction of the cost of H. Therefore, the sum of the cost shares
of the agents in S is at least i times the cost of the optimal vertex cover for S. OE
5.2.3 The metric facility location game
Given a set of cities, facilities with opening costs, and metric connection costs between
cities and facilities, the facility location problem seeks to open a subset of facilities
and connect each city to a facility in a manner that minimizes the total cost. In
the facility location game, each city is an agent. The cost of a subset of agents is
the cost of the minimum facility location solution for that subset; a cross-monotonic
cost-sharing scheme tries to share this cost among the agents. In this section, we
prove that any cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for facility location is at best
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Figure 5-2: Upper bound for facility location game
½-budget-balanced. This matches the budget-balance factor of the scheme given by
Pal and Tardos [69].
We start by giving an example on which the scheme of Pal and Tardos [69] recovers
only a third of the cost6 . This example will be used as the randomly chosen structure
in our proof.
Lemma 5.2.5 Let I be an instance of the facility location problem consisting of
m + k cities cl,..., cm, C1, ... , c and m facilities fl,..., fm each of opening cost 3.
For every i and j, the connection costs between fi and ci and between fi and cj are
all 1, and other connection costs are obtained by the triangle inequality. See Figure 5-
2(a). Then if m = w(k) and k tends to infinity, the optimal solution for I has cost
3m + o(m).
Proof. Let p be the number of opened facilities in the optimal solution. Then
the facility opening cost of these facilities is 3p, and at least m - p cities among
cl,... , cm should pay at least 3 for the connection cost. Thus, the total cost is
3p + 3(m - p) + p + k = 3m + k + p. Since p > 1, the cost of the optimal solution is
3m + k + 1 which is 3m + o(m) as m = w(k). D]
6 This example also shows that the dual computed by the Jain-Vazirani facility location algo-
rithm [45] can be a factor 3 away from the optimal dual.
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Theorem 5.2.6 Any cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the facility location
game is at most 1/3-budget balanced.
Proof. Consider the following instance of the facility location problem. There are k
sets A 1 ,... , Ak of m cities each, where m = wc(k) and k = w(1). For every subset B
of cities containing exactly one city from each Ai ( B n Ail = 1 for all i), there is a
facility fB with connection cost 1 to each city in B. The remaining connection costs
are defined by extending the metric, i.e., the cost of connecting city i to facility fB
for i X B is 3. The facility opening costs are all 3.
We pick a random set S of cities in the above instance as follows: Pick a random
i from {1,... ,k}, and for every j i, pick a city aj uniformly at random from Aj.
Let T = {aj : j Z i} and S = Ai U T. See Figure 5-2(b) for an example. It is
easy to see that the set S induces an instance of the facility location problem almost
identical to the instance I in Lemma 5.2.5 (the only difference is that here we have
more facilities, but it is easy to see that the only relevant facilities are the ones that
are present in I). Therefore, the cost of the optimal solution on S is 3m + o(mn).
We show that for any cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme (, the average recov-
ered cost over the choice of S is at most m + o(m) and thus conclude that there
is some S whose recovered cost is m + o(m). As in the previous proofs, we start
bounding the expected total cost share by using the linearity of expectations and
cross-monotonicity:
Es [C (c,S)] = E[ (c,)]+ E[Z (aj, S)]
c(S cEAi ji
< E[I((c,{c}UT) + E [E(aj,T)].
cEAi ji
Notice the set T has a facility location solution of cost 3 + k - 1 and thus by the
budget balance condition the second term in the above expression is at most k + 2.
The first term in the above expression can be written as mEs,c [(c, {c} U T)] where
the expectation is over the random choice of S and the random choice of c from Ai.
However, it can be seen easily that this is equivalent to the following random experi-
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ment: From each Aj, pick a city aj uniformly at random. Then pick i from {1,..., k}
uniformly at random and let c = ai and T = {aj : j # i}. From this description it
is clear that the expected value of ((c, {c} U T) is equal to k EJk (aj, al,..., ak}).
This, by the budget balance property and the fact that {al,..., ak} has a solution of
cost k + 3 cannot be more than k3. Therefore,
k+3
Es [ (c, S) ] < ) + (k + 2) = m + o(m), (5.6)
cES
when m = w(k) and k = w(1). Therefore, the expected value of the ratio of recovered
cost to total cost tends to 1/3. [
5.2.4 Other combinatorial optimization problems
In this section we state upper bounds for three other combinatorial optimization
ganies in particular, the ones considered by Deng et al.. [12]). These problems are
maximization problems, therefore instead of cost sharing, we need to design profit
sharing schemes. Definitions of profit sharing schemes and their properties are similar
to the ones for cost sharing schemes (with a > 1 and the direction of all inequalities
reversed).
The first example is the maximum flow game. In the maximum flow game, we
are given a directed graph G(V, E) with a source s and a sink t. Agents are directed
edges of G. Given a subset of edges, S, the profit of S is the size of maximum flow
from s to t on subgraph of G induced on the edges of S. It is known that the core
of maximum flow game is nonempty [12]. The story is different for cross-monotonic
profit sharing schemes.
Theorem 5.2.7 There is no o(n)-budget balanced profit sharing scheme for the max-
imum flow game where n is the number of agents.
Proof. Let G be a graph consisting of three nodes: s, u, and t. There are n - 1 edges
from s to u, and n - 1 edges from u to t. Let Es, and Et denote the set of edges
from s to u and from u to t, respectively. See Figure 5-3. We pick a random set S
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Figure 5-3: The graph G for the maximum flow game
of n agents as follows: With probability 1/2, pick a random edge e from s to u, and
let S = {e} U Et. With probability 1/2, pick a random edge e from u to t, and let
S = {e} U ES. For example the set S could contain the thick edges in Figure 5-3.
Assume is an o(n)-budget balanced cross-monotonic profit-sharing scheme for
RG. If edge e is picked uniformly at random from a set T, we write e - T. We have
that E Es [ZaES (a, S)] is
1 E1E> (ER ,[&a{e} UEt)12 ~-E4
aEEut
±e+Et [E(3(an {e})
1)/2. 2I
The second problem is the problem of packing the maximum number of arborescences
in a digraph. An r-arborescence is a spanning tree rooted at r in which all edges are
directed away from r. In the maximum r-arborescence game, we are given a directed
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graph G(V, E) with a root r. Agents are directed edges of G. Given a subset of
edges, S, the value of S is the maximum number of edge-disjoint r-arborescences
on the subgraph induced by S. One can think of the profit of S as the maximum
bandwidth for broadcasting messages from r to all vertices of the graph. It is known
that the core of this game is nonempty [12].
Theorem 5.2.8 There is no o(n)-budget balanced profit sharing scheme for maxi-
mum r-arborescence game.
The same construction as the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.2.7 gives us a proof
for Theorem 5.2.8.
Finally, we consider the maximum matching game, in which the agents are vertices
of a graph G, and the profit of a subset of vertices S is the size of maximum matching
·in G[S]. One can show that there is a 2-budget balance profit allocation in the core
of this game.
Theorem 5.2.9 There zs no o(n)-budget balanced profit sharing scheme for the maz-
imum matching game.
Proof. We use the same construction that was used in the proof of Theorem 5.2.1.
Let G be a complete bipartite graph with n- 1 vertices in each part (here we use
n - 1 instead of n so that the size of S becomes n), and pick S by picking a random
vertex in G and all vertices in the other part. Using an argument essentially the same
as the one used in the proof of Theorem 5.2.1, the expected total profit share of the
elements of S is at least (n - 1)/2. On the other hand, the profit of S is always one.
Thus, there is an S on which the ratio between the total profit-share and the profit
of S is at least (n - 1)/2. ]
5.3 Group-strategyproof mechanisms
A main motivation behind cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes is that they can
be used to define group-strategyproof mechanisms [62]. In the previous section, we
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proved that every cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme for certain games is poorly
budget balanced. A natural question to ask is whether all group-strategyproof mech-
anisms for these games are so poorly budget balanced. Towards this aim, one might
hope to show that every group-strategyproof mechanism corresponds to a cross-
monotonic cost sharing scheme. In fact, given a group-strategyproof mechanism M,
it is possible to define a corresponding cost-sharing scheme (M by having the agents
in a set S bid a sufficiently large value and others zero, and letting ~M(i, S) be the
payment charged by the mechanism to the agent i in this scenario. Throughout this
section, we refer to the sufficiently large bid value for agent i as ooi. Unfortunately,
this scheme is not necessarily budget-balanced or cross-monotonic. In fact, the follow-
ing simple example shows that for every cost function, there is a group-strategyproof
mechanism recovering all the cost.
Example 1 Single Payment Mechanism: Arbitrarily order the agents from 1 to n.
Then, find the first agent i in this order who.se bid is at least C({i, ... , n}). The set
that will receive the service is Q - {i, .., n}, and the total cost of servicing this set
is paid by the agent i. Other agents pay nothing.
Clearly, the mechanism is truthful (or strategyproof), since in computing the payment
of an agent, the mechanism does not look at the bid of that agent. For the vector
of true bids, let k be the agent that pays C({k,..., n}), thus all agents i < k were
asked to pay C({i,...,n}), but did not afford to pay it. For any agent i < k, i
cannot be in any lying coalition, since i does not have incentive to overbid (as his
happiness may become negative) and if he underbids he does not change the output
of the mechanism. Agent k cannot be in any lying coalition either, since the only
lying strategy for him is to underbid and does not get the service; in this case, the
happiness of other agents may only decrease. No agent i > k can change the output
of the mechanism by lying either. It follows that the above mechanism is group
strategyproof.
Intuitively, the mechanism in Example 1 is neither fair nor efficient. It always
place the burden of the entire service cost on a small subset of agents while servicing
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others for free. Agents who receive the service for free, called free riders, increase the
cost of the solution but do not contribute any payment. We consider constraining
our mechanism to rule out free riders. The main advantage of this restriction is that
the budget-balance factor of a mechanism M without free rider and its derived cost
sharing is the same, since when agents in set S bid ooi and other agents bid 0, the
serviced set is S (because there is no free rider). As the following example shows,
there exist group-strategyproof mechanisms without free rider for cost functions for
which no cross-monotonic cost sharing exists.
Consider the following cost function for 3 bidders: C({1}) = C({2}) = C({3}) =
C({1,2}) = C({1,3}) = C({2,3}) = 1 and C({1,2,3}) = 2. It is not hard to
check that no budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme exists for this
cost function. We will prove that the following mechanism M is group strategyproof
and budget balanced and does not have any free rider. The mechanism M for a bid
vector (bl, b2E b3) is as follows.
1. If bl > 1 then
(a) If min(b2, b3) > then charge (1, , 7),
(b) Else if max(b2, b3) < then charge (1,0, 0),
(c) Else if b2 > b3 then charge (1, , 0),
(d) Else (since b3 > b2 ) charge (1, 0, 2)
2. Else if < b < 1 then
(a) If min(b2, b3) > then charge (, , -),
(b) Else if max(b2, b3) < then charge (0, 0, 0),
(c) Else if b2 > b3 then charge (2, , 0),
(d) Else (since b3 > b2) charge (½, 0, 1).
3. Else if b < then
(a) If min(b2, b3) > 7 then charge (0, , ½),
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(b) Else if b2 > 1 then charge (0, 1,0),
(c) Else if b3 > 1 then charge (0, 0, 1),
(d) Else charge (0, 0, 0).
Table 5.1 depicts the payment vectors of the mechanism M. In this table, bi is the
bid of agent i. In M, we first look at bl, and based on bl, we check the bids of agents
2 and 3. The payment vectors of this mechanism is depicted in the second, third and
fifth columns of Table 5.1. We refer to these three columns as the first, second and
third column of the payment vectors of this table in the following discussion. Since
M has no free rider, if the payment of an agent for a bid vector is zero, it means that
this agent is not served for that bid vector.
if bl > 1oth. b < oth. if bi < 
if min(b2, b3) > 9 7, 9) (0 I) if min(b2, b3) > - (, )
oth. if max(b2, b3) < (1,0, 0) (0, 0,0) oth. if b2 > 1 (0,1,0)
oth. if b2 > b3 2 0)a II oth. if b3 > 1 0, )
oth. if b2 < b3 ,, > ( ,o 0, -) oth. (, ____, )
Table 5.1: The budget-balanced group-strategyproof mechanism without free rider.
Let pi(bl, b2, b3) denote the payment of agent i for the bid vector (bl, b2, b3). Sup-
pose, for contradiction, that (bl, b2, b3) be the true bid vector (willingness to pay)
of players for which there exists a lying coalition. Let S be the lying coalition and
(bl, b2, b3) be the lying bid vector. We first prove that S must include 1. If b1 < 
the cost; sharing for players 2 and 3 in the third column of bid vectors in Table 5.1 is
cross monotonic and the Moulin-Shenker mechanism [62] implies that the mechanism
is group strategyproof. If bl > , players 2 and 3 can only lie and change the payment
to another vector in the same column of the bid vectors in the Table 5.1. The only
way that a player i G {2, 3} can benefit is when bi > and i does not get the service
for true bids. But this does not happen in any of the first two columns of bid vectors
in the table. Therefore 1 E S.
Now, we need to argue that 1 cannot be in any lying coalition either. We consider
two cases:
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Case 1: b < . In this case, the payment of player 1 should be zero, even though
1 b > . This happens only when min(b2,b3 ) > or max(b2 ,b3) < If
max(b2, b3) < , then none of players 2 and 3 gets the service, thus this cannot
be the lying strategy. If min(b2, b3) > , the payments of players 2 and 3 in
the mechanism for bl < and b > is the same. Therefore, players 2 and 3
cannot benefit from this lying coalition.
Case 2: b > 1. In this case, agent i E {2, 3} can only benefit if bi > and i does
not get the service for true bids. But for any bid vector bl > and bi > 2, the
payment of i is 2. Therefore, i cannot strictly benefit from any lying coalition in
which b > . Agent 1 can only bid bl < , if either bl = and pi(b, b, b) = 
or bl = 1 and pl(bl,b 2,b3 ) = 1. But in this case for each i G {2,3}, either
pi(bl,b 2 ,b3 ) = or bi < Therefore, i - 1 cannot strictly benefit from any
lying coalition.
Finally, we need to argue that 1 cannot strictly benefit from any lying coalition.
In order for agent 1 to benefit, b > and pI(b1, b2, b3) . In this case, agent 1
cannot benefit by bidding bl < . Thus, b > . As a result, in order for agent
1 to strictly benefit from the lying coalition min(b2, b3) > or max(b2, b3) <
If min(b2,b3) > 2, the happiness of 2 and 3 in bid vector (bl, b2, b3) is positive
and one can check that in order for player 2 or 3 to change his bid such that
1 strictly benefits, 2 or 3's happiness strictly decreases (since one of them does
not get the service). Therefore, in this case, 2 and 3 cannot be in any lying
coalition. If max(b2, b3) < 1, 1 can only strictly benefit if 2 or 3 bid greater than
or equal to . Again, in order for 2 or 3 to strictly help 1, this player should
pay at least and thus, his happiness will be negative. Thus, 2 or 3 cannot be
in the lying coalition.
It follows that there is no lying coalition for M and thus, M is group strate-
gyproof. The cost sharing scheme derived from M is not cross-monotonic though,
e.g., M (1, {1,2, 3}) > M (1, {1,2}).
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In the mechanism given above, there are scenarios in which an agent does not
receive the service, but would receive service if she increased her bid by any positive
amount, however small. For example, if bl = b2 = , the third bidder gets service
for any bid greater than 1, but not for b3 = In fact, we can show that a cross-2' 2ww
monotonic cost sharing scheme can be derived from any mechanism with no free
riders for which such situations do not occur. More precisely, we call a mechanism
M upper continuous if for every agent i, if i gets the service for every bid value
greater than x holding other bids fixed, then i gets the service if she bids x. Upper
continuity by itself is not difficult to satisfy. In fact, the mechanism in Example 1
is upper continuous. However, we prove that mechanisms satisfying upper continuity
and no-free-rider conditions are as hard as cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes.
To prove this statement, we prove a useful structural lemma (Lemma 5.3.1) on the
cost sharing schemes derived from a group-strategyproof mechanism. We need the
following definition to state this lemma.
Definition 5.3.1 Let ': a x 2 H R+ U {O} be a cost-sharing scheme, S C ;,; and
i E \ S. We say i is good for set S U {i} if for every j G S, (j, S) > (j, S U {i})
and for at least one j a strict inequality holds; i is bad for S U {i} if for every j G S,
~(j, S) < ((j, S U {i}) and for at least one j a strict inequality holds. If for all j E S,
~(j, S) = ((j, S U {i}), we say i is neutral for S U {i}.
Lemma 5.3.1 Let BM be a cost-sharing scheme derived from a group-strategyproof
mechanism M with no free rider. Then for every agent i and set S, i G S, i is either
good, bad, or neutral for S.
Proof. For an agent i, let ooi be a large enough number such that if agent i bids ooi,
he will get the service, independent of other agents' bids. Let S = {1, 2,. .. , k}. It is
enough to show that agent k is good, bad, or neutral for S. Consider the following 3
bid vectors:
1. (001,... , k- , M (k,. . , 0)
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Since the mechanism does not have a free rider, in the first bid vector, set S is served
and in the third bid vector, S - {k} is served. Consider two cases:
Case 1: k is served for bid vector 2. We claim that in this case, k's payment is
equal to (M (k, S). Otherwise k would lie in scenario 1 by announcing ~M (k, S)
as his bid and consequently pay less. We claim that for every j :/ k, .M (j, S) <
M (j, S- {k}). Assume for contradiction that (M (j, S) > (M (j, S- {k}). Then
j can convince k to bid 0 in scenario 2. Agent k's happiness remains the same
(zero) and j pays less, and so {k,j} form a lying coalition, contradicting the
group strategyproofness. Here we used coalitions of size at most 2 in the proof.
Case 2: k is not served for bid vector 2. In this case, we claim that for every
j k, M(j, S) > &2'(j, S - {k}). Assume for contradiction that M(j, S) <
&,l(, -- {k}). Now, j can convince k to bid ook in scenario 2. Agent k's
happiness remnains the same and j pays less, so again {k, j} is a lying coalition
(of size at most 2), contradicting group strategyproofness.
In case 1, k is good or neutral for S by definition and in case 2, k is bad or neutral
by definition. [
Before proving the main theorem, we need to prove the following three lemmas:
Lemma 5.3.2 Consider a group-strategyproof mechanism M without free riders. For
the bid vector B = (bl,..., b), if bi = O for i S and bi > M(i, S) for i S, then
set S is serviced at their cost share, i.e., each i E S pays M(i, S).
Proof. Order the bidders such that S = {1,... , k}. Let ooj be a large enough
number such that ooj > M(i,S) and if agent j bids ooj, he will get the service,
independent of other bids. We will prove by induction that if the first i bidders in S
bid ooi and the rest bid bi, the set S is serviced at the cost share. First notice that
if bj = ooj for all j E S, S gets serviced at the cost share by the definition of the
derived cost sharing ~M. Consider the following bid vectors:
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3. (01, - -, O~-1, 0, 0, - , 
2. (O1, .. .,ooil,bi,bi+l,..., bk,O ,... 0)
By inductive hypothesis, i gets serviced at his cost share M(i, S) for bid vector
1. If he gets serviced at less than his cost share for bid vector 2, when the true bids
are as in scenario 1, i will lie and bid bi. Similarly, if he gets serviced at more than
his cost share for bid vector 2 or does not get the service, when the true bids are as
in scenario 2, i will lie and bid ooi. Since there is no lying coalition, i gets serviced
at his cost share for bid vector 2 and is thus indifferent between scenario 1 and 2.
Therefore, no one can benefit between the two scenarios or else they could form a
lying coalition with bidder i. Since all nonzero bidders get serviced at their cost share
for bid vector 1, they should get the service at their cost share for bid vector 2 as
well. O
Lemma 5.3.3 Consider a group-strategyproof mechanism M with no free riders.
For any bid vector B3 = (bl,..., b,), if the serviced set is S, then payment of i E S is
exactly equal to M (i, S).
Proof. Let Si = {i C Slbi < M (i, S)}. First we prove that all members of S1 should
pay exactly .M (i, S), thus their bid should be equal to M (i, S). Let S2 = S - S1 be
the members of S who bid strictly greater than their cost share in S and S3 = A - S
be the remaining bidders. Let P be a bid vector at which every member i of S1
bids ooi, every member i of S2 bids bi (his bid in B) and all members of S3 bid zero.
From Lemma 5.3.2, in scenario P, set S will get the service at the cost .M(i, S). If
any agent i in SI pays less than M(i, S) (his payment in P) for bid vector B, then
in scenario P, i can form a lying coalition with Sl U S3 and pretend the bid vector
B. As a result nobody in S U S3 pays more and at least agent i pays strictly less
contradicting group strategyproofness.
Now consider agent i S2. If he pays more than M(i, S) for bid vector B, he
would make the lying coalition SI U S3 U {i} in scenario B and pretend the bid vector
7 instead and pay less. Agent i strictly benefits from this lying strategy and no other
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1. (00 1) ... 00i- 100i bjii I... ) bk) 0 ... 0)
agent pays more. Therefore, S1 U S3 U {i} pretending P is a lying coalition for scenario
1 which contradicts group strategyproofness. Therefore, all members of S2 also pay
the same as M (i, S). []
Lemma 5.3.4 Consider a bid vector B' = (b, b,..., b) in a group-strategyproof
mechanism M with no free rider. If the set S gets the service for the bid vector 3'
and i E S is bad for S then b > M (i, S).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that bi = M(i, S). If the true bid of i is bi = b,
the happiness of agent i for bid vector B3' is zero. Since the set S gets the service at
the bid vector B', from Lemma 5.3.3, the payment of agent j C S is ~M (i, S) for bid
vector B'. Consider the bid vector 13 = (bl,..., bn) where bj = ooj for j S- {i};
and bj = 0 otherwise. By the definition of M, the payment of j S - {i} for 13 is
'M(j, S - {j}). Since i is bad for S, M (j, S - {i}) < M (j, S) for all j E S and the
strict, inequality holds at least for one agent t C -S. In addition agent i is indifferent
tetween bid vectors 13 and 1', since in both cases his happiness is zero.
Thus, in scenario .3', all agents can make a lying coalition and pretend 13: nobody
is harmed by this lying strategy and agent t strictly benefits. Therefore, the fact that
i gets service in B' at his cost share contradicts the group strategyproofness of M. l
Using the above lemmas, we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.5 The cost function C has an upper-continuous a-budget-balanced
group-strategyproof mechanism with no free riders if and only if it has an a-budget-
balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme.
Proof. Given an a-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme , the
Moulin-Shenker mechanism M(() gives an a-budget-balanced group-strategyproof
mechanism [62] with upper-continuity and without free riders.
Given an a-budget-balanced group-strategyproof mechanism, the upper continuity
condition implies that all agents get the service at their cost share if all other agents
bid ooi. Therefore, Lemma 5.3.4 implies that there is no bad agent for any set.
Thus, from Lemma 5.3.1 all agents are good or neutral in M. This proves that M
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is cross monotonic. Moreover, the budget-balance factor of (M is the same as the
budget-balance factor of M, since there is no free rider. []
In the proof of Theorem 5.3.5 we do not use coalitions of size greater than 2.
Thus, with the assumptions of no-free-rider and upper-continuity, coalitions of size 2
are as strong as coalitions of arbitrary size. We do not know if this equivalence holds
without these assumptions.
Finally, we consider a strong fairness property called the subsidy-freeness prop-
erty 7 [61]. This condition says that the total charge of the mechanism to all users in a
set S is at most the cost of the set c(S)8 . In the following theorem, we show that the
budget-balanced group-strategyproof mechanisms with this property are equivalent
to the budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes.
Theorem 5.3.6 There exists a budget-balanced group-strategyproof mechanism with
no free rider satisfying the subsidy-freeness property for a cost function C if and only
if this cost function has a budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme.
Proof. The "if" part follows from the Moulin-Shenker mechanism [62]. In order
to prove the "only if" part, we first prove that given a budget-balanced group-
strategyproof mechanism M satisfying subsidyfreeness, there is no bad agent for
any set. Consider agent i who is bad for the set S. Then for any agent j E S - {i},
M (j, S) > M (j, S-{i}),
and strict inequality holds at least for one j. Thus,
E SM(j, S) > E C(kM(i S ),jeS-{i} jcS-{i}
contradicting the subsidy-freeness property. Therefore, all agents are good or neutral
for any set S, and so the cost sharing (M derived from M is cross monotonic. Since
7 This property is considered by Moulin. Also see Devanur et al. [13] for a discussion of strat-
egyproof (but not group-strategyproof) mechanisms satisfying subsidy-freeness for set cover and
facility location problems.
sThis is the same as the core property for each subset S.
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the mechanism has no free rider, the budget-balance factor of the mechanism and the
derived cost sharing is the same. O
We do not know if this theorem holds for budget-balance factors other than 1, and
so the upper bounds for different problems in this chapter only imply that there
is no budget-balanced group-strategyproof mechanism without free rider and with
subsidy-freeness for these problems.
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied upper bounds for the budget-balance factor of cross-
monotonic cost-sharing schemes for a variety of combinatorial optimization games.
Our techniques are quite general and may prove applicable to variety of other inter-
esting games. For example, the facility location game restricted to a tree always has
a budget-balanced cost sharing in the core [32], bulli we do not have a tight lower and,
upper bound for the budget-balance factor of a cross-monotonic cost sharing scheme.
For the facility location on the line, we have the upper bound of 7.9 A more challeng-
ing open question is that of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes for the Steiner tree
game. There are 1/2-budget-balanced scheme for the Steiner tree and Steiner for-
est [49, 50]. Recently, Konemann et. al [51], showed that this budget-balanced factor
is tight for cross-monotone cost-sharing schemes for Steiner tree and Steiner forest.
Their construction is based on the construction of our example for the metric facility
location problem. However, the best known upper bound for the budget-balanced
factor of the core property for both problems is 8/9. Closing the gap between the
known lower and upper bounds (8 and ) for the budget-balanced factor of a cost
sharing in the core for Steiner tree and Steiner forest is an interesting open problem.
A main motivation behind cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes is the develop-
ment of group-strategyproof mechanisms. As mentioned in this thesis, almost any
9 The example is as follows: Consider 3 facilities with opening cost 2 - , and 4 cities. The
connection cost of facility 1 to cities 1 and 2 is 1. The connection cost of facility 2 to cities 2 and 3
is 1. The connection cost of facility 3 to cities 3 and 4 is 1. The other connection costs follow the
triangle inequality.
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cost function (including all those for which we derived upper bounds on cost shar-
ing schemes) has a trivial group-strategyproof mechanism. Several different sets of
axioms, some of which are explored in this thesis, can be added to the mechanisms
to rule out these trivial ones. An interesting open question in this area is to extend
the result of Theorem 5.3.6 and show that a-budget-balanced group-strategy mecha-
nisms with subsidy-freeness are equivalent to a-budget-balanced cross-monotone cost-
sharing schemes.
It is a standard economic result that a strategyproof mechanism can not be
both efficient (i.e., return a solution that maximizes social welfare) and budget-
balanced [34, 75]. It would be interesting to explore the possible budget-balance
factor of group-strategyproof mechanisms that are in some sense close to efficient.
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Chapter 6
Open Problems
In this thesis, we develop several new algorithms and decentralized mechanisms for
different combinatorial optimization problems. In this chapter, we describe the main
open problems corresponding to each chapter of the thesis.
1. The main open problem in Chapter 2 is to close the gap between the known
approximation factor and the inapproximability result of GAP and IBDC. The
best known approximation factor for these problems is 1 - + c for any c > 0
and the only hardness result that is known for these problems is their APX-
hardness. In Chapter 2, we proved that the factor 1 - 1 is almost tight for the
CapDC problem.
Another interesting open problem is to extend the local search or the LP-based
algorithm to the maximization version of the facility location problem with
packing constraints. The facility location problem with packing constraints
can be viewed as the IBDC problem with an extra opening cost for each cache
location and an installation cost for putting each request type in each cache
location. No constant-factor approximation algorithm is known for these prob-
lems. In Chapter 2, we developed constant-factor approximation algorithms for
all variants of the DCP problems and SAP and KMed.
2. The main open questions in Chapter 3 are as follows:
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(a) A strategy profile in a strategic game is a c-approximate Nash equilibrium
if no player can change his strategy and increase his payoff by more than
a factor of c. The first open problem is to find a 2-approximate (or any
constant-factor approximate) Nash equilibrium in the cut game in polyno-
mial time or to prove that finding such an equilibrium is PLS-complete.
The answer to this question may or may not imply a fast or poor conver-
gence of (1 + )-greedy players (see the definition in Chapter 3) to Nash
equilibria. In Chapter 3, we proved fast convergence of (1 + e)-greedy
players to approximate solutions, but not to pure Nash equilibria. The
same set of questions can be asked about basic-utility and market sharing
games.
(b) One open question is to bound the length of best-response walks to pure
Nash equilibria in basic-utility games and market sharing games, or to
prove that a best-response walk to a PSNE may be exponential.
(c) Another open question s the speed of convergence to constant-factor ap-
proximate solutions on polynomial-length random best-response walks in
the market sharing game.
3. In Chapter 4, we developed a model for studying the outcome of a game as
a result of a sequence of selfish behavior of players. Considering other types
of walks in the state graph and studying other types of selfish behavior of
players is an interesting area for future research. We can define the price of
sinking for other types of selfish behavior and prove bounds on the performance
of the outcome of the game by bounding the price of sinking in those models.
Considering the model that we described in Chapter 4, the most interesting open
problem is to bound the price of sinking for different variants of the distributed
caching games (and in particular, the CaplBDC game). Characterizing the set
of sink equilibria for different classes of games, e.g., the CapDC game is another
area for future consideration.
4. Two main open questions related to Chapter 5 are as follows:
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(a) Proving upper bounds or improving lower bounds for the budget-balanced
factor of the "fair" group-strategyproof mechanisms is the most important
open problem of this chapter. In particular, understanding the budget-
balanced factor of the group-strategyproof mechanisms with no free rider
and with the subsidy-freeness property is a challenging open problem.
(b) Another open problem is to close the gap between the lower and upper
bounds of the budget-balanced factor of the cost allocations in the core for
the rooted steiner tree game. The known lower and uppers bounds for this
problem are and , respectively. We conjecture that the right answer is
8
9'
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